Weapons Collection Programmes:
Questions to Answer and Challenges to Face

Presented to the Conference on Possible Alternatives and Ways for the
Collection of Arms in Albania,
Organized by the Albanian Atlantic Association in Tirana, 24-25 October 1998

Sami Faltas, Bonn International Centre for Conversion

1. Introduction

Sometimes, small countries command great attention in world politics. On October 23rd, millions of people all over the world watched Israel and Palestine sign a new interim peace agreement in Washington DC. Albania, also in need of peace and stability, is not at the centre of world politics. However, the international community is-quite rightly, I believe- addressing its problems with growing urgency.

The Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) is an institute for research and consultancy that focuses on the transformation of military to civil activities in six domains. These are government expenditures, research and development, manu-facturing, military bases, personnel and surplus weapons-my speciality. We plan to publish in 1999 a book of studies on weapons collection programmes undertaken after the settlement of a conflict in various parts of the world. One of these, on Eastern Slavonia (Boothby, 1998) has just been published separately, and another, on weapons destruction techniques (De Clerq, forthcoming) will follow soon. The book will also include chapters on Mali, Liberia, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Central African Republic, as well as general conclusions.

Here I will present some of the preliminary findings of such studies, conducted at BICC or elsewhere, recently published or forthcoming. Please bear in mind that this is a new field of studies with a modest body of knowledge and a lot of open questions, both theoretical and empirical. I would also ask those of you who know Albania well to carefully review whatever I have to say in order to judge whether it is relevant to conditions in this country.

1.1 Resistance to Disarmament

It is often difficult to disarm persons and groups not officially authorized to possess weapons. The main reasons for this resistance can be divided into three categories.

1.1.1 A Perceived Need for Instruments of Force

People often believe that they need weapons to obtain benefits or avert dangers by the use or threat of force. Several contributors to this conference, among them Prime Minister Majko, tell us that Albania has a problem concerning public order. The law enforcement agencies cannot guarantee law and order in all parts of the country and therefore do not enjoy the full confidence of the population. Conse-quent-ly, some Albanians are reluctant to give up the means of defending themselves, their families and their communities. Furthermore, the conflict in Kosovo is an obstacle to disarmament in Albania in several ways. Forces in Albania have channelled an unknown, but probably large, part of the arms looted from military depots in 1997 to the Albanian fighters in Kosovo. Besides, the unrest north of the border contributes to the climate of insecurity in Albania. Finally, the pervasiveness of weapons throughout Albania in itself makes people reluctant to be among the first to disarm. So even if we disregard the use of arms for criminal or domestic political purposes, which may be consider-able, it is easy to see why many Albanians under the present circumstances want to keep their options concerning the use of arms open. Whether this subjective 'want' reflects an objective 'need' is, of course, a different matter.

1.1.2. The Attractiveness of Weapons: A Male Problem

Men are often attracted to owning and displaying weapons, as well as carrying them around, talking about them and playing with them, even if they have no need or intention to use them in anger. Traditional and modern cultures often consider the bearing of arms a sign of honour, valour, virility or prestige in a man. In his paper, Professor Luarasi gives us a fascinating account of what he calls the traditional Albanian 'Cult of the Gun' and its relationship to the 'Code of Honour'. He also describes the invocation and misuse of these traditions today. Mr Arian Starova, a former foreign minister of Albania, cautions us not to exaggerate the role of traditional customs in Albania's security problems today. Be that as it may, there is also a modern culture of arms and violence, promulgated by the entertainment industry. All in all, it seems safe to say that to the extent that boys and men, subscribing to old or new values, feel attracted to owning weapons because they believe it enhances their social standing in one way or another, this complicates attempts to disarm the civilian population in Albania or indeed any other part of the world.

I have intentionally referred to men and boys, because around the world, the vast majority of people who are attracted to violence and weaponry are males. Even if some women share this fascination, it is rare for them to indulge in the deliberate misuse of weaponry. For all practical purposes, we can consider this a male vice. Perhaps the fact that most women are impervious, if not hostile, to such cultures of weaponry and violence means that they can make a significant and specific contribution to disarma-ment. Changing a culture, including a culture of arms and violence, almost always involves altering the roles allotted to men and women. Furthermore, as most women dislike weaponry and violence, they are potential advocates of disarmament and peace. Many already perform this function. Finally, as women are frequently the victims of the misuse of weapons, they can speak out against this evil with considerable authority. The difference between the sexes is so striking in these respects that I would venture to suggest that we need more than just the help of women in disarmament efforts. In my opinion, we need their guidance.

1.1.3 The Monetary Value of Weapons

The resistance to disarmament can also stem from the monetary value of the weapons. Since a few guns put together can have a street value equal to several times an average Albanian's monthly income, the owner may be reluctant to give them up without recompense. This obstacle may be the easiest to overcome, namely by substitution. As we shall see, the quid pro quo may consist of money or of another value. It may be offered directly to the persons surrendering arms, or to a community to which they belong.

1.2. The Need for a Comprehensive Approach

Thus disarmament involves tackling an interplay of historical, cultural, political, psychological and economic factors. I will therefore suggest that only a com-prehensive approach stands a good chance of success. We have also seen that disarmament means changing both people's objective behaviour and their subjective perceptions, beliefs and emotions with respect to arms.

An anecdote can illustrate this. During the Seventies in Amsterdam, I would sometimes get impatient with people who complained that it was not safe to walk in the streets after dark. "Try reading a different newspaper," I would suggest, implying that exaggerated press reports of armed robberies had given them a wrong perception of reality. Today I realize that one can only make people feel safer if one takes action to fight and prevent crime in the city's streets and-this is essential- one is seen to be doing so. People draw conclusions and act on the basis of their own perceptions and misperceptions. By the same token, I will suggest that visibility, information, symbolic actions and the role of the media are important factors in the success of weapons collection programmes.

Thinking about the critical factors in such programmes, I came up with a catalogue of questions to be answered and challenges to be faced. This list will serve as the backbone of this paper. I hope you will forgive me if, from now on, I present more questions than I can answer. People responsible for weapons collection in one capacity or another will, I hope, find the catalogue of questions useful as a check-list of issues requiring their attention.

I will discuss six categories of questions :

• Why? Reasons, Goals and Objectives
• What? The Urgency and Feasibility of Collecting Certain Items
• When? Programme Timing
• Who? The Role and Interest of All Parties Involved
• Where? Areas and locations
• How? Consolidating the Results of Disarmament

1.3 Economic Growth, Security and Social Organization

But first, let us dwell briefly on the interplay of societal factors that seem relevant to the success of disarmament programmes. It seems plausible that economic growth, public security and social organization depend on each other.

Economic growth is not possible without a certain level of social organization and a measure of peace and stability in a given society. Indeed, higher levels of economic development require more sophisticated forms of social organization, which in turn need a high level of public security and stability. For its part, peace and stability are hard to maintain if people's incomes are declining sharply and society begins to fall apart. Finally, the fabric of society will probably begin to tear if the economy is in crisis and public order breaks down.

However plausible all this may seem, we need to bear in mind that some of these concepts are not clear enough to be operational. The processes going on between them are not simple or automatic-other factors intervene. Nor are the relationships necessarily linear: an increase at one point of the triangle will not always result in a commensurate increase at the other two. We are not even sure of the causality at work here: we cannot say what exactly causes what under which conditions. Nevertheless, we can probably assume that in general these three variables, or rather groups of variables, go together. They go up together, and they are likely to go down together.

Today, it is becoming a platitude to say that security and development cannot exist without each other. Our triangle (see above) distinguishes the economic aspect (i.e. growth) and the social aspect (i.e. social organization) of development. Perhaps one of the merits of this distinction is to highlight the import-ance of civil society, especially non-governmental and non-profit organizations, to the economy and to public security. It is less commonplace to stress the importance of civil society for security and economic growth. However, interestingly, several speakers at this conference have done just this, and I would add my voice to theirs. Without a healthy develop-ment of voluntary, not-for-profit organizations operating freely under the rule of law, it is hard to imagine a revival of the economy and the re-establishment of law and order in Albania, or indeed any other country. These things cannot be achieved by governments and firms alone.

2. Questions to Be Answered and Challenges to Face

Looking at experiences with weapons collection in other parts of the world and asking ourselves whether they contain useful lessons for Albania, we need to establish to what extent conclusions from case studies can be generalized. Weapons have been collected in peaceful, highly developed societies like the United Kingdom and Australia. The same has been done in societies torn by intrastate conflict, like the Serbian-inhabited Croatian region of Eastern Slavonia and Haiti in the Caribbean. It is in some ways difficult to compare Albania to either of these. In a recent paper, Edward J. Laurance (following a typology developed by Rachel Stohl) placed Albania in a category of its own, characterized by a "stalled transition from authoritarian rule and a centralized economy to democracy and a free market system."(Laurance, 1998, p. 25) I doubt whether we should take this to mean that the Albanian situation is unique in every respect, and therefore lessons learned elsewhere never apply. I will suggest that some of these lessons may be useful in the Albanian context.

2.3 Why? Reasons, Goals and Objectives

It may seem perfectly obvious why a weapons collection programme is launched, namely to take certain weapons away from certain people. Nevertheless, it is important to reflect on the question. I see three kinds of motives behind such programmes: reasons, goals and objectives.

The reason to embark on a weapons collection programme is the event that 'triggered' it. This may be a shocking incident like the wanton shooting of schoolchildren in the Scottish town of Dunblane or the looting of military depots in Albania. It can also be a peace accord like the Dayton Agreement that led, among many other things, to disarmament in Eastern Slavonia. This is usually uncontroversial. In most cases, the goal of weapons collection- the direct result that the programme is supposed to achieve-is not a difficult issue either. In Albania, it is the retrieval by the authorities of as many looted military weapons as possible. However, interests, opin-ions and agendas can vary considerably when it comes to the desired outcome of the project in the longer term, which I would call its objective. Here are some of the complications involved in analysing the objectives of a weapons collection programme.

Various parties may agree to support the programme in pursuit of different objectives. For instance, some may be mainly interested in the disarming of certain groups, whereas others may be motivated especially by the incentives offered in exchange for the weapons. Furthermore, the objectives that actors say they are pursuing may be quite different from they really hope to achieve. Finally, objectives may be directly or indirectly related to weapons collection. The former include curtailing the power of a certain group by disarming it, enhancing law enforcement and reducing arms-related crime and fatalities. Objectives that are not directly linked to collecting weapons may be demonstrating to public opinion at home or abroad that the authorities are living up to their commitments or signalling to the population that progress towards peace is practically possible, even if few weapons are actually being retrieved.

All this makes the question of objectives, or desired outcomes, complex. Never-theless, the parties responsible for arms collection would for several reasons be well advised to make a clear decision, at an early stage, concerning their objectives. First, they are not likely to be successful unless they pursue their objective deliberately and consistently, which means that they need to be fully aware of this desired outcome. Second, it will be impossible to evaluate the success of the project unless its objectives were established at the outset. Third, in a democratic society, the people responsible for such important endeavours should be held accountable by public opinion and, in the case of government agencies, by elected assemblies. This is hardly possible unless they announce at the outset what they hope to achieve in the weapons collection project. To be sure, this may be different from their real motive, as we have seen.

2.4 What? The Urgency and Feasibility of Collecting Certain Items

It is rarely possible to collect all weapons that one would like to retrieve. Bearing this in mind, it is wise to establish priorities or indeed restrict the programme to the retrieval of certain types of weapons, based on what is deemed urgent and feasible.

The authorities responsible for weapons collection are likely to be particularly concerned about the availability of certain kinds of arms in the hands of unauthorized persons. The reasons for this may lie in:

• The lethality or destructiveness of the weapons, in other words the damage they can cause to people, property, the environment or whatever,
• Their perceived proliferation or pervasiveness (how widely they are spread), or
• The perceived danger of unintended or lateral damage, in other words the risk of improper use (e.g. by children) or harm to untargeted people or objects (e.g. people passing by).
  These risks can be weighed in various ways. For instance, hand grenades are less destructive than anti-tank weapons. Nonetheless, the authorities may consider it more urgent to collect them because they are more widely spread and/or because they are more likely to be used inappropriately. On the other hand, the authorities may give higher priority to anti-tank weapons because they fear politically-motivated attacks on government vehicles.
• Whether it is feasible to collect weapons depends, amongst other things, on:
• Traditional and modern values regarding the possession of such arms, · How long such items have been available,
• The insecurity felt by the arms owners,
• The perceived likelihood that law-enforcement agencies will be able and willing to ensure the safety of the arms owners and their communities,
• The rewards that can be offered in exchange for the weapons, and
• The penalties that can be imposed if arms owners do not co-operate.

In this connection, two other issues come to mind. The agencies responsible for weapons collection need to decide to what extent and in what way the programme is to be publicized. In countries like El Salvador and Mali, a highly visible approach was adopted to signal to the population that the war was over and hatchets were being buried. On the other hand, in Guatemala, a deliberate decision was made to give the programme a very low profile in response to the wishes of the fighters who were to relinquish their weapons.

In any weapons collection programme, registration is needed to ascertain the types and numbers retrieved in order to assess the progress and ultimate result of the pro-gramme. It will also help the authorities keep track of the retrieved items, which is important in preventing a new illegal traffic. Finally, it can be a step towards legaliz-ing, regulating and monitoring the civilian possession of certain weapons, either for a limited period of transition, or indefinitely.

2.5 When? Programme Timing

Timing is important for several reasons. There would seem to be two major windows of opportunity for the disarmament of civilians and former combatants:

• Soon after the settlement of an armed conflict, as in Nicaragua, Mali, Eastern Slavonia and other places.
• In peacetime, soon after a shocking incident involving the use of weapons, as in the cases of Scotland and Tasmania that triggered the large-scale collection of weapons in, respectively, the United Kingdom and Australia.
• In both of these situations, there is likely to be a momentum toward disarmament that, once lost, may be very difficult to regain. By the same token, it is extremely difficult to successfully collect weapons during armed conflict and in peacetime, if the populations have long grown accustomed to the availability and wide-spread possession of weapons.

Besides, there are operational considerations that make timing critical:

• Once the populations have found out that weapons are to be collected, collection should start very soon under controlled conditions, because otherwise the prospect of incentives may have undesirable effects. For instance, there may be an influx of additional weapons.
• For these reasons and others, the period in which weapons are collected should be a matter of weeks, rather than months or years.
• There should be a clear deadline, after which holders of illegal weapons will be actively prosecuted and punished.

2.6 Who? The Role and Interest of the Parties Involved

This is the heart of the matter. Let us look at the people expected to give up their weapons, the wider community, and the authorities responsible for the project. First, the arms owners targeted by the project.

Who exactly is expected to give up weapons? This definition is obviously important, because if a decision to disarm some groups and not others is considered unbalanced or unfair, this does not bode well for the success of the project. In fact, it could exacerbate the tensions in society and torpedo the whole endeavour.

Are the targeted groups required, or only invited to disarm? Experience suggests that before and during the period of collection, strong emphasis should be placed on voluntary compliance, positive incentives and freedom from prosecution. However, it seems equally important to make it clear that after this period of amnesty, the laws governing the possession of arms by civilians will be fully and actively enforced. In other words, use the carrot first, and the stick later.

What drove arms owners to acquire and keep the weapons in the first place? The authorities will need to address these motives, as I argued in section 1.1.

What might induce arms owners to give up their weapons? Before we come to carrots and sticks, let us consider other motivating factors. In a general atmosphere of indignation about a violent crime or a climate of reconciliation after a conflict, many people may be happy, indeed eager, to give up the instruments of violence without the prospect of rewards or sanctions. When people realize the risks involved in keeping deadly weapons in or near their homes, this too may motivate them to get rid of their arsenals. Information, education and awareness campaigns have a role to play here. In any event, such campaigns will be needed in order to explain to the public the weapons collection programme, its objectives, and timetable, and the rewards and penalties involved. They will probably be most effective if they are managed by non-governmental organizations trusted by the population.

As to incentives, these consisted of money in the cases of the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Haiti and Eastern Slavonia. The nature of a Buy-Back programme, as the word implies, is to offer a sum of money roughly equivalent to the market value of the items handed in. This is an attractive incentive, but it can have undesirable effects. It may result in inflation and/or the purchase of other, perhaps more modern and powerful arms. Other programmes, in the USA and El Salvador and other places, offered consumer goods like toys, food coupons or concert tickets in exchange for weapons. The value of these was usually below the market value of the weapons handed in and served more as a token reward. Another example of a token reward was the certificate signed by President Doña Violeta Chamorro and given to Nicaraguan ex-combatants when they handed in their weapons. It acknowledged their co-operation and enlisted their aid in the process of national reconciliation. By the reports I have seen, it was appreciated, but I hasten to add that it came with a sum of cash and, in many cases, a small investment fund. Compared with consumer goods and tokens, capital goods and investment funds have the advantage of contributing to the development of income-generating activities (for ex-combatants, former arms owners or others). This directly links two points of our triangle, i.e. economic growth and public security. In Mozambique, people handing in weapons were given farming tools. In Nicaragua and Mali, funds were made available for ex-combatants to engage in micro-enterprise projects.

As I have argued, the authorities will in almost all cases need to actively prosecute and punish those who, having failed to seize the opportunity to hand in illegal weapons, continue to break the laws regulating the possession of arms. This, of course, implies that such laws are in place and understood by the public, that the penalties are a credible deterrent, that the authorities are able and willing to enforce the law and that the judiciary can appropriately deal with offenders.

Turning to the wider community and the responsible authorities, one needs to consider whether, and if so how, schools, churches, trade unions, youth and women's organizations, media, human rights groups, environmental groups, are to be involved in weapons collection. Of course, one also needs to define the role of government agencies, and how they will co-operate with NGOs. More specifically, one might consider:

Who will be in charge of the information and education campaigns? It may be desirable for these to be managed by non-governmental organizations supported by the government.

Will rewards be offered to individuals, or to collectives? Linking disarmament to economic investment and the creation of jobs may be more effective if it is handled collectively than on an individual basis. Brigadier-general (retired) Henny van der Graaf has advocated 'weapons for development' both in Mali (Van der Graaf & Poulton, forthcoming) and during this conference with regard to Albania. He recommends the collective approach for weapons collection in Gramsh and other parts of this country.

How does the programme fit into broader endeavours of non-governmental and community organizations? In Mali, for instance, it was part of a continuing programme, involving government agencies, private industry and NGOs, to promote economic growth, social development and administrative autonomy in the underprivileged North of the country. In El Salvador, it was an element of a broadly-based campaign against crime. In the United States, South Africa, Australia and the United Kingdom, weapons buy-back programmes have been and continue to be closely linked to efforts to combat crime. In Nicaragua and other countries, it was part of a process of national reconciliation.

The following tasks will in most cases be shouldered by government agencies, although NGOs and international organizations may also be involved.

Who will store and guard the collected weapons? Are adequate numbers of well-trained and honest personnel available? Will they have adequate facilities and equipment? · Who will dispose of them? And how? Destruction is the destination favoured by most analysts writing on this subject. It can be carried out by government agencies, private contractors, or even by the owners themselves, under controlled conditions. BICC will soon publish a study on destruction technologies (De Clerq, forthcoming)

To whom, if anyone, will they be transferred? In several cases, the collected weapons were turned over to the armed and police forces of the government concerned. In a few cases, collected weapons were exported, generating revenues, but creating the risk of proliferation and misuse elsewhere.

Who will maintain law and order, thereby creating the sense of public security and stability conducive to disarmament?

Who will monitor and evaluate the programme? It may be desirable to involve independent observers from NGOs and international organizations.

Who will bear the cost of the programme? In many cases, foreign aid will be required. It will probably come with 'strings', i.e. conditions, attached.

Who will prevent a new proliferation of arms? As we shall see in section 2.8, this will almost certainly require a broad coalition of government and private organizations, maybe even involving international parties.

2.7 Where? Areas and Locations

How is the area defined in which arms are to be collected? The same cautionary note applies as with regard to the targeted groups.

How will conditions in surrounding areas affect this? It stands to reason that weapons collection in the North of Albania will be complicated by the conflict in Kosovo.

What are suitable collection sites? This is not just a matter of accessibility and logistics. It is also important to choose locations where arms owners will feel safe. If it is necessary to ensure their anonymity, this imposes certain conditions on the site. Colonel (retired) Besnik Alibali during our conference suggested that some weapons owners have a strong preference for the arms to be collected from their homes. His committee in Durres arranges for this to be done by handing out forms that people can use to report weapons in their possession and request their removal by the authorities. This has resulted in the collection of some weapons on an entirely voluntary basis, without any rewards or penalties involved.(Personal communication, 27 October 1998) It may be wise to offer this option.

Where will the collected weapons be stored?

Where will they be repaired, dismantled, recycled, or destroyed?

2.8 How? Consolidating the Effects of Disarmament

The goal of any weapons collection programme is to give arms a different destination. This raises questions such as:

Will they be handed over to a government agency within the country? In states troubled by domestic conflicts, this may be controversial. In Eastern Slavonia, it took the fear of brutal repression and handsome rewards in Deutschmarks to induce the Serb population of the enclave to hand over their weapons to the Croatian government.(Boothby, 1998)

Will they be sent abroad? As we have seen, this may create new problems elsewhere. Destroying the weapons may be less attractive financially, but preferable for political reasons.

In each of these cases, operational, financial and technical details may be important. Finally, the authorities will need to pay careful attention to the prevention of a new proliferation of arms.

Can the illegal import of arms be prevented by proper border and custom controls?

Can corruption amongst government officials be minimized?

Can a breakdown of law and order be avoided that would give rise to a wide-spread demand for private weapons?

Can peaceful channels for conflict resolution be provided and maintained? Here political freedoms, including the freedom of expression, representation, and the development of civil society seem particularly important.

3. A Few Tentative Conclusions

1. Weapons collection programmes only succeed when they enjoy strong support across the political spectrum

2. They stand a much better chance of success if voluntary organizations are intimately involved in the process, creating an atmosphere of confidence, providing support and creating a situation in which a return to arms in undesirable and unlikely.

3. This process will be greatly enhanced if women play a leading role in it.

4. Media also have a key role to play, providing information, reporting on the progress achieved, providing a forum for debate and replacing the images of insecurity and violence by images of development and disarmament.

5. A subtle mix of rewards and penalties is needed for a weapons programme to succeed. Ultimately, the ownership of arms should not be left to the personal choice of individuals. The state needs to preserve its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. So sanctions against the illegal possession and use of arms are necessary and should be imposed. However, during a weapons collection programme, an amnesty is needed, and the emphasis should be on voluntary compliance and positive incentives.

6. No disarmament is possible without effective law enforcement agencies that enjoy the trust of the population.

7. It is highly desirable to plan and prepare for the evaluation of a weapons collection programme. The first requirement is the clarification of its objectives. An independent and critical evaluation is necessary in order to check whether the resources used have been properly spent, but also because it will enhance the programme's credibility and hence the support it enjoys.

8. In sum, a comprehensive approach to weapons collection, involving measures to bolster public security, promote economic growth and foster the development of civil society is more likely to have successful and durable results than a piecemeal approach.

4. Epilogue: A Note on the Symbolism of Disarmament

I stressed earlier on that people act on the basis of their perceptions. It is not reality, but their perception of it, that influences their behaviour. Bearing this in mind, it is not difficult to appreciate the influence of symbols and images. In closing, I would like to suggest that in a weapons collection programme, like in all fields of human interaction, symbolic actions may have a powerful effect.

In Eastern Slavonia, the commander of UNTAES was the Belgian General Schoups. Soon after assuming this post, he visited the commander of the largest Serb militia in the enclave, saluted him with full military honours, and announced that his orders were to completely disarm the Serb militiamen. The militia commander said that, after having been left in the dark for a long time, he appreciated being informed of the intentions of UNTAES. Next, he asked who would ensure the security of the Serb population when they had been disarmed. "I will," Mr Schoups said gruffly. It would seem that the two commanders established a degree of mutual respect and trust that was beneficial to the success of the programme.(Schoups, 1998).

In Nicaragua, as I noted above, ex-combatants who gave up their weapons were given a certificate in the name of the president of the republic, acknowledging their co-operation, promising them amnesty and informing them that social services provided by NGOs were available for their use. It was a piece of paper that meant next to nothing as far as the tangible benefits it offered were concerned. But most people never receive a letter from their head of state, and I imagine that a guerillero who had been living and fighting in the mountains for a considerable time liked being handed an official document of appreciation from Doña Violeta, who was widely respected in a country torn apart by political conflicts.

In Mali, combatants were given the opportunity to throw their own guns onto a large pyre that was then lit and exploded into what was called the Flamme de la Paix (Flame of Peace). Former rebel leaders held hands with the president and his ministers as the fire light the African sky. It was only a gesture, but one that appealed to the imagination of the population and gave a poor West African country a brief spell of international fame.

5. Bibliography

Boothby, 1998. Derek Boothby. The UNTAES Experience: Weapons Buy-Back in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia). Brief 12. Bonn: BICC, October.

De Clerq, forthcoming. David de Clerq. Small Arms, Light Weapons and Micro-Disarmament: A Survey and Guide to Destruction Methodologies. Report 13. Bonn: BICC. To be published by BICC in Bonn.

Di Chiaro, 1997. Joseph Di Chiaro III. Weapons Collection as an Element of Post-Settlement Peace-Building: General Guidance and Framework for Case Studies. Bonn: BICC. Unpublished draft.

Galtung, 1996. Johan Galtung. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo: PRIO.

Laurance, 1998. Edward J. Laurance. Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action. Washington DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. July. http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/weapons/weaponsframe.htm

Laurance, forthcoming. Edward J. Lawrence. Voluntary Weapons Collection Programs in Central America: El Salvador and Guatemala. To be published by BICC in Bonn during 1999.

Meek, 1998. Sarah Meek. Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes. Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies. ISS Monograph Series No. 22, March.

O'Connor, 1996. Neil M. O'Connor. Buy-Back Programs as an Instrument of Micro-Disarmament: Observations from Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. Monterey, California: Monterey Institute of International Studies. January. Unpublished draft.

Schoups, 1998. Jozef Schoups. 'Collection and/or Destruction of light Arms in Peace-Keeping Operations. Specifically: the Case of Eastern Slavonia, Croatia'. International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development. Brussels, 12 October. Oral Presentation.

Van der Graaf & Poulton, forthcoming. Henny van der Graaf and Robin Poulton. Flames of Peace: Weapons Collection and Disposal as an Element of Post-Settlement Peace-Building-the Case of Mali. To published by BICC in Bonn during 1999.

Sami Faltas
Bonn International Center for Conversion
An der Elisabethkirche 25 53113 Bonn, Germany
Phone: + 49 228 9119635
Fax: + 49 228 241215
E-mail: sfaltas@bigfoot.com
Internet: http://bicc.uni-bonn.de