

3.2.6 OCEANIA/PACIFIC

OVERVIEW

For most states in the region SALW trafficking and misuse are a low priority. Many smaller states have no military forces, and neither the police nor civilians are armed. Nevertheless, the main regional body, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has a reasonable level of declared commitment to tackling SALW proliferation, and there is a regional agreement on SALW.

Within the PIF, the Nadi Framework was produced by the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference and the Oceania Customs Organization in the document *Towards a Common Approach to Weapons Control* of March 2000. In October of that year the PIF approved the development of model legislation to facilitate the implementation of the principles enshrined in the Nadi Framework and in the Honiara Initiative (the 1998 in principle agreement on SALW that began the process of developing the Nadi Framework). In May 2001 the first draft of this legislation was produced, but it remained under review for considerable time.

Urged on by Australia and New Zealand, the Nadi Framework Model Weapons Control Bill was finally endorsed by Pacific leaders at the PIF meeting in August 2003. The Nadi Framework process emphasises harmonisation of regulations and good basic standards therein. Many countries' controls over SALW in the region are outdated, and in many cases are not codified in law but rather are governed by common practice. In the French territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia (Tahiti) and Wallis & Futuna small arms are largely regulated by the legislation of mainland France.⁸⁵ The Model Weapons Control Bill formalises, improves and harmonises standards in the following areas:

- establishes controls over civilian possession, trade, and manufacturing
- establishes registration and licensing systems for possession and trade
- establishes the need for a “genuine reason for possessing and using a weapon” and outlines what such reasons include
- criminalises illicit trafficking
- controls import and export of arms
- contains standards on marking and record keeping and storage for civilian weapons
- deals with border control issues.

Implementation of the model harmonised weapons legislation has thus far been slow, and it appears likely to remain at that pace. This is largely because of the limited urgency associated with changing local laws. Only Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji have amended their laws largely in line with the Model Weapons Law. Papua New Guinea may do so in the near future. While not officially announced, there is some momentum within the region for the PIF to promote regional export controls on small arms.

Most illicit firearms in the Pacific (except those craft manufactured versions) began as legal weapons in the hands of local civilians, the military, and police. In all Pacific nations, domestic leakage of legally imported and legally held guns into illicit hands reportedly greatly exceeds the volume of firearms smuggled into the region.⁸⁶ Thus, the safety and security of weapons stockpiles has been a priority in the region, and much practical progress on tackling SALW within PIF states has focused upon this – largely with the financial and technical assistance of Australia and New Zealand.

⁸⁵ Of all Pacific Islands, these territories have reportedly been the least transparent in their small arms-related policies and have failed to cooperate with independent researchers.

⁸⁶ Alpers, Philip, Twyford, Conor, and Muggah, Robert, “Trouble in Paradise: Small Arms in the Pacific” pp 277 – 307 in *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE OCEANIA/PACIFIC

In order to adequately implement the PoA states should put into place the necessary foundations for co-operation, information exchange, and national co-ordination. Thus 7 states have established an official point of contact (Section II, Para 5) to act as liaison between states. 2 have national co-ordination mechanisms, including officially designated national co-ordination agencies or bodies (Section II, Para 4). Further, none actively involve civil society in their national co-ordination of action on SALW. 2 have developed national strategies, though only one is a formal plan on small arms. Additionally, 5 have submitted at least one report on national implementation to the UN DDA.

Laws and Procedures

The PoA contains a number of commitments by states to have laws and procedures on many key aspects of SALW. In particular, in order to establish effective basic controls over the production and transfer of SALW (Section II, Para 2):

- 16 states have laws and procedures controlling the production of SALW
- 5 states have laws and procedures controlling the export of SALW (though others are covered by less formalised controls)
- 19 states have laws and procedures controlling the import of SALW (Section II, Paras 2, 11, 12)
- 5 states have laws and procedures controlling the transit of SALW (Section II, Paras 2, 12)
- No states have laws and procedures controlling the brokering of SALW (Section II, Para 14).

The scope and stringency of these laws and procedures, and their enforcement, varies considerably. At a national level 2 states have reviewed at least some of their laws and/or procedures controlling international SALW transfers since 2001.

In line with rudimentary commitments in the PoA to criminalise illegal possession, manufacturing, trade and stockpiling of SALW (Section II, Para 3):

- 20 states have laws and procedures criminalising the illicit possession of SALW
- 15 states have laws and procedures criminalising the illicit trade in SALW
- 14 states have laws and procedures criminalising the illicit manufacturing of SALW
- 3 states have laws and procedures criminalising the illicit stockpiling of SALW.

Reflecting the considerable importance attached to such national controls, 4 states have reviewed at least some of their laws and/or procedures over civilian possession of SALW, the domestic SALW trade, and SALW manufacturing since 2001. As with controls over international transfers of SALW, the scope and stringency of these laws and procedures, and their enforcement, varies considerably. However it will become increasingly harmonised through implementation of the Nadi Framework.

Weapons management

Much of the illicit trade in SALW stems from inadequate control over weapons and ammunition stocks. Thus the PoA contains a wide range of commitments relating to weapons management. Of the states in the region:

- 6 have standards and procedures for the management and security of stockpiles (Section II, Para 17)
- 4 of these include regular reviews of stocks (Section II, Para 18)
- 7 states have reviewed or enhanced their standards and procedures for the management and security of stockpiles since 2001.

Further reduction of the stocks potentially available for illicit trafficking is achieved through the disposal of surplus, collected, and confiscated weapons and ammunition. Thus, within the region:

- 2 states have destroyed some surplus stocks since 2001 (Section II, Paras 18 and 19)
- 3 states have destroyed some confiscated, seized, and/or collected SALW since 2001 (Section II, Paras 16, 21).

While not an absolute commitment, the PoA emphasises that destruction should be the main means of SALW and ammunition disposal:

- No states have a policy of destroying most or all surplus weapons and ammunition (Section II, Paras 18 and 19)
- 2 states have a policy of destroying most or all collected and/or confiscated SALW (Section II, Para 16).

Disarmament programmes also reduce the stock of arms and ammunition available for illicit circulation. 4 states have conducted some form of disarmament, including:

- 2 post-conflict DDR programmes (Section II Para 21)
- 1 Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes (Section II, Para 20)
- 4 amnesties (Section II, Para 20)
- 0 forcible disarmament programmes.

In order to enhance the traceability of weapons (and in some cases ammunition) states undertook a range of commitments related to marking, record-keeping, and tracing:

- 1 requires that all SALW are marked as an integral part of their manufacture. (Section II, Para 7)
- 4 have measures to tackle unmarked or inadequately marked weapons (Section II Para 8)
- 7 keep at least some detailed records on holdings and transfers of SALW (Section II, Para 9)
- None appear to actively co-operate in tracing (Section III, Para 11).

International Co-operation and Assistance

The PoA contains a wide range of commitments to assist other states' implementation, and to co-operate with civil society. In the Oceania/Pacific:

- 2 states have provided some form of donor assistance to SALW-related projects
- At least 2 states actively co-operate with civil society.

Civil society

Government co-operation with civil society in the region is limited, though governments have demonstrated some openness and support for further co-operation. In both New Zealand and Australia, government consultation and correspondence with gun lobby groups remains far more frequent than with NGOs supportive of the PoA. New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has invited disarmament-oriented NGOs to only one domestic PoA-related meeting since 2001, while another was mounted by the UN in Wellington (in March 2001). In Auckland, New Zealand Police met once in 2003 with peace, disarmament and gun control groups.

Civil society groups in the region have not tended to prioritise SALW issues, with some notable exceptions. The Catholic development agency, Caritas Australia, and the Australian Campaign Against the Arms Trade have been relatively active, and IANSA member organisations have been active on particular SALW issues in Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA SNAPSHOT: CONSULTATION IN THE REVIEW ON LEGISLATION

Emerging from the aftermath of conflict, Papua New Guinea (PNG) faces high levels of armed crime: 80% of violent crime is believed to involve the use of firearms in PNG.⁸⁷ As part of efforts to tackle such problems Papua New Guinea is in the process of reviewing its SALW controls. This review process, ongoing at the time of writing, has included significant efforts at consultation in a process covering a wide range of SALW issues.

The National Executive Council of Papua New Guinea established a Gun Control Committee to review the state of its current legislation. This process will culminate in a national Gun Summit in June 2005. UNDP has pledged to provide support for this summit.⁸⁸ This summit is expected to examine key SALW issues such as the armoury control procedures for the defence force, the police, and correctional centres; means of international collaboration in limiting illicit trafficking into PNG; and the tightening of the firearms act.⁸⁹ A Gun Control Roadshow was launched by the government in March 2005 in order to consult with communities prior to the Gun Summit.

Additionally, in rural PNG, small arms-related activities are slowly being developed within the country's largest religious organisation, the Catholic Church.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY: REGIONAL CO-OPERATION, CO-ORDINATION, AND ASSISTANCE

Overall implementation of the PoA by Australia and New Zealand is good. Notable elements of recent implementation by the two states include reviews of legislation and policies, such as New Zealand's declared national policy of destruction of all surplus and collected small arms,⁹⁰ and Australia's review of export control legislation which it claims, will address the issue of extra-territorial arms brokering controls. Both states also participate in the Open-Ended Working Group.

In particular both states have tackled the need for co-operation, co-ordination and regional action. While there remains room for improvement, and the two states have laid the foundations for co-operation differently, action in this regard has been notable. Both states have appointed national points of contact. New Zealand is only state in region with an official co-ordination agency: The Small Arms Programme of Action Coordinating Group comprises representatives from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Defence, Police, Justice and Customs, along with the Environmental Risk Management Authority. Although New Zealand's 2004 annual report to UN DDA states that the Group "consults regularly" in recent times such consultations have been ad hoc, with contact made between members only when needed, to achieve immediate aims. The current MFAT officer responsible can neither recall attending, nor being made aware of, any recent meetings of the full Group.

Australia names as its national co-ordination agency on small arms the Australian Police Ministers' Council (APMC). This body, however, does not appear to have discussed any international policy aspects of small arms control, and has only tackled domestic small arms issues on an irregular basis. However,

⁸⁷ <http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20050304/news01.htm>

⁸⁸ <http://www.undp.org.pg/vrpci.html>

⁸⁹ "PNG to Tackle illegal arms trade", *ABC Online* at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200505/s1358860.htm>

⁹⁰ New Zealand National Report 2003.

Australia did develop a national policy framework on small arms prior to the UN Conference in 2001 and this policy framework emphasised the importance of “enhanced regional action” in support of the UN process.⁹¹ The foreign policies of both states are traditionally close and without major tension – including within the small arms field. As the region’s two industrialised states, New Zealand and Australia financially maintain, and strongly support the 16-nation Pacific Islands Forum.

Regional Assistance, Co-operation and Co-ordination⁹²

Australia and New Zealand often seem to work in close concert within the region. Even prior to the PoA both states have reportedly been determined to reduce the flow of arms and ammunition into the region, particularly into troubled areas such as the Solomon Islands and PNG. Thus, both states apply close scrutiny to all applications to export small arms and ammunition to all states, an particularly with regard to those transfers which will impact upon the region.

However, collaboration between Australia and New Zealand is reportedly more due to parallel aims and to coincidence than it is to organisation: Both states national reports emphasise the role of the “Quadrilateral Working Group” meetings in which defence representatives from Australia, New Zealand, France and the United States meet annually to discuss, co-ordinate and reduce duplication in their respective national security assistance programmes for the Pacific Region. However, these “Quadrilat” meetings cover a wide range of issues and sources suggest that discussion of SALW issues is minimal. Further co-ordination between Australia and New Zealand is limited. Reportedly, only one organised event in this field links the two countries: an annual foreign affairs meeting at branch head level whose 12-month agenda must cover the entire range of issues related to disarmament and arms control. Sources indicate that although in appearance the two nations seem to work closely together, common positions are rarely planned and collaboration is almost invariably ad hoc. Consensus and co-ordination largely reflects pre-existing parallel interests.

Bilateral co-ordination appears also to have occurred de facto as a result of secondments of officers in each of the years 2002-2004: a career officer has been seconded from New Zealand’s MFAT in Wellington, to the International Security Division at Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Canberra. All three seconded officers worked in part on small arms issues and automatically kept the two countries close in this area. However, this appears to have been largely fortuitous rather than co-ordination by design.

Capacity

Neither New Zealand nor Australia maintains dedicated budget lines, or personnel, for small arms-related issues. Indeed, in both New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs a single desk officer is tasked with small arms work, accounting for estimated 10% and 20% of their workload. In both Canberra and Wellington, an important additional role of the part-time “small arms contact” is to liaise with, and in a variety of ways to assist, their counterparts in the 14 minimally-resourced member nations of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Neither Australia nor New Zealand report a noticeable increase, nor any lessening of financial commitment to small arms policy matters since the 2001 UN conference. Although internal budget lines are not split, and so no figures are available, it is felt that there may have been a marginal increase in New Zealand’s expenditure, though largely as a result of the new Arms Amendment Bill (No 3) rather than regional assistance.

⁹¹ International Small Arms Issues : An Australian Policy Framework 1999. http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/1999/fa082_99.html

⁹² PoA Section II, Paragraph 26.

In Australia, some years ago DFAT dedicated a AUS\$100 million, ten-year dedicated aid budget, in line with Australia's obligations under the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel landmines. This, however, has not been repeated for PoA implementation or small arms related assistance, and is unlikely to be pursued. Both before and after the 2001 UN conference, all small arms-related projects have been mounted only for the duration of the relevant construction or weapon collection programme. Most of these have now been completed.

Assistance

Australia and New Zealand are the primary providers of donor assistance to small arms projects in the Pacific region. Indeed, while other donors, such as Japan and the EU, express enthusiasm at regional UN seminars, there are no known examples of small arms-related projects that are unrelated to an immediate armed conflict situation which have been funded by outside donor agencies. The UNDP is developing a violence reduction project in the Pacific, focused largely on PNG, but this has no dedicated small arms component. In contrast, assistance from Australia and New Zealand has had wider regional scope.

Broadly, while New Zealand's connections are closest with the eight or nine Pacific Islands Forum nations of Polynesia to the north and east, Australia is much more involved with the Melanesian members of PIF, the most prominent of which are Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The actions of Australia and New Zealand in the provision of assistance in SALW projects have largely reflected these connections, thereby avoiding duplication.

Assistance has particularly, but not exclusively, been related to the regional level commitments within the PoA to "promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in particular physical security measures,"⁹³ and to support disarmament.⁹⁴ Australia and New Zealand have both contributed to the building, rebuilding, and securing of state-run armouries, and the training of those responsible for keeping them secure.

Australia has provided seven new armouries in Papua New Guinea through its Defence Co-operation Programme, in 2002 and 2003. Costing US\$2.3million to build, there have reportedly been no losses from these new secure armouries.⁹⁵ This contrasts strongly with the significant loss of small arms from PNG Defence Force stocks in previous years.

Similarly, both donors have provided assistance to the upgrading of armouries in the Solomon Islands and in Vanuatu and the building of armouries in Samoa. Australia has supported the building of armouries in Fiji, and New Zealand has provided similar support to the Cook Islands and Tonga. Thus, half of all Pacific Island states have received some assistance from either, or both, Australia and New Zealand on this critical element of weapons management. To date, reportedly, none of these new armouries has suffered a loss due to inadequate security measures.

While apparently prioritising the creation and bolstering of secure armouries in the region, both donors have supported wider good practice in weapons management. For instance, the Australian Defence Force has provided expert assistance to PNG military and police to destroy surplus small arms and crime gun, and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which was deployed in July 2003 led by Australia with a significant New Zealander element, collected and destroyed over 3,700 weapons there.

⁹³ PoA Section II paragraph 29.

⁹⁴ PoA Section II, paragraph 30.

⁹⁵ Alpers, Philip, "Gun-running in Papua New Guinea: from arrows to assault weapons in the Southern Highlands", Geneva: Small Arms Survey, forthcoming.

In cases where both donors have actively supported work in a particular Pacific nation or for a particular action, the two donors appear to have co-operated effectively, such as in the RAMSI, the various cases of mutual support for armoury rebuilding in some states, and the donors' joint funding for independent small arms research.⁹⁶

National firearms controls

The Australian buy-back and destruction of well over 700,000 privately owned small arms remains the largest such effort in the world. The country's stringent laws have continued to be refined and improved – both in terms of the letter and enforcement of the law. In the wake of high-profile mass shootings, the federal government used a long-scheduled, semi-annual APMC meeting to broker agreement between attending police ministers to harmonise aspects of domestic firearm legislation across the jurisdictions of the eight states and territories of Australia. Internally, the Australian Crime Commission is developing a national intelligence framework on illicit trafficking in firearms, and various enforcement units have been tasked with targeting illegal handguns. A national system to electronically link the firearm registers in each jurisdiction is currently under construction.

In New Zealand, legislation related to domestic gun ownership is considerably more permissive. New Zealand remains the only PIF nation without universal firearm registration. Though many owners are reportedly asked to voluntarily divulge their holdings of small arms to a firearms licensing officer once a decade, during renewal of their 10-year licence to possess firearms, this is not required by law. Further, there is no requirement for any voluntary list of firearms or markings to be verified, cross-checked or centrally recorded. There remains no system for police or other officials to centrally search weapon descriptions, serial numbers and other distinguishing data for 96% of civilian-held firearms in New Zealand. Despite strong recommendations that universal firearm registration be re-introduced, this move has been explicitly rejected by government. However, some changes have been made to New Zealand's arms regulations. The February 2005 Arms Amendment Bill (No 3) established three new offences, in line with the UN Firearms Protocol and the PoA. These are:

- illicit manufacture of firearms and their parts
- illicit trafficking of firearms, their parts, and ammunition
- the removal or altering of firearm marking without lawful excuse.

Learning points

- ◆ The two states' assistance provided to SALW-related work, has been substantial and significant. It has, however, been largely project oriented rather than part of a wider and co-ordinated regional strategy, and there remains scope for enhanced co-ordination.
- ◆ Assistance focusing upon stockpile management and security has been targeted at priority areas. While these remain a priority, the focus for future action may shift towards implementation of the Model Weapons Regulations agreed under the Nadi Framework. The greater regional focus of these types of SALW activities is likely to require enhanced, and less ad hoc, forms of co-ordination and of co-operation between the two donors.

⁹⁶ Since the 2001 UN conference, four independent small arms-related research projects have been sponsored by Australia and New Zealand. The first was funded from a trust sponsored by the New Zealand Government, while the three most recent studies, to a combined value of more than US\$200,000, were jointly funded from the Foreign Affairs budget of both countries.

FIJI SNAPSHOT: CIVILIAN WEAPONS LAWS AND ILLICIT MANUFACTURING

Fiji has low levels of civilian firearms ownership (estimated at 0.18 arms per 100 population).⁹⁷ It is one of the few Pacific Island states to appoint a national point of contact. Fiji also participated in the various regional SALW meetings and is a signatory to the Nadi framework. Fiji is one of only three Pacific Island states to produce a national report on implementation of the PoA. This report, submitted to the UNDDA in 2004, focused particularly on the adoption of a new Arms and Ammunition Act in 2003.

Fiji is the only state in the region to move towards implementing the model weapons controls agreed within the Nadi Framework. In this regard, the Fijian Arms and Ammunition Act includes controls over: manufacture, possession, use and carriage, dealership, import, transit and export of SALW.

The new act largely focused upon closing minor loopholes in the 1961 Act. It also created some new offences and toughened penalties. In line with regional and global agreements, including the Firearms Protocol, and defined in terms set out in the model Weapons Control Bill of the Nadi Framework, the Arms and Ammunition Act criminalized illicit trafficking and concealment of imported arms as well as those intended for export. In most areas of regulation, however, the new act made very little significant change.

One key issue raised by the new Act, relates to the changes to controls over manufacturing. The 1962 law did not contain an explicit control over manufacturing, but merely required that the commissioner of police must approve the establishment of an arms arsenal. This provision was interpreted by experts as constituting a de facto prohibition upon manufacturing. Part 2 of the new law does include more explicit provisions on manufacturing but effectively loosens rather than tightens this provision by providing for local manufacturing by any one, provided that they are licensed to do so by the Minister. Civil society organisations in Fiji have criticised these provisions as being too permissive. While technically living up to the requirement in the PoA to criminalise illicit manufacture, this case illustrates that the underdeveloped commitments in the PoA on domestic controls can lead to lower levels of control over aspects of the illicit trade in SALW.

Fiji is also undergoing modernisation of its stockpile management and security, with Australian assistance one new armoury is being built, and two more are planned for the near future.

THE SOLOMON ISLANDS SNAPSHOT: DISARMAMENT AND LINKS WITH BROADER INITIATIVES

The Solomon Islands is emerging from a period of violent conflict and instability in which SALW have played a critical and destructive role. In this context, its implementation of the PoA and efforts to tackle SALW-related problems have been substantial. The Solomon Islands have appointed a national point of contact, and reported twice to the UN DDA. The Firearms and Ammunition Act, include controls over production, import, export, and transit; and possession, stockpiling and trade; were last amended in 2000. However, the Solomon Islands government lacks a national co-ordination agency, and there has not been a national level co-ordination effort.

In 2000 the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) ending two years of conflict on the island of Guadalcanal was signed between Guadalcanal and the Malatian Militias on that island. Weapons collection was a key part of the TPA. An International Peace Monitoring Team was deployed to assist the Peace Monitoring Council, particularly in receiving and managing surrendered weapons given in under a weapons amnesty. However, worsening violent instability undermined efforts to consolidate peace in the Solomon Islands.

⁹⁷ Alpers, Philip, and Twyford, Conor, *Small Arms in the Pacific*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 8, (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, March 2003), p 11.

In July 2003, under the auspices of the Pacific Island Forum, the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was deployed to stabilise Honiara. This policing mission was staged by 2,250 personnel provided by ten member states (predominantly by Australia and New Zealand, and small numbers from Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Nauru). This mission rapidly stabilised Honiara and progressively much of the rest of the Solomon Islands.

RAMSI prioritised the collection of illicit SALW. In contrast to two previous weapons amnesties, which had collected mostly old hunting weapons and craft manufactured arms, disarmament during the RAMSI period has been highly successful. Within one month RAMSI had collected an estimated 90 – 95% of total number of weapons believed to be remaining in circulation (over 3,700 weapons and over 300,000 rounds of ammunition) – including many of the high-powered rifles that leaked from state stocks during the unrest.⁹⁸

Among the reasons for the success of this weapons amnesty were stronger penalties after the amnesty period. On 20th August 2003 the Facilitation of International Assistance (Weapons Surrender) notice declared the Solomon Islands a Weapons Surrender Area and required the submission of all weapons.⁹⁹ The possession of weapons was made illegal with penalties including 10 years prison sentence or US\$3,500 fine introduced by RAMSI.¹⁰⁰

It is likely that a range of other SALW initiatives, after the limitations of the first two amnesties, contributed to the success of the RAMSI disarmament. In particular, in 2002, the National Peace Council established a Weapons Free Village Campaign after the limited success of the second weapons amnesty. Weapons Free Village ceremonies have played an important awareness raising role. This program aims to establish 1,200 weapons free villages in the Solomon Islands, and appears to be close to achieving this goal.

Further awareness raising and confidence building has taken place with the disposal of collected weapons through public destruction ceremonies. This has been carried out for the majority of arms collected in all three amnesties.

Awareness raising and demand reduction have been a key part of other related projects in the Solomon Islands. The Ministry of Provincial Government, responsible for the DDR program supported by UNDP and AusAid, NZAid and the EU which sought to demobilise former Special Constables, has conducted “weapons stigmatisation programmes” and mediation and reconciliation activities.¹⁰¹

In the past, the Solomon Islands have had serious stockpile management problems. The majority of the more powerful types of weapons used in the conflict came from government stocks. While the Royal Solomon Islands Police have long had procedures in place for stockpile management, in 2001 an International Peace Monitoring Team audit found severe problems with stockpile management.¹⁰² Thus, the division of the Royal Solomon Islands Police that was previously responsible for stockpile management was disbanded by RAMSI. Australia and New Zealand have since provided assistance to upgrading the physical security of the main armoury in the Solomon Islands.

⁹⁸ http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/solomon/solomons_ramsi_details.cfm

⁹⁹ National Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, Submitted by the Government of the Solomon Islands, June 2003 – June 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Muggah, Robert, “Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea”, Discussion Paper of the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Australian National University Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, p 6.

¹⁰¹ National Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, Submitted by the Government of the Solomon Islands, June 2003 – June 2004.

¹⁰² National Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, Submitted by the Government of the Solomon Islands, Submitted to the BMS July 2003.