William Benson, Saferworld

The Horn and Central Africa are both regions that have suffered disproportionately from the widespread use of arms, in particular, light weapons, many of which were originally manufactured and supplied by EU Member States. The end of the cold war was initially seen by many as an historic opportunity to check the supply of arms to these regions, and to allow scarce resources to be reallocated to economic development and social expenditure. Although a number of governments in the region are exploring ways to reduce military expenditure, most sub-Saharan states remain plagued by political instability (internal and external), shattered economies, and a surplus of weapons, which continue to circulate within the region.

At a first glance, EU Member States appear to have been exercising increased restraint. Recorded arms exports from the EU to the Horn and Central Africa have fallen by over 90%, from $700 million in 1985 to less than $50 million in 1995. However this report argues that such restraint is not sufficient: it does not account for arms that are shipped illicitly to the two regions, nor for arms that are brokered from EU Member States, nor for EU arms exports which are diverted from their legitimate end-user to the regions. Nor will it address the vast quantities of arms and ammunition already in circulation.

The report urges the introduction of a comprehensive and restrictive European Code of Conduct on the arms trade to ensure a co-ordinated policy of restraint over arms exports to regions of tension. It also calls for the implementation of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms that was agreed in June 1997.

Central Africa The Central African countries examined in this report - Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) - have all suffered, or are currently suffering from armed confrontation and ethnic tension. A further problem shared by Central African states is the presence of large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons who have fled from conflicts, notably from Burundi and Rwanda.

The Horn of Africa

All of the countries in the Horn [2]are suffering from the adverse effects of recent or ongoing violent conflicts. Internal conflicts continue in both Somalia and Sudan, and both Eritrea and Ethiopia have suffered from prolonged conflict in the past. Tensions are also rising between Sudan, and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda.

Recognising the tensions and insecurities within the two regions, both the EU and UN have implemented a number of embargoes against states in the region as follows: Rwanda: The UN imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to Rwanda in May 1994. The embargo was lifted in September 1996.

Burundi: The UN has repeatedly declared its readiness to impose a ban on the supply of all arms and related material to Burundi.

Sudan: The UN imposed aircraft sanctions on Sudan in August 1996. EU Member States agreed a full scope arms embargo on Sudan in March 1994.

Somalia: The UN imposed a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia in January 1992.

Zaire: EU Member States imposed an embargo on Zaire on 4th June 1993. The embargo has remained in place against the Democratic Republic of Congo.

A number of licenses have been granted by EU Member States for the export of major conventional weaponry to the Horn and Central Africa since 1990, many of which appear to break the eight Common Criteria on Arms Exports agreed by EU Member States in 1991 and 1992.

Finland and Germany both supplied Eritrea with military transport aircraft in 1994, and Italy licensed the export of jet trainer aircraft in 1996 [3]. This is despite the fact that Eritrea has recently emerged from a prolonged conflict, and is currently in dispute with Sudan.

The UK, from 1993 - 1996, issued arms export licences for the following categories of equipment to countries in the Horn and Central Africa (no figures are available for exports since June 1996, due to a computer breakdown in the Department for Trade and Industry):

• Small arms and ammunition to Burundi, Uganda, Somalia, and Sudan
• Bombs, torpedoes etc. to Rwanda and Somalia
• Ships/submarines to Sudan
• Aircraft (or parts therefore) to Ethiopia and Somalia.

France supplied five shipments of arms to Rwandan Government forces after the imposition of the UN arms embargo, in May and June 1994, according to Human Rights Watch. The shipments allegedly contained artillery, machine guns, assault rifles, and ammunition [4]. The French Consul in Goma justified the shipments as being fulfilment of contracts negotiated prior to the embargo.

France signed a military co-operation accord with Rwanda in July 1976. Military assistance totalled nearly 12 million Francs in 1992 [5] , including ammunition supplies, training for the military, and aerial support. Despite the official suspension of the accord in 1994, nine Rwandan military officers remained in training at French military academies in 1995.

France also signed an accord with Burundi in 1974. Military assistance continued into 1995, whilst Burundi was in the midst of a civil war. Between 1992 and 1994, France supplied the equivalent of US$10 million in military transfers to Burundi, including helicopter gunships, spare parts for aircraft and armoured vehicles, light weapons and artillery, and communication equipment[6].

One of the most significant findings of the report is that the vast bulk of weapons exported to the Horn and Central Africa have not been officially recorded or registered, and have arrived illicitly. In most cases, such transfers have involved light weapons or small arms. The report contains extensive details of alleged illicit transfers (often in contravention of UN or other embargoes). Although this study is by no means exhaustive, the countries most seriously implicated are Belgium, France, and, to a lesser extent, the UK. The following is a summary of the involvement of these countries. Fuller details, and information regarding the involvement of other EU countries, are provided in the full report.

Belgium

Belgian involvement in Africa has tended to be concentrated in Central Africa, especially those countries that formerly made up Belgian Congo - Rwanda and Burundi. Belgian law prohibits the sale of "lethal aid" to countries at war. Consequently, the Belgian government suspended the provision of all arms to Rwanda in 1990, when war broke out. A large proportion of Belgian arms documented in the Horn and Central Africa by various sources are, therefore, likely to have been exported prior to the imposition of embargoes on these countries, or to have arrived illicitly from other sources.

The vast majority of allegations of Belgian involvement in arms transfers relate to brokering by Belgian-based companies or individuals, or to the use of Belgian ports and airports as transit points for illicit shipments of arms. Although the Belgian authorities have made some moves to block the illegal transhipment of arms and military equipment through Belgian ports, Belgium continues to have a reputation as being a 'hub for international arms trafficking' [7] . Networks operating out of Belgium are alleged to have facilitated the delivery of weapons from the former Soviet Union to Africa [8], including Burundi, the Zairean military, and Hutu rebel forces based in Eastern Zaire [9].

• A Belgian entrepreneur is said to have been one of the primary arms procurers for the Burundian government and military, and for Tutsi paramilitary forces. According to Human Rights Watch, his clients in Africa have included President Mobutu of Zaire, UNITA's Jonas Savimbi, and President Buyoya [10].
• Sabena, the Belgian national airline, has also been linked to the transport of arms to Zaire between April and July 1994 by various press reports [11].
• Landmines of Belgian origin were identified in Rwanda by French (and other Western) officials, according to Human Rights Watch. The landmines were traced to a shipment previously sold by Belgium (at an unspecified date) to Libya [12].
• A Belgian company, FN Herstal has been instrumental in building and equipping an ammunition factory in Kenya at a cost of 2.4 billion Bfr. There have been a number of allegations that ammunition from the factory has been supplied to the Great Lakes region, including Interahamwe militia groups in Zaire [13].

France

France has traditionally been deeply involved in the politics of many African countries, particularly the Francophone countries such as Rwanda and the former Zaire. The report details French involvement in the Horn and Central Africa as follows:

• French troops deployed in Rwanda in 1990 provided artillery support for Rwandan infantry troops, according to diplomats on the ground [14]. France also supplied helicopter parts, mortars, and munitions to the former Rwandan Government Forces which French forces kept operational, according to Human Rights Watch [15].
• Rwandan Government forces continued to receive weapons from Zaire via Goma airport (inside the French controlled zone) during the UN authorised "Operation Turquoise" according to interviews conducted with airport staff and crews [16]. Following the defeat of the Rwandan Government forces, French forces handed over confiscated arms to the Zairean authorities, who were, at the time, militarily supporting Rwandan forces [17]. French forces also left behind at least one arms cache in the Rwandan town of Kamembe which contained over 50 assault rifles and several machine guns [18].
• The French national bank, Credit Lyonnais financed an arms shipment from Egypt to Rwanda. The deal, worth $6 million, included mortars, rocket propelled grenades, anti-personnel mines, plastic explosives, AK47s, and was confirmed by Rwanda's Ministry of Defence, James Gasana [19].
• Sudan bought French helicopters in an elaborate deal through intermediaries in Lebanon and the Comoros Islands [20]in 1995, according to Africa Confidential. France also delivered materials and services to the Sudanese security forces [21].
• In April 1996, the Zairean airforce bought three second-hand French "Caravelle" aircraft which were previously in service in Polynesia, according to Africa Confidential. The transaction took place in secret, and was co-ordinated by a Belgian organisation code-named "Eureka" [22].

With the election of a new regime in Paris, it has been announced that France has begun to map out a new policy towards Africa which may result in the modification of defence accords, and reduced military intervention. Many secret clauses regarding military assistance are believed to have been declared null and void [23].

Direct British Government involvement in the Horn and Central Africa has been limited. However, there have been numerous incidences of companies based in the UK, or companies owned or operated by UK nationals, being implicated in the transfer of arms.

• In 1993, expatriate Hawadle Clan members residing in the UK, were known to be collecting money to fund the domestic war effort in Mogadishu, Somalia [24].
• Guerrilla movements in southern Sudan acquired British and French produced arms, with financial help from Egypt and through intermediaries in Uganda and Kenya [25], according to press reports in 1995.
• A British pilot was arrested in the former Zaire, after a plane carrying weapons for the Rwandan army was seized on 25 July 1996 in Goma, Zaire [26].
• In November 1996, documents found in Eastern Zaire implicated Mil-Tec, a firm formerly registered in the Isle of Man, in brokering arms transfers from Israel and Albania to the former Rwandan Government, both before and after the imposition of the UN embargo. Shipments after the embargo included 500 AK47 rifles, 4,000 mortar bombs, 102 rocket launchers, and 750,000 rounds of ammunition.
• Arms manufactured in Britain and France have been seen in use throughout Sudan, but their date of origin and source of supply is unclear [27].

The report also examines the role that the EU, and EU Member States have played in reducing the flows of weapons in conflict-prone regions, or in taking weapons out of circulation. Examples of such measures include support for the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, support for building the capacity of customs and border officials, and other initiatives, such as gun buy-back or exchange programmes. The report shows that whilst the EU and some Member States are financing such initiatives in the region, other Member States are simultaneously exporting arms to the countries concerned.

The EU, and EU Member States have, for example, been involved in large scale demobilisation and reintegration programmes in a number of countries, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The EU has provided £13.5 million for a short term recovery programme in Eritrea, as well as £365,000 for the rehabilitation and reintegration of 100,000 ex-fighters. Additional funding has come from Member States including Germany and Italy [28]. Yet despite this, Italy, Germany, and Finland have all exported military aircraft to Eritrea.

Similarly, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria contributed towards the £22.5 million provided by external donors towards the demobilisation programmes in Uganda. However, whilst the EU was involved in these assistance programmes, some countries, including Britain, continued to export arms to Uganda.

If countries in the Horn and Central Africa are to have any chance of realising sustainable economic and social development, they must first tackle the proliferation of arms. Whilst such weapons remain in circulation, the potential for conflicts erupting or resuming will remain. In this respect, EU Member States have a vital role to play in both limiting the supply, and helping reduce the demand for weapons. Recommendations for possible action are summarised below.

Introduce a comprehensive and restrictive EU Code of Conduct

All of the countries examined in the report are either emerging from, or experiencing conflict. This has been recognised by the international community, and embargoes have been put in place against Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Zaire. However, when exports are subject to national discretion, the report has shown considerable discrepancies in export controls throughout the EU. Member States should therefore ensure that controls are co-ordinated within a uniform policy of restraint and responsibility based on a restrictive Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. Such a Code is essential to prevent arms being exported to regions of tension, and to ensure that development aid granted by one Member State is not undermined by another Member State exporting arms to the country in question.

Britain is seeking agreement on an EU Code of Conduct during it's Presidency of the EU. However, this report shows, that for a Code of Conduct to be effective, it must be wide-ranging, and include a common system of end-use controls to prevent arms being diverted, and controls on all arms deals that are brokered by EU residents or nationals.

End-use certification provisions and monitoring procedures vary widely across the EU. Many current national requirements are weak, and do little to prevent arms being re-exported, or used for proscribed purposes. For example, arms exported to Saudi Arabia and Libya have allegedly been re-exported to Rwanda. With increased cross-border collaboration, and intra-European trade, EU end-use requirements will only be as strong as their weakest link. Member States should therefore seek to establish best-practice, and implement common end-use procedures. They should also exchange information on sensitive end-users, and develop systems for verifying and monitoring end-use through diplomatic missions on the ground.

A rigorous system of parliamentary accountability should be agreed and adopted in conjunction with the EU Code. At the present time, there are significant discrepancies amongst EU Member States in terms of transparency measures, and provisions for parliamentary scrutiny, over their arms export policy and practice. Member States should adopt a common rigorous system of parliamentary scrutiny over arms transfers, including the publication of an annual report, prior notification of military exports to parliament, and the annual publication of a comprehensive EU Register of military exports. Increased transparency should be promoted within other regimes, such as the UN register.

The brokering of arms sales from third countries has also been shown to be a major loophole in EU control systems which requires urgent attention. It is essential to ensure that individuals engaged in this type of activity are brought within the law. All proposed transactions involving brokering agents should be subject to the licensed approval of national governments. A number of EU Governments - Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands - have already done this (to varying degrees). Belgium is seeking to introduce similar legislation, following allegations of brokers operating out of Belgian ports and airports.

A committee established in the UK, following the Mil-Tec scandal concluded that there is no scope under UK legislation for controlling arms trafficking and brokering. This point has still not been addressed, and brokers based in the UK are still able to operate outside of UK arms export control laws.

Implement the EU Programme to combat illicit trafficking

A further area where there is scope for co-ordinated EU action is in combating the illicit trafficking of arms. The report shows that the majority of arms supplied to the countries in the Horn and Central Africa (particularly in the case of embargoed destinations) are supplied illicitly by a network of dealers and traffickers.

EU Member States agreed a Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms in June 1997. The report argues that because national systems for identifying or registering arms and ammunition are inconsistent, and often inadequate, a common EU system of registering and tagging arms should be implemented to ensure that arms found in proscribed destinations can be traced to their source. Such a system should be complemented by a database to allow easy access and exchange of information between national authorities.

Under the programme, EU Member States should also ensure that surplus weapon stocks are destroyed, and not exported or sold (as is common) to sensitive destinations or to unscrupulous end-users raising the possibility that these weapons might be re-exported to prohibited destinations, or regions of tension. The EU should also assist (both with funding and expertise) in the destruction of weapons in developing countries. There have been many examples of weapons collected during disarmament programmes 'leaking' back into civilian society due to inadequate security controls. The best way to prevent such leakage is to destroy the weapons. Such initiatives can also play a symbolic role in disarmament programmes as was the case in Mali, where collected weapons were destroyed in a 'Flame of Peace'. The destruction of weapons should be built into demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Tackling the root causes of conflict

Whilst the primary responsibility for addressing issues of national and regional insecurity must rest with the countries in question, the EU (and EU Member States) have a responsibility to provide assistance in such matters when required and requested. Development assistance focusing on poverty eradication, growth with equity, reducing marginalisation, promoting responsive and accountable government, and the rule of law, could have an impact on reducing the risks of violent conflict [29].

Support for Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes (DRPs)

DRPs represent a valuable opportunity to remove weapons from society, and to reintegrate combatants into civil society. The international community (including the EU) has increasingly become aware of the benefits of DRPs, and has contributed to a number of programmes in the Horn and Central Africa through the UNDP and the World Bank. However, such experiences have also highlighted a number of shortcomings, namely lack of adequate (and timely) funding, lack of prior planning, and a failure to see the entire reintegration process through. The EU (and EU Member States) should seek to address these problems and establish of a group of experts, familiar with the DRP process who would be able to assist in the planning and implementation of such programmes.

Destruction of surplus weapons

Wherever possible, the EU and EU Member States should assist (both with funding and expertise) in the destruction of surplus weapons. There have been many example of weapons collected during disarmament programmes 'leaking' back into civilian society due to inadequate security controls. The best way to prevent such leakage is to destroy the weapons. Such initiatives can also play a symbolic role in disarmament programmes as was the case in Mali, where collected weapons were destroyed in a 'Flame of Peace'. The destruction of weapons should be built into demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Capacity building

A failure to address the security situation can result in a 'spiral of violence', and a culture of gun ownership. As long as insecurity and violence abound, individuals will be reluctant to surrender any arms they hold, as they may well represent a means to food and income, as well as security. The EU thus has a valuable role to play (with training and expertise) in assisting states in the Horn and Central Africa in restricting the flow of arms between and within regions of tension. The EU, and EU Member States should therefore use a proportion of development assistance to build the capacity of police and customs/border authorities, and to provide support for judicial and legal systems in order to strengthen security and limit the illegal flows of arms. It is vital that any such programmes should also include human rights training, and that the programmes are contingent upon police and security forces complying with agreed international conventions on human rights and police conduct. Capacity building programmes should also aim to provide support for existing regional and sub-regional bodies concerned with tackling illicit arms flows.

Microdisarmament measures

Finally, EU Member States have a valuable role to play in sponsoring other initiatives aimed at reducing the levels of light weapons in circulation within regions of conflict. Measures could include support for buy-back or exchange schemes, and the collection of weapons through peacekeeping operations. The EU should also provide assistance, where required, in verifying the secure collection and destruction of arms gathered through such schemes, in order to prevent them 'leaking' back into society.

1. For the purposes of this report, the countries being examined in the Horn of Africa are Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, and in Central Africa: Burundi, Rwanda Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire).

2. Definitions of the country composition of African regions vary. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development, comprises Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya.

3. SIPRI Yearbooks 1990-1997.

4. Rearming with impunity, ibid, HRW, May 1995.

5. La compasion no basta, Vicens Fisas, Barcelona, May 1995.

6. Burundi: Stoking the fires, Human Rights Watch, p.55.

7. Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi, HRW, December 1997.

8. Arms for Rwanda - Blood Money, and Geopolitics, Frank Smyth, The Nation, May 2nd 1994.

9. From an interview with an arms trafficker, Brussels, August 2, 1996, Quoted in Burundi: ibid., HRW.

10. Burundi, ibid., HRW, December 1997

11. Le Matin, 26/11/96, The name "Sabena" appeared on a document recovered from the camps close to Sahe (West Zaire), a former administrative centre of the militias.

12. Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, HRW, p.30. Belgian officials have strongly denied such allegations. The Foreign Ministry has said that no weapons have been sold to Libya since the imposition of UN arms embargo against Libya.

13. Source: radio Rwanda, Kigali, in French 1800 GMT, 9th November 1996.

14. Peace Courier - 6/7/94.

15. Arming Rwanda, ibid., HRW, January 1994.

16. Arming Rwanda, ibid., HRW, January 1994.

17. Interview with United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda officials, quoted in HRW, Rearming with Impunity.

18. Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, HRW, May 1995

19. HRW, Arming Rwanda.

20. Africa Confidential, 12th May 1995.

21. Conflicts in Africa - An analysis of Crises and crisis prevention measures, GRIP, 1996, p.115. According to Africa Confidential, (4th February 1994 & 29th July 1994) a number of Sudanese intelligence officers are known to have visited Paris, including two senior army officers who were amongst the official spectators at a military parade in 1994.

22. Burundi: Stoking the fires, Human Rights Watch; Also reported in Africa Confidential.

23. Jane's Defence Weekly, 9th July 1997.

24. The US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).

25. Jane's Defence Weekly of 09/05/92, Jan Gruiters, The French Connection, Pax Christi, 1994; Africa Confidential, 29/07/94, 16/12/94, 03/03/95 and 12/05/95, reported in Conflicts in Africa, ibid.

26. Amnesty International.

27. Africa Confidential 3rd February 1995.

28. In May 1995, Italy committed $58,000 for demobilisation programmes. Germany has contributed towards refugee rehabilitation and private sector development. The German government views the export of transport aircraft as aid.

29. Further details on tackling the root causes of violent conflict are provided in Partnership 2000: The Future of EU-ACP Relations and Conflict Prevention, Saferworld and Oxfam, September 1997.