Edward J. Laurance Monterey Institute of International Studies
Presented to the Conference on Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons
Washington, D.C., December 1997

In February 1994 the American Academy of Arts and Sciences hosted a conference on The International Trade in Light Weapons. At the time, and certainly in retrospect, this conference was viewed as the start of a new effort to deal with a new phenomenon of the post-cold war era. Namely, the proliferation and accumulation of small arms and light weapons, with negative effects, levels, and modes of acquisition which were very different from those which had shaped policy during the Cold War. Nearly four years later, a great deal has been accomplished and the way forward is more clear. This paper summarizes what is known, what has been done in the way of action, and the way forward.

WHAT IS KNOWN

Since the results of the four years of research and experience is being covered in Michael Klareís presentation, only a very brief description will be given here. It needs to be part of this summary of actions taken, since much of what must be done in the future must reinforce what has been learned to date. For example, the negative effects and modes of acquisition have become clear but continuous research and documentation will be required to buttress policy decisions. In a sense these clusters of knowledge are the building blocks upon which to take action.

Academic research, the work of NGOs and the various actions described below have produced six clusters of knowledge upon which to base policy action.

1. The globe is now dominated by intra-state or internal conflict, prosecuted by criminals, terrorists, and irregular militia and armed bands who indiscriminately and unlawfully use small arms and light weapons.

2. The causes, effects and solutions related to these conflicts are international in nature, requiring a multilateral response.

3. There is no longer any doubt as to the increased availability of the small arms and light weapons used in these conflicts, and the causes of such availability. Both supply and demand factors or causes must be considered, alternatively calling for better governance, arms control and security in the state experiencing the problem, and/or for more controls by those states from which the arms originate.

4. A consensus is also emerging on the types of weapons involved in these conflicts. They are typically smaller, weigh less, cost less, are more portable, and less visible than major conventional weapons. Except for ammunition, weapons in this class do not require an extensive logistical and maintenance capability, and are capable of being carried by an individual combatant, pack animal or by a light vehicle. Some of the more prevalent weapons include assault rifles, hand grenades, rocket launchers, land mines and explosives.

5. The modes of acquisition of this class of weapon differ from the superpower-dominated arms supply system of the Cold War. Much of the supply and acquisition of small arms and light weapons is legal. But there has been a relative rise in illicit or illegal trade. There are at least three types of illicit acquisition that are identified and the verified in most areas of intra-state conflict - covert or secret transfer of arms to a government or non-state actor from another government, the black market, and illicit in-country circulation.

6. The negative effects from the indiscriminate and unlawful use of these weapons has also become painfully clear.

* Ninety percent of the casualties from these weapons are civilians,

* Crime committed with these weapons increases in frequency and lethality.

* Economic, social and political development is disrupted by the presence and misuse of these weapons.

* Conflicts are more readily resolved by force of arms.

* There is a spiral of insecurity as citizens arm themselves against these effects. * States experiencing these effects must expend scarce resources for increased security and health services.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEGUN TO ACT

Several years ago, when the academic and NGO community began to document these problems, the result was a series of debates about the topics just discussed- types of weapons, causes, effects, etc. While further research and study will continue to inform and shape policy action, an array of actions has already begun to coalesce around the issue of small arms and light weapons as a primary factor in preventing and reducing the armed conflict that have increasingly disrupted human development programs. These actions are the evidence that much of the knowledge regarding the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is real and being acted on, that resources are being allocated based on this reality.

The United Nations

The United Nations is turning its attention to the problems stemming from the proliferation of light weapons and their use in conflicts. The following is a brief chronicle of actions taken or underway:

- Peace operations The combatants in these conflicts employed mainly small arms and light weapons, and United Nations peace forces and the civilian populations in these conflict areas have been increasingly subjected to their negative effects. Due to these negative effects, these peace operations now routinely involve weapons collection, disarmament, and destruction.

- The Mali mission In October 1993 Mali requested the Secretary-General to assist in the collection of light weapons proliferating in that country. The requested assistance was provided in the form of an Advisory Mission in August 1994, which issued its report to the Secretary-General in November 1994. In February/March 1995 the same advisory mission visited Burkino Faso, Chad, Cote díIvoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The result has been a relatively successful turn-in and collection of weapons, as part of the successful resolution of the conflict between Mali and the Tuareg minority, as well as a demonstration of how disarmament and human development are linked.

- Secretary General In January 1995, the Secretary-General reviewed the experience of the past three years and issued a Supplement to the Agenda for Peace. After reviewing the progress made in weapons of mass destruction, he called for "parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons." He introduced the concept of micro-disarmament, referring to the light weapons actually being used in the conflicts with which the UN is dealing, those "that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands." The new Secretary General has continued to highlight the need for action in the area of small arms and light weapons.

- Great Lakes Commission of Inquiry In resolution 1013 of 7 September 1995 the Security Council authorized an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations that former Rwandan government forces were being supplied with arms in violation of a previous Council-imposed arms embargo. The Commission confirmed these allegations and concluded that much more could and should be done to stem the flow of weapons in this region.

- Guidelines-Illicit Trade On 6 December 1991 the General Assembly adopted resolution 46/36H on international arms transfers, with particular emphasis on the illicit arms trade. On 3 May 1996 the United Nations Disarmament Commission, after three years of deliberation, adopted a consensus set of "Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991."

- Panel of Experts on Small Arms On 12 December 1995, as part of a continuing effort to address the increasing problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 50/70B entitled "Small Arms." This resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel of qualified governmental experts, on: " (a) the types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations; (b) the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade; and (c) the ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict." The Panel submitted its report to the Secretary -General in September 1997, and some of its recommendations are included later in this paper.

- Follow-on action to the UN Small Arms Panel During the fall 1997 General Assembly, Japan promoted a resolution that calls for an ammunition study, and Member State views on the feasibility of having a global conference in 1999. Germany also promoted a resolution that asks states, with the support of the Secretary General, to conduct pilot projects that will demonstrate the feasibility of linking disarmament and development in a practical manner.

- Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice In May 1997 this Commission, a component of the U.N. Economic and Social Council and based in Vienna, passed a resolution on firearm regulation for the purpose of crime prevention and public health and safety. It was based on information provided by an Experts Group headed by a firearms expert from the Canadian Department of Justice. Fifty governments voluntarily responded to a survey which covered issues related to firearms, including legislation, regulation, use, trade and manufacturing, trafficking, policy and public education initiatives. Although its focus was on crime from a domestic perspective, it uncovered and documented much evidence that points to small arms and light weapons as an international problem. The resolution also encouraged Member States to consider specific regulatory approaches. The work of the Commission continues as Member States may still complete the survey, and regional workshops are being held in Slovenia, Tanzania, Brazil and India.

- Anti-personnel mine campaign and treaty The success of the campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines, especially the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, has demonstrated that a weapons-specific focus can galvanize public and governmental support to alleviate human suffering. Canadaís Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, one of the prime movers behind the campaign, is now openly asking the coalition of middle powers, peace groups and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations that made the land mines treaty possible to take on the problem of the proliferation of small arms.

The World Bank

The World Bank is in the process of setting up a small section on post-conflict reconstruction. This office will deal with issues such as demobilization of soldiers, and their reintegration into society, as well as the collection and destruction of weapons surplus to the security needs of the governments and societies involved. The office will bring together those parts of the World Bank who are already involved in this aspect of post-conflict reconstruction.

Regional efforts

- West Africa A conference on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament, and Development in West Africa was convened in Bamako from November 25-29, 1996. Delegations from 12 West African countries searched for a common position on possibilities for future regional cooperation. The idea of a moratorium on the importing, exporting, and manufacturing of light arms was the subject of particular interest throughout the conference. Delegates agreed to submit the idea to their respective governments. The government of Norway is working with Mali and her neighbors to operationalize this moratorium.

- Southern Africa The Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) organization has established an Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). At a recent meeting of its Public Security Sub-Committee, it recognized that "firearms and drug trafficking cause the most serious threat to communities in the region, particularly the smuggling of firearms...." The Committee went on to recommend computerized registration of firearms, a regional data for all stolen firearms, and special operations where illegal firearms could be retrieved.

- Latin America The OAS has begun to address the problem of arms and conflict from two different perspectives. First, the Inter-American Drug Abuse and Control Commission of the OAS is developing model regulations for the control of the smuggling of weapons and explosives and its linkage to drug trafficking in the Inter-American region. A second OAS initiative is the development of a Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, signed in November 1997. The Convention requires each OAS state to establish a national firearms control system and a register of manufacturers, traders, importers and exporters of these commodities. It also calls for the establishment of a national body to interact with other states and an OAS advisory committee. It also calls for the standardization of national laws and procedures within the OAS, and ensuring effective control of borders and ports.

- European Union In June 1997 the European Union agreed to an EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. Citing the importance of the issue and the several actions already taken by the United Nations, the EU Member States vowed to strengthen their collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of arms, particularly of small arms, within the EU. Further they called for concerted action to assist other countries in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of arms. Specifically they recommended focusing on strengthening laws, training police and customs officials to enforce export laws, setting up regional points of contact to report trafficking, setting up national commissions, preventing corruption, and promoting regional cooperation and the use of data bases. The EU also agreed to suppress such trafficking as part of United Nations peace operations, set up weapons collection, buy back and destruction programs, set up educational programs to promote awareness of the negative consequences of such trafficking, and promote the integration of former combatants into civilian life.

OECD

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently addressed for the first time the linkage between armed conflict and its effect on development. Its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) formed a Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, whose two years of work culminated in a draft policy statement by ministers and heads of agencies in May 1997. While the OECD report emphasized that conflict prevention activities will have the most effect if targeted at the root causes of conflict, at each phase of conflict the issue of weapons accumulations were addressed. Key OECD findings include:

* In situations of submerged tensions, "visible actions to address root causes of unrest, based on suitable early warning, analysis of information, and the rapid flow of signals, are vitally important. Activities could be aimed at .....limiting the flow and diffusion of arms, especially light weapons...."

* "Where crisis conditions in society become manifest (as evidenced by, for example, social unrest, armed opposition, mass demonstrations etc.), timely prevention measures must be considered and rapidly implemented....At this stage, it becomes particularly important to monitor and prevent the stockpiling of arms by the conflicting parties..."

* In fragile periods of transition and during the post-conflict phase, disarmament, demobilization and mine clearance are important.

NGOs

In the NGO world, several efforts are underway directly focusing on the linkage between the accumulation and availability of small arms and light weapons, and armed violence. And there is also a significant literature developing around the problems associated with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Both the academic and NGO activity is focused on several important functions. First, an epistemic community is being developed around the issue of small arms, light weapons and micro-disarmament. This includes the use of the Internet, the exchange of papers and documents, workshops and conferences, and the publication of several major books on the subject. Second, information from public sources on types of light weapons is being published. Third, national capabilities to produce such weapons are becoming transparent, to include rudimentary information on their export. Fourth, case studies are being written by regional specialists who have witnessed directly the impact of small arms and light weapons on conflict. These case studies are particularly useful as a source of answers to three critical questions; 1) What are the negative consequences of excessive accumulations of these weapons?; 2) What are the modes of acquisition?; and 3) What are the various policies being developed to deal with these consequences?

A few NGOs are actually conducting programs to directly alleviate negative effects. A church-based group in Mozambique conducts a weapons collection and destruction program. In El Salvador a group of business-persons, in conjunction with the Rotary Club and the Catholic Church, have joined forces with the government to implement an on-going weapons turn-in and destruction effort. The Institute for Security Studies in South Africa is conducting a project which has selected one specific locale, is identifying the negative effects from the presence and misuse of weapons, and is developing a strategy for a solution.

In July 1997 the Conference on Light Weapons and Peacebuilding in Central and East Africa was held in Capetown. It was co-sponsored by the NGO International Alert and the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Capetown, and took the effort to tackle the problems of light weapons to the next level. First, the participants were a mix of NGOs from the region, international NGOs, academics, representatives from international organizations, and most importantly representatives from governments of the region. Second, the format allowed enough interaction so that proposed solutions by non-governmental participants and international organizations were forced to stand the test of challenges by the states in the region who are embroiled in the conflicts which utilize these weapons. The result was a realistic survey of the problem, and practical recommendations as to what can be done in the short and long term.

NEXT STEPS

Early Warning- Can it be applied to weapons flows and buildups?

How might the early warning process be adapted to detecting arms flows and accumulations? How would it differ from the experience to date in the humanitarian area? Some of the differences create obstacles that donít exist in early warning associated with humanitarian affairs. First, humanitarian practitioners have learned first-hand how sensitive governments are to the revelation of human rights abuses associated with armed conflict. The topic of arms accumulations and flows is even more sensitive, especially since every state has the sovereign right to acquire arms to defend itself. The line between defense and offense, even genocide, can be very thin, as was seen in Rwanda.

Second, even with governmental cooperation, tracking arms buildups is made difficult due to the small size and low price of the weapons, as well as the lack of transparency associated with their transfer and accumulation. Since much of the trade is illicit, and often associated with illicit trade in drugs and other commodities, gatherers may well find that delving into this type of information will be very dangerous. Third, the nature of the behavior being uncovered and reported may present problems to the type of gatherer normally associated with current early warning efforts. For example, there is a difference in the lethality and hence the potential for destabilization in ordinary hunting or single shot rifles and assault rifles, let alone stand-off and impersonal weapons such as mortars and rockets. Some effort will have to be made to develop some military expertise among the gatherers normally found in conflict zones.

But overcoming these obstacles seems worth the efforts, since monitoring and reporting arms buildups has great potential to assist in predicting the human suffering endemic to these conflicts. It could theoretically allow the policymakers to intercede in the buildup of tools of violence. There is agreement among practitioners in conflict prevention that the emphasis should be on operational indicators of violence potential. The tools of violence would seem very ripe for such an effort, especially since it is known that perpetrators of violence always precede their efforts with an arms buildup. And in most cases these buildups take enough time to allow for an early warning process to work.

And the experience of the UN in the worst case, the Great Lakes region in Africa, indicates that even under these conditions it is possible to detect weapons flows and give warning. Officials of both UNIMIR and the Commission of Inquiry reported that even their minimal presence allowed them to see arms buildups in progress. In the case of the Commission they reported that even one inspector can disrupt the supply of weapons, even if temporarily.

Early Warning Indicators

Despite the case made above for necessity and feasibility of monitoring arms flows and accumulations, most of the current effort to develop early warning systems to prevent conflict do not include such monitoring. Such indicators can be integrated into the early warning systems being developed by NGOs and international organizations.

Starting from the supply side, what types of information could be collected and shared that would give some advance warning of the outbreak or escalation of violence?

- One of the most tragic events related to arms buildups and conflict has been the failure of the United Nations to adequately monitor the location, collection and disposition of arms in several post-conflict peace operations. It would seem relatively easy, especially politically, to improve this monitoring activity.

- The post-Cold War era has been marked by the creation of an extensive surplus of small arms and light weapons. States have been very reluctant to destroy this surplus, choosing instead to export it, especially to zones of conflict. A closer monitoring of this surplus and its disposition would give very advanced warning of the arrival of excessive arms into a region or country.

- Most lists of early warning indicators mention external support as a key factor in the potential for escalation of conflict. External support from a country with extensive arms supply capacity and experience would be an early indication of arms supplies.

- As seen in South Africa, Albania and some other cases, insecure arsenals, police stations, and other weapon storage facilities have been the source of weapons for participants in armed violence. A closer monitoring of these facilities, and especially any weapons thefts, could signal the start of an arms buildup designed to destabilize the country. In effect that is what is happening in Albania as news media report the theft of arms and their leaking into Macedonia and Kosovo.

- By its nature corruption is difficult to monitor. But getting a handle on corruption among officials responsible for weapons security would give some warning as to illicit arms trafficking and destabilizing buildups.

- The monitoring of illicit commodities networks should also include watching for arms shipments as well. In general, those involved in conflict prevention and management should be receiving information on these networks.

- Since so much of the trade in these weapons is illegal, monitoring black market prices of weapons can give a good indication of the magnitude and availability of supply. For example, while an AK-47 can be purchased for a few dollars in southern Africa, it is more than a thousand dollars in Israel and the West Bank. In Albania, the price of AK-47s fluctuated from very high in the beginning, to very low ($20) when the market was saturated, and climbed once again as arms dealers began to consolidate stocks and limit availability.

- Very little emphasis has been placed on ammunition supplies as a potential early warning indicator. Unlike the weapons themselves, which can be produced in a conflict region or recirculated from existing surplus stocks in the region, for the most part ammunition must be mass produced using precision tools. It therefore is normally acquired from arms-producing states outside the region. An exception may be the presence in a conflict region of an ammunition factory previously exported under license or outright by an arms-producing state. Detection of excessive ammunition production and export would be a critical indicator of impending armed conflict, since no military operation can succeed without adequate ammunition supplies, despite adequate numbers of weapons. It has certainly been demonstrated in the Great Lakes region. The simple presence of a monitor in an airport could detect the supply of ammunition, since to be of use it must be delivered in bulk.

- Monitoring borders between countries of warring factions could reveal an increase in weapons flows that would warn of an impending buildup.

- Violence increasingly promulgated by military weapons found in armed forces of modern armies (e.g., hand grenades vice homemade bombs) is an indicator that arms are very plentiful and becoming destabilizing. The monitoring of the weapons used by gangs would also provide a warning as to the increased availability of military-style weapons.

- The increase in legitimate acquisition of weapons by individual citizens is often a predictor of increased violence in a society, since many of these weapons become the target of centers of violence (gangs, drug dealers) seeking to acquire arms through theft.

- The potential for violence is often indicated by the sudden display in public of military-style weapons. The lethality of an assault rifle or a belt full of hand grenades is such that reducing its presence can significantly increase the potential for conflict prevention and control.

- Government programs which distribute weapons to citizens or paramilitary organizations is a good indicator that the potential for uncontrolled violence is increasing.

- Effective monitoring of the demobilization of former combatants and redundant military personnel will provide early warning of their dissatisfaction and a return to the way of violence of their former profession.

The Continuing Need for Transparency

These brief examples indicate that early warning is possible and would enhance the likelihood of preventing conflict. As some case studies indicate, the information gatherers involved in internal conflicts have succeeded in providing some early warning. But in most cases the information was obtained with great difficulty, often too late, and in some cases at great risk to the information gatherers. What is required is increased transparency.

Transparency by itself is no guarantee that action will be taken, as was seen in Rwanda. Lundís account of the 1993-94 period in Rwanda concludes that the 500 UN troops dispatched to observe were "insufficient to be able to detect the efforts being taken by the Hutu authorities not only to avoid the implementation of the (Arusha) accords but also to recruit and arm militias ready to retake the country at the first opportunity." Other accounts, however, conclude that transparency was there, but the political will was not.

Transparency in the production, acquisition, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons is far behind that of major conventional weapons. Among other things, given that much of the flow of this class of weapon is illicit, simply adding this class to the UN Register is problematic. But as hinted at in the brief discussion of early warning indicators, there are some types of information that could be made more transparent that would enhance the work of those dedicated to preventing and dampening the effects of conflict with these weapons.

First, not all of the trade in these weapons is illicit. A first approach to monitoring and transparency is to increase information on the legitimate trade flow of arms. Perhaps some types of weapon in this class could be added to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. An alternative approach is to make transparent this type of information at the regional level. In the proposed Moratorium on the Exporting, Importing and Manufacturing of Light Arms in Africa, discussed in Bamako, Mali, in March 1997, it was suggested that "governments will be able to supplement the moratorium with various additional measures. Concerning future arms acquisitions, the governments may wish to establish a sub-regional arms register. The register would contain pertinent information regarding the acquisition of arms necessary for uniformed forces."

A second possibility is to make transparent the legitimate owners of weapons, allowing the focus to concentrate on those who would be more likely to conduct armed violence. As only one example, Brazil and Paraguay signed an agreement in 17 October 1996 requiring that both countries provide each other a monthly list of arms acquisitions by citizens.

If arms flows themselves are too difficult to monitor, at least the manufacturers and the legitimate arms traders could be made public. This would allow the more efficient monitoring of the supply of arms, and also provide a target for those political forces working against the supply of arms deemed destabilizing. The OAS Treaty calls for such transparency. A similar approach has been proposed for the European Union (EU) and is proposed as an associated measure for the Bamako Moratorium. The United Nations could also serve as a repository for this type of information.

A more controversial suggestion is to develop a system which registers a weapon with an international serial number upon manufacture, so that weapons can be traced to end-users. The UN Small Arms Panel recommended that the UN initiate a study on "the feasibility of establishing a reliable system for marking all such weapons from the time of their manufacture", and it is also part of the EU program. It should also be noted that in the United States, such transparency has allowed law enforcement officials to be increasingly effective in pinpointing and closing down major sources of weapons used in violent crime.

As previously shown, weapons have been seized, collected and destroyed. Keeping a record of all of these actions, making them public and/or exchanging such information with states in the region would accomplish several things. It would first put the focus on the fact that arms accumulations have become excessive. Second, it would provide policymakers with a better idea of the magnitude and quality of inventories. This has been proposed for the EU, and the Bamako Moratorium. This approach is also being increasingly used with great effect in the United States, as the main sources of illicit guns are identified and eliminated.

Dealing with this problem could be helped if arms-producing states took steps to clarify which types of weapons are strictly for military or police work, as a precursor to establishing control mechanisms to restrict or prohibit ownership of such weapons by civilians. As indicated, the line between weapons ownership for individual protection versus armed violence can be thin. Developing a norm that calls for the elimination of such weapons as assault rifles, hand grenades and other military weapons in the hands of civilians could assist conflict prevention work. Making transparent the possession of these weapons would enhance the development of such a norm.

Finally, transparency remains critical, not only to publicize the suppliers of tools of violence but also the users. There should be no let up in the adverse publicity which increasingly accompanies the human carnage resulting from the use of these weapons, to include pictures of the weapons. In the landmine campaign, effective use was made of the humanitarian cost of these weapons. Why is it any different that a sudden supply of hand grenades and assault rifles results in the death of thousands of civilians? In Burundi, much of the violence is committed with machetes, clubs and knives. But the most lethal attacks are with military weapons such as grenades, rockets, assault rifles and mortars. Where did these weapons come from? Are they under the control of responsible military units or have they been distributed to militias? In the end, people kill people, but when military weapons are used, the lethality approaches the inhumane level. Those who use such weapons, especially indiscriminately and purposefully against civilians, should be consistently condemned, in the hope that at least lower levels of violence will allow negotiations on the root causes to proceed.

RECOMMENDED POLICY ACTIONS

United Nations

Peace Operations

Since the post-Cold War security system now includes United Nations peace operations, it makes sense to examine how these operations could be reformed to provide more early warning and more importantly, a framework for action based on increasingly transparent information on arms buildups.

One of the first places that this transparency and early warning could be implemented is in UN peace operations. In the conclusion to the extensive UNIDIR research project on disarmament and peace operations, Gamba and Potgeiter highlighted the importance of information gathering.

In order to manage arms during peace missions, military commanders need to be able to detect the movement of belligerent forces, determine the location of hidden arms caches, and anticipate the plans and tactics of those who intend to violate agreements and threaten the execution of the mission mandate. This boils down to a need for a sound information gathering, assessment and distribution system...Accurate warning will allow more effective counter measures and provide an opportunity to disrupt threatening behavior. ...Despite the importance of this element..., information gathering in the field - even as it relates to the enforcement of consensual disarmament - has been neglected at best, or shunned, at worst."

How can this be improved? The first focal point would be the mandates of these operations. Given the importance of arms flows and buildups on conflict, any mandate should give the UN the capacity to monitor and report such activity. The list of early warning indicators and transparency options previously developed is a good place to start.

Then the UN forces should be given the mandate to collect and destroy all weapons related to the conflict. The experience of IFOR in the former Yugoslavia is instructive in this regard. In the case of the Dayton Accords, specific time tables were established for turning in weapons, after which all discovered caches and seizures from persons would be the property of IFOR. A November 1996 incident typifies actions related to this mandate. Fighting broke out when Muslims saw Serbs destroying their homes in the demilitarized zone, took up arms from previously hidden caches, and attacked the Serbs in the demilitarized zone. The Serbs responded. After separating the parties, the U.S. Army troops in that zone destroyed the Muslim weapons. Interviews with recently returned IFOR officers reveal that this and similar incidents are commonplace and require ingenuity and patience. There is also not a specific list of weapons authorized to be carried by police in the demilitarized zone. In one case they requested permission to carry hand grenades, since they regularly did so prior to the accords. This was denied. In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations in December 1996, NATO and IFOR Commander General George Joulwan remarked on the frustrations of dealing with the collection of weapons. He stated that he had just implemented a new IFOR policy to destroy all weapons seized, regardless of owner, a policy which has resulted in the destruction of over $25 million in operational military equipment. Such mandates and policies also serve to focus attention on the tools of violence, an area more susceptible to action that dealing with the intractable root causes.

Mandates which would allow for more action related to armaments -- monitoring, collection and destruction -- are only one aspect of the solution. Also needed is a change in the focus of those in the UN bureaucracy charged with managing conflicts. Very often their conservative approach prevents critical information on arms flows from being used for conflict prevention. As only one small example, the UN Small Arms Panel requested information on the arms being used by participants in the on-going UN peace operations. Such a list was to be used to define the types of arms in question so as to avoid an academic debate on the definition of small arms and light weapons. The Situation Centre of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations could not task its various headquarters in the field for this information, viewing it outside any of the existing mandates.

A third action could be the creation of a specific department dedicated to arms issues at UN PKO in New York and in each peace operation headquarters in the field. In New York this department could focus on creating transparency, in the form of a reporting system that focuses on the types of information previously discussed in this report. It also could develop a handbook that described the various weapons typically used, so that UN personnel, and all other information gatherers in the field, could be better prepared to at least recognize when lethal weapons were being accumulated and displayed in the streets. In addition, a handbook could be developed that instructed field personnel in regard to how to destroy these weapons.

All of these actions would serve the critical overall purpose of emphasizing the importance of weapons in the outbreak and exacerbation of conflict. They would be huge steps forward in developing an international norm against the acquisition, accumulation and proliferation of lethal military-style weapons by civilians. A comparison with the how the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) deals with the anti-personnel landmines (APM) issue makes the point. DHA has a home page on the Internet, and arguably serves as the focal point for most of the action on dealing with APMs, for NGOs as well as national governments and IGOs. They also are very active in publicizing the negative effects of this weapon. A similar UN organizational home is needed for small arms and light weapons. Perhaps this could be the first priority of the new Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation (DDAR) at the UN.

A Proactive Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation

The global consensus that has emerged surrounding the linkage between excessive arms accumulations and the outbreak and exacerbation of conflict should provide the political will for the Member States to task the UN to at last take on an enhanced role in the variety of weapons-focused responses that have been outlined in this report. In the reform plan document Renewing the United Nations, it is stated that "nations everywhere have come to recognize their stake in the success of multilateral negotiations and the monitoring of weapons developments. As a consequence, the United Nations has taken centre stage in the worldwide effort to limit both weapons and conflict." This report also identifies "the flow of conventional weapons and small arms into the hands of civilians..as a new danger. While the UNDDAR will continue to perform its traditional roles as the support agency for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) process and the Register of Conventional Arms, it is in the area of small arms and light weapons that this organization can contribute more substantively. Specifically, it should establish an effective monitoring capability to identify and inform the international community of those situations in which weapons-focused solutions will be most effective. Also, since the collection and destruction of surplus arms is becoming more prevalent, the UNDDAR could take the lead in coordinating the expertise needed to conduct such operations, especially those cases which occur separate from official peace operations.

Other UN Actions

In addition to addressing peace operations, The UN Panel on Small Arms made several other recommendations for action.

* The UN should adopt a proportional and integrated approach to security and development, including the identification of appropriate assistance for the internal security of states where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently.

* The UN should support, with the assistance of the donor community, all appropriate post-conflict initiatives related to disarmament and demobilization, such as the disposal and destruction of weapons, including weapons turn-in programmes sponsored locally by governmental and non-governmental organizations.

* The UN should urge greater cooperation between states and organizations such as Interpol and the World Customs Organization to combat illicit trafficking in weapons.

* The UN should initiate studies on:

- the feasibility of establishing a reliable system for marking all small arms and light weapons from the time of their manufacture;

- the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of such weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorized by states, and of establishing a database of such authorized manufacturers and dealers;

- all aspects of the problem of ammunition and explosives.

* The UN should consider the possibility of convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects.

Multilateral Policies

The international nature of the problems defined in this report mean that many specific policies must be developed and executed at the multilateral level. While some of these policies are being developed in regional organizations, some remain undeveloped at this time, and are put forward here as suggestive.

Regional cooperation As already indicated, regional organizations have begun to recognize and deal with the role of arms in conflict. Some of these activities include intelligence sharing and transparency, cooperative cross-border weapons collection programs, the coordination of domestic armaments regulations (e.g., common end-user certificate), and in the case of West Africa, a moratorium on weapons acquisitions by governments. In both the OAS and West African effort, an important innovation has been developed, namely, the establishment of national commissions to deal with problems stemming from small arms and light weapons. These commissions serve to formalize the importance of arms in conflict prevention, and can serve as the focal point for the policy prescriptions that are developed, starting with transparency measures.

Embargoes In some cases it will be necessary for the UN or regional organizations to conduct an embargo on weapons and ammunition. Despite the obstacles to such actions, many of the suggestions made in this report could enhance the likelihood of success. This is especially true of the suggested enhancements in the area of transparency. The overall increase in awareness and knowledge (e.g., types of weapons) could improve the effectiveness of this tool. Further, should the increased attention on weapons lead to the development of norms against the excessive accumulation of this class of weapon, the political will that is often missing in such embargoes might be more present. The Great Lakes region, and other places, have demonstrated that even a few U.N. observers on the ground can make a difference. We should not succumb to those who say it is no use intervening unless there is enough force to control the entire situation. No such levels of force will be forthcoming, either from the supplier of such forces or the recipients states whose sovereignty will be put in jeopardy. This is especially true in the early stages of unstable peace. Blue helmets at airfields make a difference.

Moratoria The UN Panel on Small Arms focused on the success of the Mali operation in several places, especially the regional effort to impose a moratorium and urge suppliers to cooperate . It recommended the adoption and implementation of regional and subregional moritoriums on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons.

Focus on ammunition Another multilateral armaments-specific measure is to focus on ammunition. It is clear that the post-Cold War surplus will insure that weapons will be available to fuel conflicts for some time to come. But ammunition is a different story. For one thing, it requires fairly high technology to mass-produce ammunition that is reliable. Most ammunition manufacturing equipment has been built by the industrialized countries. Where did they export such machinery? Can it be located and monitored, or perhaps acquired and destroyed? Further, ammunition in quantities that make a difference is heavy and bulky. It is easier to detect in these quantities. The opposite side of the lethality of an assault rifle is that its rapid fire capabilities also require constant supply of ammunition. Much more can be done to develop this option..

Security for sources of weapons and ammunition In those situations where a stable peace prevails, providing more security for obvious sources of weapons and ammunition is another approach. In the Albanian situation, the source of the tools of violence was government arsenals which opened up when major defections occurred in the armed forces. South Africa and countries of the former Soviet Union have had similar problems. Perhaps a more concentrated effort could be made to safeguard such obvious sources of the tools of violence, either through an international capacity building effort or an international control regime.

Agency Coordination The successful actions to demobilize and disarm, and in fact end the conflict in Mali, owes a great deal to the excellent coordination between the development, humanitarian, conflict resolution and disarmament policy organizations who participated. Much needs to be done to streamline and improve the interaction between these bureaucracies, both governmental and non-governmental.

Reward parties which show restraint in acquiring and using weapons In many conflicts the international community has identified the "bad guys" or rogue groups that are responsible for the armed violence. Taking sides is very common, despite the quest for neutrality. It is understandable that some single out support for oppositionist groups as the major factor in tensions escalating to violence, especially when that support is weapons. "Oppositionist groups should instead be encouraged to use nonviolent means to keep pressure on the regime, thereby allowing their cause to retain the moral high ground and thus international support." But this approach puts a moral responsibility on the international community to publicize this restraint and reward the oppositionists in some way. But the international community has a way of neglecting hot spots unless they are hot. How has the leader of the Albanians in Kosovo been rewarded for his restraint? This approach also goes against one of the basic principles of international law, that the oppressed have an inherent right to rise up against their oppressors. Every effort to deal with armaments in the United Nations faces this hurdle. This is not to say that attempts to control the supply of arms to oppositionists is not warranted. Rather, expanding such ad hoc efforts to some type of international or even regional regime will be challenging.

National Governments

One of the characteristics of the landmine campaign that enhanced the potential for success was the focus on a set of actions that national governments could sign on to, namely the total ban on the manufacture, use or export of anti-personnel landmines. While developing a similar set of goals for national governments in the area of small arms and light weapons is inherently more difficult, the work of the United Nations has produced what in effect is a model of responsible behavior that, if adopted by states, would contribute significantly to the prevention of conflict.

As previously mentioned, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice of the U.N. Economic and Social Council has developed a model with five common elements:

- Regulations relating to firearm safety and storage

- Appropriate penalties for misuse or unlawful possession of firearms

- Programs to encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe or unwanted firearms

- A responsible and effective licensing system

- A record-keeping system for distribution and marking of firearms

In addition, the UN Small Arms Panel developed many recommendations that add to this model of responsible behavior.

* All states should implement the recommendations contained in the guidelines for international arms transfers produced by consensus in the Disarmament Commission.

* All weapons which are not under legal civilian possession, and which are not required for the purposes of national defense and internal security, should be collected and destroyed by states as expeditiously as possible.

* All states should determine in their national laws and regulations which arms are permitted for civilian possession and the conditions under which they can be used.

* All states should ensure that they have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the legal possession of small arms and light weapons and over their transfer.

* States emerging from conflict should impose or reimpose licensing requirements on all civilian possession of these weapons on their territory.

* All states should exercise restraint with respect to the transfer of surplus military weapons and consider the possibility of destroying such weapons.

* All states should ensure the safeguarding of such weapons against loss through theft or corruption, in particular from storage facilities.

In a sense, the above list becomes the target for those donor states who can increase their assistance in the form of capacity-building to states which must deal with the well-known set of demand-side factors.

NGO Community

NGOs as data providers The recommended actions for the UN, regional organizations and national governments becomes the source of an agenda for action by the NGO community. Nowhere is this more obvious than the need for information and data. A comparison with the success of environmental and humanitarian NGOs, and those NGOs which participated in the landmines campaign, is instructive. In these cases national governments came to rely on NGOs for data critical to the policy process. NGOs became allies in a coordinated process because of their ability to provide governments and international organizations with information. NGOs addressing the problem of small arms and light weapons are just beginning such an effort.

The policy agenda laid out for the UN gives NGOs new opportunities to actively participate in solving these problems through supplying critical information. As one example, it appears that a focus on ammunition may be fruitful. Arguably it may be easier to deal with the fewer number of ammunition sources than the weapons themselves. Which firms manufacture ammunition? Where in the developing world are the ammunition plants exported during the Cold War? How is ammunition shipped? What does it look like? This type of information is hard to come by in the usual published sources. It is interesting to note that the report of the UN Small Arms Panel includes a table on the production of assault rifles , a table produced not by governments but by the independent Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security. Just a few years earlier attempts to insert similar types of information into a report on the UN Register of Conventional Arms was dismissed out of hand.

Broaden the coalition Despite the evidence in this report that weapons-focused policies are inexorably tied in with the larger issues of development and human rights, very little is being done to create the type of coalition that will enhance the very necessary contribution of NGOs in the solution of these problems. Illustrative of this was the annual Disarmament Week program put on by the NGO Committee on Disarmament. Except for the well-known coalition on landmines, almost all of the presenters and commenters were those who come from traditional arms control and disarmament agendas, and from the United States. Typically these NGOs do not have first-hand information from the field. What is needed in fora such as this is the full range of development and humanitarian NGOs working in the field making the case that human security is being diminished by the presence of too many weapons. One exception to this trend is the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, which has succeeded in stigmatizing those states and actors who are enabling the outbreak and exacerbation of conflict by illicit arms trafficking. Donor states are now looking for model projects to demonstrate the utility of arms-focused policies. Only a broad based coalition of NGOs can contribute to this process.

Early warning In their effort to be neutral, NGOs have a bias toward not being involved in things military. The increasing casualties suffered by humanitarian NGOs has begun to change this orientation. In many cases these NGOs are in place, on the ground, and could be the source of early warning, not just on the factors related to starvation and health epidemics but also to arms buildups as well. In Albania neutral observers observing the black market for arms note how the prices for an AK-47 rise and fall, one of several indicators of how many such weapons are on the market. To the extent that these NGOs do not do this because of lack of familiarity with weapons and their means of transfer into a zone of potential conflict, this could be rectified by the proliferation of knowledge on this dimension. Additionally, these NGOs could make use of the early warning indicators suggested in this report.

Academics

As has been demonstrated in this report, at all levels of the international community action is being taken to lessen the effects of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of this class of weapon. In many cases these policies, both actual and proposed, are based on a general sense that the weapons are a problem. This general sense that arms and conflict are linked is enough to generate the actions described in this report. But, as with other policy issues, better knowledge of the causal links between arms acquisitions and transfers, and conflict would clearly enhance the solutions, as it would allow the more precise application of tools in those circumstances best suited for success. Additionally, as long as weapons-focused policies impact negatively on certain actors (e.g., governments stockpiling weapons for future contingencies, arms dealers), these actors will resist cooperation by citing the lack of evidence that weapons are the problem. In short, despite a great deal of information on conflict situations, some of which appeared earlier in the case studies in this report, academics need to get much closer to a theory of conflict which can better pinpoint the role of weapons

Some of the questions that need answers include:

* How can a destabilizing accumulation be defined early enough to be of value in conflict prevention?

* If arms accumulations are destabilizing under certain conditions, can these conditions be generalized to adequately provide early warning to policymakers?

* Are there particular weapons that are more destabilizing than others, under certain conditions?

The challenges involved in such research should not be underestimated. Many of the questions cannot be answered without gathering more data on specific cases, field data which will often be dangerous to collect. Also, the lack of significant and useful theoretical findings from the extensive research on the causes of war is sobering.

A CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE THE INDISCRIMINATE AND UNLAWFUL USE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

While just two years ago the action by the international community described above may have been hailed as a good start, it is now clear that it is inadequate, given the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis associated with the accumulation and proliferation of these weapons. The action at the UN level is proceeding at a snailís pace. The UN Panel on Small Arms made 23 recommendations, only one of which was approved in the General Assembly resolution adopting the Panelís report- an ammunition study. And the resolution calls for yet another panel of experts. Some have blamed those sponsoring the resolution but the problem is more systemic. The questions of small arms and light weapons, especially the negative effects, are a humanitarian issue, not just a security or arms control issue. Restricting the action to the First Committee is inadequate. For example, the anti-personnel mine issue resides with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

Despite well-known deficiencies in UN peace operations, nothing is being done to make the required changes that would insure a more effective disarmament process. The regional efforts in both West and Southern Africa, while off to a promising start, are going very slow due to the lack of capacity and cooperation among states in the region. While the work of NGOs has begun to produce techniques and procedures that work, these efforts are seriously underfunded.

What is required is another approach at the international level which will give these various efforts a boost by calling more attention to the humanitarian crisis and establishing new norms that could break the various political logjams that have arisen at the global and regional level. Such an effort would also create a sense of urgency for donor states and international lending agencies to support disarmament and development projects which involve capacity building for weapons control and the collection and destruction of surplus weapons. Such a need could be met with a campaign similar to that of anti-personnel land mines. In the case of this type of weapon, NGOs were the ones who raised and publicized the issue as humanitarian in nature. This momentum was picked up by a core group of smaller states - Canada, South Africa, Norway, Austria, Belgium- which had become dissatisfied with the slow pace of the international legal approach based on what is known as the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) treaty. In December 1997 more than 120 countries signed a treaty which bans outright the production, use and export of anti-personal landmines and commits the signatory states to destroy existing stocks and support demining.

OTTAWA PROCESS THREE

There is now the beginnings of movement by Canada and her allies from the anti-personnel land mine campaign to consider an "Ottawa Process Three" for small arms and light weapons. In his General Assembly speech of 25 September 1997, Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy stated that "land mines are not the only complex, cross-cutting problem to be addressed if we are to reduce or prevent conflict. All too often it is small arms, rather than the weapons systems targeted by disarmament efforts, that cause the greatest bloodshed today. In the hands of terrorists, criminals and the irregular militia and armed bands typical of internal conflict, these are true weapons of mass terror."

In December 1997 the author was invited to make a presentation to the Ottawa Process Forum, a lessons-learned and way -forward workshop held on the last day of the Land Mine Conference. The topic was how the land mine campaign could be applied to small arms and light weapons. The result, included as Appendix 1, is the Proposed Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons. While a full discussion of how this treaty would come to pass and function in practice is beyond the scope of the paper, the text in the Appendix does list the basic benefits and challenges of such an approach. By raising the issue to the humanitarian level, as was the case with anti-personnel mines, the potential for uniting the various approaches addressed in this paper is optimized. In essence, the actual work must be accomplished at the local, national and regional level. But a global convention which required both victim states and exporting states to step up to s set of principles, would enhance the work of all. There was significant interest in the proposal on the part of both NGOs and governments, interest which hopefully will be transformed into the start of a campaign to rid the globe of the negative effects of these weapons.

CONCLUSION

Further action by the United Nations will proceed very slowly, and the work of states and NGOs in the field needs much more financial support to begin to make a dent in the work that needs to be done. As this Ottawa Process Three begins to develop, it must be supported by a coalition focused on the humanitarian effects of the excessive accumulation of these weapons, with the goal of pushing all actors in the international community toward taking those responsible actions needed to enhance human development. The biggest need is for the human development community to publicize the effects of these weapons, become more active in the planning and execution of collection and destruction programs, and demand the remedial action required for them to proceed with their work.

APPENDIX 1

Proposed Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons

Purpose

The purpose of the treaty is to lower and eliminate the civilian casualties and human suffering caused by the indiscriminate and illicit use of light weapons, weapons designed and manufactured for use by legal military organizations but found in the hands of terrorists, criminals and the irregular militia and armed bands typical of internal conflict.

Components

Preamble The preamble would state that the parties 1) are determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by the indiscriminate and unlawful use of light weapons, and to the disruption of economic, social and political development, the prevalence of violent solutions to conflict, and the militarization of both civil society and governments; 2) welcome the work being done by civil society, NGOs, national governments, regional organizations such as the OAS, EU, and the United Nations; and

3) base themselves on the principles of international humanitarian law.

Principles As with the landmine treaty, the focus is on the tools of violence. Given the fact that these weapons are produced, exported, and acquired for legitimate national security purposes, it is not appropriate to seek a ban on any type of weapon. Rather, the heart of the convention is a set of principles, which when agreed to and complied with by states, will result in the prevention and reduction of the indiscriminate and unlawful use of the light weapons responsible for human suffering. These principles define what states must do within their own boundaries, as well as influence to which states they transfer this type of weapon.

Definitions As with the landmine treaty, some definitions of the types of weapons covered will be required. The United Nations Small Arms Panel has produced a consensus typology that could be the basis for weapons covered by this convention.

Collection and destruction of surplus weapons In addition to abiding by principles which will prevent the indiscriminate use and in some cases reduce the rate of acquisition of these weapons, the treaty must address the voluntary collection and destruction of weapons surplus to the security needs of the state and its citizens. This component is analogous to the destruction of stocks and mine clearance element of the landmine treaty. It will codify such efforts already taking place, provide incentives for states reluctant to commence such efforts, and provide psychological support to other efforts addressing armed violence.

International cooperation and assistance Since complying with the principles of this treaty will require resources, this component provides the procedures regarding how states ask for and/or distribute such resources.

Transparency States agree to be more transparent in regard to the legal acquisition and possession of these types of weapons. Care should be taken to respect the sovereignty of states and the right of their citizens to bear arms, if applicable.

Operational components The treaty will operate in a manner similar to the landmines treaty, with components covering facilitation and clarification of compliance, national implementation measures, settlement of disputes, meetings of states parties, and review conferences.

Ottawa Process III

As with the campaign and treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, this campaign and treaty will have as its goal like-minded countries, NGOs and civil society working together to develop a treaty that a maximum number of countries will sign, ratify and comply with. Such a treaty will establish a new norm regarding the indiscriminate and unlawful use of light weapons, and enhance the efforts of civil society, NGOs, governments and international organizations.

Current Situation

Consensus on the extent and nature of the humanitarian crisis The recent work of international organizations, national governments, NGOs and civil society has produced an emerging consensus that the internal conflicts now dominating the globe produce an unacceptable level of civilian casualties, disrupt economic, social and political development, and encourage violent solutions to conflict and the militarization of both civil society and governments. It is also clear that the problem is a global one requiring the attention of the international community.

Action underway At the global level, the United Nations has gained considerable experience in dealing with light weapons as part of peace operations, conducted official inquiries regarding the illicit acquisition of these weapons, and provided assistance to states suffering from the indiscriminate use of these weapons. In 1997 it received a report from an experts panel on the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfer of these weapons, which concluded with a number of recommendations for action. The UN ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice conducted a fifty-country study on firearm regulation and is conducting regional hearings on a proposed set of principles which could lead to reduction in casualties from firearms. At the regional level, in November 1997 the Organization of American States agreed to a Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials. In June 1997 the European Union agreed to an EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. At the national level, many countries have implemented a wide variety of programs to address the negative effects of the indiscriminate use of these weapons. These include programs to enhance border controls, improve registration and licensing procedures, improve security of weapons storage sites, and develop voluntary weapons collection and destruction programs. NGOs have also been active, creating networks of scholars and activists, producing case studies of both effects and solutions, engaging in field work that has resulted in the illumination of negative effects and illicit arms acquisition, and hosting workshops that bring together governments, NGOs and civil society.

Inadequacy of current response to the humanitarian crisis Despite this promising start, it is becoming apparent that while the work to alleviate this crisis must be conducted at the local, national and regional level, a global push is needed. It is also clear that this will not occur any time soon through the United Nations, where only one of the UN Small Arms Panel recommendations has been acted upon. Evidence from civil society experiencing this crisis continues to mount and the cry for more action is growing.

Benefits of treaty approach

The treaty will not detract from or interfere with ongoing local, national and regional efforts. Rather it will provide a new norm around which these efforts can grow, efforts to which donor states can increase their financial support. The focus on the humanitarian costs of the indiscriminate and unlawful use of these weapons will serve to integrate current efforts based on a variety of approaches- crime prevention, arms control, firearms regulation, human rights, development, gun safety, etc. Above all it will provide hope for those who are the victims of this humanitarian crisis.

Challenges

Developing an agreed set of principles will be more difficult than the ban approach of the landmines treaty. The NGO coalition so critical to the landmine campaign is in its infancy, with a pressing need to integrate development, public health and humanitarian relief organizations into the effort. And the NGOs working with civil society in the victim countries will be taking even greater risks than their landmine campaign counterparts.

PRINCIPLES

Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons

(Examples)

States agreeing to the Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons undertake to establish laws and regulations which:

-Determine which arms are permitted for civilian possession and the conditions under which they can be used;

-Establish a responsible and effective licensing and record-keeping system;

-Allow the effective control over the legal possession of light weapons and over their transfer;

-Provide for appropriate penalties for serious offenses involving the indiscriminate or unlawful possession and use of light weapons by individual citizens or government police and military forces;

- Establish opportunities for citizens to voluntarily surrender illegal, unsafe or unwanted weapons

- Collect and destroy all weapons not under legal civilian possession, and which are not required for the purposes of national defense and internal security;

- Ensure the safeguarding of weapons possessed by police and military forces

against loss through theft or corruption, in particular from storage facilities;

- Exercise restraint with the respect to the transfer of surplus weapons; and

- Prohibit the export of light weapons from their territory to any state not a party to this treaty.

APPENDIX 2

Bibliography of Key Works on Small Arms and Light Weapons

Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Klare and Laura Reed, eds. Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995).

Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations. Volume XIX, No. 2, 1996.

Laurance, Edward J. with Sarah Meek. The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Brief 7 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996).

Louise, Christopher. The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation. Discussion Paper No. 59 (Geneva: UNRISD, 1995).

Renner, Michael. Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament. (Washington: The Worldwatch Institute, October 1997).

"Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Epidemic Spread of Conflicts." Chapter Three. Conversion Survey 1997. (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1997).

Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography. Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. November 1996.

Rana, Swadesh. Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts. (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995).

Renner, Michael. Small Arms, Big Problems. (Washington: World Watch Institute, 1997).

Singh, Jasjit ed. Light Weapons and International Security. (Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, 1995).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project. A series of case studies on managing this class of weapon in peace processes. Cases include Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia and Croatia, Southern Africa, Cambodia, Angola/Namibia, Liberia, Nicaragua and El Salvador, and Haiti. 1995 and 1996.