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| Who Sold The Weapons Used For The Gatumba Massacre? |
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On 13 August 2004 armed combatants attacked Gatumba transit camp close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Gatumba transit camp sheltered civilian Congolese refugees, mainly of the ethnic Banyamulenge, and Burundian returnees. More than 150 refugees died in the attack and more than 100 were wounded.
Tracking Lethal Tools, a report for the Control Arms campaign, investigated several cartridges recovered at the scene of the massacre. Following the usual practice for ammunition for military small arms and light weapons, the cartridges are stamped with codes identifying their manufacturer and /or country of manufacture as well as their year of production.
Identifying the supply chain |
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The markings on the cartridges show that one was manufactured in Bulgaria in 1995 by Arsenal, Kazanlak; two in the People’s Republic of China in 1998 by unknown Chinese manufacturers and one in Yugoslavia in 1999 by Prvi Partizan in Uzice, Serbia. But without high common international standards for tracing weapons transfers, identifying the legal point of manufacture is of little further use for tracking the chain of transfers of these cartridges.
Were these arms acquired through raids on military stockpiles, capture on the battlefield, supply from other armed groups, purchase through international brokers, or supply from a government either with political support or for personal gain?
Without markings giving the cartridges a unique lot number, not even the manufacturers will be able to identify the original recipients of the lots of ammunition from which these cartridges came.
If there was a unique identifying code on each lot of cartridges, and also if manufacturers registered the initial transfers of each lot, the initial recipient could be identified. An effective trace would still require that the subsequent recipients, who acquired and retransferred the ammunition lots, also kept accurate records. If adequate standards were in place, this would make it possible to identify the arms dealer, broker or shipping agent, who transferred the original ammunition lots, or parts of them, to the perpetrators of the massacre.
This kind of tracing is at present largely impossible. If not even the supply chain of a weapon or ammunition lot can be identified, it will remain virtually impossible to hold accountable those who arrange illicit arms transfers.
During 2005, there will be the final sessions of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Marking & Tracing of small arms, light weapons and ammunition. These will be held in New York between 24 January and 4 February and 6 to 17 June. IANSA members are campaigning for a strong legally binding instrument. Read more about the UN Marking & Tracing process here. |
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