7. Components for Military and Security Systems

The export of MSP components for weapons systems (175) is an ever-increasing part of the global arms market, and effective control of the components trade presents a major challenge for EU Member States if they are to help protect human rights and prevent humanitarian crises. (176) Many countries are often involved in the manufacture of a single weapons system, and components are likely to be less visible in the final product, making it much harder to monitor whether or not such export items have been misused for human rights violations.

Since the end of the Cold War, the global and EU arms industry has undergone wholesale restructuring, leaving it more diversified and internationalised than before. As contractors outsource production, subcontracting, both nationally and internationally, has grown to be increasingly important. Networks have developed internationally, making the existence of a comprehensive production capability within any one country increasingly rare. Weapons systems are now, more than ever, assembled from components sourced from a global market place.

The importance of the trade in components and sub-systems to the defence industry was highlighted in a 1999 submission to a UK Parliamentary Select Committee by the UK Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA): "the UK especially demonstrates great strength in the high technology sub-systems sphere… In consequence, a considerable proportion of defence export contracts won each year have been for subsystems, components, spares, etc and there are very few major Western high technology programmes which do not have some level of British subcontractor participation."(177) Through partnership agreements, offset deals, technology transfer and licensed production agreements many companies in the EU Member States and New Member States have had a growing involvement in the components and sub-systems sector.

Because of the increasing importance of high-tech electronic systems to both military and police forces, many components or sub-systems are now considered to be strategic goods that need to be controlled. Some components are classed as dual-use and licensed under the agreed "dual-use list", (178) others come under the EU "military list". But, worryingly, others are not even considered to be controlled goods.(179) Many EU companies not normally associated with the conventional military or "bombs and bullets" production have significant involvement in the high-tech "dual-use" sector. For example, a recent report on Ireland identified that whilst Ireland's "military" exports in 2002 were only valued at €34 million the "dual use" exports were valued at € 4.5 billion.(180)

The cases below illustrate how the lack of governmental control of EU components for weapons systems has resulted in such arms being transferred to foreign armed forces that commit human rights violations.

Ireland and Israel:
The US Data Device Corporation (DDC), which has production facilities in Cork, Ireland (DDC Ireland Ltd) states on its website that its MIL-STD-1553 Data Bus products are used in the AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters.(181) The company describes the important role that their product plays in enabling military aircraft and helicopters to function, so "a MIL-STD-1553 data bus allows complex electronic subsystems to interact with each other and the on-board flight computer. This data bus is the life line of the aircraft" [emphasis added].(182) These systems can include a lethal array of armaments, including a mix of up to 16 Hellfire missiles or 76 70mm aerial rockets and 1,200 rounds of 30mm ammunition for its M230 Chain Gun automatic canon.(183)

Amnesty International has vigorously opposed the transfer of a range of military helicopters from the USA to both Israel and Turkey because these governments permitted their armed forces to use the helicopters for gross human rights violations. Five Palestinians were killed and 15 others injured when Israeli Apache helicopter gunships fired two missiles at a car in a busy part of northern Gaza city on 25 December 2003. (184)

At present it is still not known whether DDC Ireland is supplying military standard data-bus components for incorporation into Apache attack helicopters. To establish whether export licences were being granted for this type of product, Amnesty International asked the Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment: "What export control category code would apply to MIL-STD 1553 Data Bus products from DDC Ireland Ltd?". In response, the Minister for Labour, Trade and Consumer Affairs, Mr Tom Kitt T.D, stated in a letter that "the question of the appropriate control category code (which should apply to any product), is in the first instance a matter for the producer/exporter to determine as they have the best knowledge of their own products. Therefore, if you wish to know the control category code of any product, I would suggest that you contact the producer".(185) Amnesty International wrote to both DDC Ireland Ltd and DDC (USA) in 2001, but to date has still not received an answer.(186)

Even if Amnesty or Irish parliamentarians could establish the category of Dual Use licence that would be required if DDC were exporting its MIL-STD 1553 data bus products from Ireland, it would now be of little use if these components were going first to the USA for incorporation into the Apache attack helicopters prior to shipment to another country. Since April 2001, the introduction of the EU "Community General Export Authorisation"(CGEA) has meant that the "bulk of the dual-use items subject to export licensing requirements are not subject to individual export" control when destined for the following CGEA countries: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, United States of America.(187) This applies to exports of such components within all 10 states included in the CGEA. Thus, exports of this category of "dual use" component can be exported from Ireland and will not be reported in the current DETE licence statistics.

So there would appear to be nothing to prevent the export of the DDC data bus from Ireland to the US for incorporation into Apache attack helicopters destined for Israel or for any other country where the government permits its armed forces to use military aircraft to indiscriminately attack and target civilians.

The Netherlands and Israel:
Analysis by Amnesty International (Netherlands)(188) has shown that a large part of Dutch MSP exports are components for incorporation into larger weapon systems, mainly to be assembled in the USA which, in turn, is the major supplier of arms to Israel.

The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated: "in the request for an export license the end user must be mentioned. When the delivery by another country ends-up in for example Israel, then the export guidelines will be applied for Israel and a negative advice will be given…. conform[ing with] the Dutch policy. In the case [where] the final destination is not known, Foreign Affairs will apply the guidelines on the country where the components are first going to. When this is a country with a solid arms export regulation – an EU member state, a NATO ally – in principle a positive advice will be given to Economic Affairs, but when the country has a unsound arms export regime, this will result in a negative advice. The Minister regards the arms export regime of the US, the biggest and most important ally of the Netherlands, as sound."(189)

The policy is formalised in the Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the USA and the Netherlands, which regulates bi-lateral exports as well as exports to third countries.(190) The US is the biggest customer for military products from the Netherlands so the policy brings roughly 25% of Dutch arms exports under 'a common' US-Dutch export policy.

This policy has major consequences for arms control and the protection of human rights. When, for example, Dutch Hellfire Missile components are to be sent to the US for a production run of which some are to be used by the US military and a proportion transferred to third countries, these exports have been viewed as exports to the USA [and therefore deemed acceptable], even though a proportion will probably end up in countries that would be deemed unacceptable and would have been refused a direct arms export licence. The Hellfire is becoming one of the most well known missiles, not least because of its use in trouble spots in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Israel. The missile is produced by Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman and a number of subcontractors and exported to thirteen countries.(191) Hellfire Missile exports started in 1997. The biggest Dutch delivery took place in 1999, and was valued at € 3.6 million.

Export records show that in 2001 the Dutch government authorised the export of components for the F16 fighter plane to the USA valued at over 57 million guilders. Since 2000, there have been orders for 344 F16s from nine countries.(192) Due to the lack of transparency in the Dutch reporting of components exports, it is not known whether any of these particular planes incorporate Dutch components, but potentially they could – especially given the Dutch Foreign Minister's statement on components and end use quoted above.

At least one Dutch company is open about the end-user of its products, on its ethical policy page: "In principle, Philips companies do not produce products or render services specially designed or developed for the military, except for the following products: F16 parts and Apache parts supplied to NATO countries and Israel (under compensation agreements US/Netherlands)."(193) So, although Dutch parliamentarians and the Dutch people are not given the information as to whether Dutch components are incorporated into Apaches that are in action in Israel, this information is known at the Philips headquarters.

Amnesty International is also concerned about the transfer of small arms parts from the Netherlands. The table below describes Dutch export licenses to the USA and shows that significant quantities of components have been transferred. These are believed to include triggers, bolts etc. of pistols, revolvers and rifles which have been produced by a Dutch fine metallurgy company which has exported them to a well-known US small arms producer. The US is one of the world's major small arms exporters, including to armed forces that abuse human rights. Whilst the Dutch government might take a strong position on the proliferation of SALW, this components loophole means that Dutch small arms parts potentially can be transferred to many countries.

Belgium and Kenya
In 1988, FN Herstal (Belgium) had signed a construction contract, worth 2.4 billion Belgian francs (approx US $80 million), with the Kenyan government to build an ammunition production factory, capable of producing 20 million rounds per year, at Eldoret in Kenya. However, construction was not completed until late 1995. Subsequently, the Belgian government provided export authorisation for FN Herstal to supply ammunition production machinery for the Eldoret facility.(200)

Concerns regarding the dangers of the inadequate regulation of MSP technology transfer from Belgium to establish the Eldoret ammunition factory in Kenya had been raised by Belgian parliamentarians, NGOs(201) and journalists since mid-1996 when details of the contract became public.(202) On 14 November 1996, following public protests, the Belgian government suspended the issuing of export licenses for weapons transactions to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania for sixty days. Then, on 27 February 1997, the government announced that construction at the factory would be halted until further notice, pending receipt of formal guarantees from the government of Kenya that it would not sell ammunition to Rwanda, Burundi or Zaire.(203) However, on 8 March, the Belgian government reportedly agreed to the resumption of work at the factory, after receiving written guarantees from the government of Kenya that bullets produced at the Eldoret facility would not be exported to countries in the Great Lakes region. (204)

A 2002 report by GRIP (Belgium) investigating the marking and tracing of SALW stated that "Officials from the UN International Commission of Inquiry on arms transfers in Rwanda interviewed by the authors on 1 October 1998 explicitly blamed Kenyan officials with regard to the provision of supplies from the Eldoret ammunition factory to factions in the Rwanda conflict."(205)

In October 2003, the Kenyan National Security Minister, Chris Murungaru, was reported as saying that the Kenyan government would not close down its bullet factory in Eldoret despite being at the centre of concerted efforts to rid the region of illegal small arms and light weapons. The East African had earlier established that the factory produced three types of bullets, namely, 9mm ammunition for the FN35 Browning pistol and the Sterling, Uzi or H&K MP5 sub-machine guns used by the armed forces; 7.62x51mm for the FN-FAL and the G3, the main rifles used by the armed forces; and 5.56mm ammunition, used by the Kenya police.(206) Amnesty International has documented human rights violations by these forces using small arms.

In February 2002, it was reported that Kenyan police had shot and seriously injured three children who had joined a demonstration against a local playground being taken away by the local administration. The children, aged between 16 and 10, were shot in the hands, legs and thighs by police officers. One of the children's hands was shattered by a bullet from a G3 rifle. The children accused the police of being trigger-happy, saying that they did not attempt to talk to the group before lobbing tear gas and firing live ammunition at them. Such incidents are not uncommon and over the recent years Amnesty International has documented many cases of police shootings and killings in Kenya, some of which may have been extrajudicial executions. It is possible to identify the particular G3 rifle used in this incident from its serial number, but the supply route to Kenya is not known.(207)

Belgium and Tanzania
On 16 December 2003, the Belgian company New Lachaussée was given the go-ahead from Belgium's state-backed credit agency, Ducroire, for 8.8 million Euro (US$10.8 mn.) of cover on an 11 million Euro investment in an ammunitions plant in Mwanza, Tanzania(208). The company was also seeking government approval for the export of technology to Tanzania for establishing the factory. Given Tanzania's relatively weak export controls, Amnesty International raised concerns over the effect of the proposed technology transfer and ammunition factory establishment on human rights in the region.

Amnesty International sections in the EU joined other NGOs to lobby and campaign on this issue. Although Federal Minister Louis Michel said in January 2004 that an export to Tanzania was not of concern because Tanzania was not at war, he "rephrased" his answer in the second week of February 2004 saying that there would not be an export to Tanzania. In February 2004, Minister Van Cauwenbergh (the prime minister of the Walloon government) announced that the licence for the export to Tanzania had not been approved due to the uncertain violent situation in the region of the Great Lakes. This is a major success for the human rights and arms control community in Belgium and Europe as a whole. It shows that governments can be made to abide by their international commitments and to act responsibly, when there is enough public and political pressure brought to bear.

The Big Six "Letter of Intent - Framework Agreement"

In a Letter of Intent (LOI) signed in July 1998, the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK stated their desire "to establish a co-operative framework to facilitate the restructuring of European defence industry."(209) Consequently, the six LOI states negotiated a Framework Agreement "concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European defence industry". (210) Various measures were introduced, including simplified licensing procedures for components. Transfers within the six members are no longer referred to as "exports", which constitutes a step towards a common market for defence goods within that limited area. (211)

For exports to "third countries", a mechanism was established to negotiate common "white lists" of countries eligible to receive certain armaments. States involved in a joint production agreement would negotiate these product-specific "white lists" in advance and by consensus. During the course of the project, potential recipients can be added or deleted at the request of a contributing government.

The implications for arms control and human rights resulting from this process are hard to gauge at present. The Framework Agreement clearly states that consultations preceding the agreement of the "white lists "will take into account, inter alia, the Parties' national export control policies, the fulfilment of their international commitments, including the EU code of conduct criteria, and the protection of the Parties defence interests, including the preservation of a strong and competitive European defence industrial base."(212) Thus, the Agreement ensures that, for the first time, "taking into account" the fulfilment of the EU Code Criteria is now legally binding for the six LOI states when previously it was only a politically binding commitment. However, the actual wording: 'taking into account' indicates a low level of commitment and requires relatively subjective interpretation. Furthermore, such an international treaty is not subject to enforcement in the way that national and European law is.

A further complication arises since the "White List" would be drawn up by consensus, and any country involved in a particular programme can therefore veto the inclusion of a particular destination on the list of prospective customers. Given that Sweden, for example, has tighter export controls than for example the UK when it comes to components, this could mean that UK components would be less likely to be exported to sensitive third country destinations via incorporation in a system produced in another country. However, a UK Ministry of Defence official, questioned by the UK Defence Select Committee and quoted in its Report, admitted that if a minor partner was too eager to wield its veto of particular destinations "…they are unlikely to be a partner of choice in future collaborations. They will also have … to take into account … bilateral relations with the countries concerned, as well as the industrial coalitions." (213)

Lessons to be learned

This chapter has highlighted Amnesty International's concerns over the inadequate control and reporting by EU governments of the transfer of MSP components and subsystems to "third countries" for incorporation into weapons systems. The deliberate lack of transparency in EU export licensing of components and subsystems to certain countries has hindered parliamentary scrutiny, especially within all ten states included in the CGEA.

EU Member States should affirm through an Operative Provision of the EU Code or an EU Common Position that at least the Code Criteria will be applied to case-by-case licensing of the export of components and subsystems used for arms as well as to complete weapons systems. In order to promote respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, the Member States should agree to actively promote mechanisms, including for greater transparency, to help ensure the effective control of exports of strategic components for final assembly elsewhere.