10. Surveillance and "Intelligence" Technologies

Amnesty International is greatly concerned by instances where the provision of powerful surveillance and interception capabilities to repressive states are contributing to human rights violations carried out by the police, security and intelligence forces. Criterion Two of the EU Code prohibits the transfer of equipment which might be used for "internal repression" and Operative Provision 6 covers certain dual-use goods "where there are grounds for believing that the end user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country".(271) However, EU governments so far appear to limit the definition of security and dual use equipment that can be used to facilitate internal repression to "lethal" or military hardware.

Surveillance and C3I (command, control, communication and intelligence) technologies cover a wide range of components, sub-systems, products and software. They are used by military, law enforcement, emergency services, commercial and private organisations. Whilst the term C3I is generally used to denote military and police systems, civilian systems are more commonly referred to as ICT (Information & Communication Technologies). However, as this report illustrates, most civilian communications have inherent surveillance and "control" facilities and therefore this report includes military, police and civilian systems within the C3I category. The uses of surveillance systems can range from providing Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance, local, regional or national traffic control to global systems for the monitoring of telephone, internet and fax communications. Such systems may have legitimate military, police and civilian uses. Amnesty International does not oppose the transfer of surveillance and C3I technologies in general, but such technologies have inherent capabilities that facilitate human rights abuses by security forces in repressive countries.

China:
In the days following the Tiananmen massacre on 4 June 1989, the Chinese authorities used images from a CCTV traffic control system originally supplied by the USA and the UK with World Bank assistance to create instant "wanted" posters from close-up images of student activists. These were broadcast on state-run television with a telephone number asking viewers to report those portrayed. Arrests of prisoners of conscience and unfair trials followed. In 2002 a human rights researcher revisited Tiananmen Square and established that surveillance cameras were still operating.(272)

Colombia:(273)
On the night of 12 November 2002, about 700 soldiers surrounded the town of Saravena, Arauca to enable the army, police and members of the Offices of the Attorney General(274) and the Procurator General(275) to raid homes, workplaces and shops. By the end of the evening more than 2,000 civilians had been rounded up at gunpoint and taken to Saravena's stadium where they were photographed, videotaped, questioned, their background checked, and their arms marked with indelible ink.

This mass detention, known as Operation Heroic (Operación Heroica) purportedly designed to round up alleged members of armed opposition groups, was the largest operation of this kind carried out by the Colombian security forces in recent years. Most of Saravena's human rights community, as well as many known trade unionists and other social leaders were among the 2,000 people detained that night. However, only 85 were officially arrested. Of these, 35 were subsequently released for lack of evidence. Of the remaining 51, around 40 were trade unionists. At the time of writing this report, as few as 30 of the 2,000 people rounded up that night are still believed to be under investigation.

Because of the "invisibility" of surveillance systems it is very difficult for human rights organisations to provide direct evidence of the impact of surveillance and C3I systems on human rights violations.

EU export controls of Surveillance and C3I technologies :
If they are designed primarily for military users, exports of some of these technologies are controlled through the Military List,(276) whilst some others are controlled through the EU Dual-Use list.(277) However, it is unclear whether some surveillance technologies, if designated for police or commercial use, are subject to any export licence control at all.

There appears to be little understanding amongst government export control departments of the potential impact that such technologies have on facilitating serious human rights abuses. Amnesty International believes that greater attention needs to be given to the export licensing and transfer of these technologies to countries or MSP forces that have poor human rights records. Such inattention to the serious impact that such surveillance technologies can have on civil liberties and human rights is illustrated by the interpretation by certain EU governments of the EU embargo on China,(278) adopted in June 1989 following the Tiananmen massacre. Despite the embargo and the EU Code, both of which contain criteria prohibiting the transfer of equipment which might be used for "internal repression" it is clear that EU companies have been involved in the supply of communication and surveillance systems that have contributed to "internal repression in China. (See also the Undermining the Criteria Chapter for related discussions). Transfers of concern continue.

Identification control technologies:
In 2002, the French firm Thales Identification reported that China had chosen the company's secured identification technology to produce its new "smart" national ID card. According to the company, "the project has the potential to become the biggest of its kind worldwide with more than 1 billion potential users." The company stated that it would provide the Chinese authorities with the secured identification systems to personalise the card graphically and electronically.(279)

According to the Ministry of Public Security, the authorities have issued 1.14 billion ID cards since 1985 when it started using ID numbers to identify residents on the mainland. New ID cards will use integrated circuitry (IC) technology to make them harder to forge. The new IC identification cards can be read by computers, which make it possible for police to check huge numbers of ID cards in a much shorter time than before. This has lead to concerns from Chinese legislators that the police may infringe the rights of individuals during random ID cards checks.(280) In 2002, a Newsweek article described how some Internet cafes in Jiangxi province were "experimenting with swipe cards linked to customers' national ID cards. Some Beijing Internet cafes have installed surveillance cameras overlooking computer screens. One cafe manager took foreign reporters to a back room, where a police-linked computer, connected to four spy cameras, monitored users."(281)

Despite the difficulties of documenting the impact of such technologies, Amnesty International and other human rights groups have reported the impact of telephone-tapping and other surveillance systems in a number of countries including Saudi Arabia,(282) and Mexico, where in 1996 Amnesty detailed a "sharp increase in the targeting of human rights defenders throughout Mexico. In scores of cases such threats contain extensive details about the victim's personal and professional lives, suggesting intelligence work, including telephone-tapping. Amnesty International believes that such activities cannot happen without the authorities' acquiescence."(283) Amnesty has also reported on the activities of the security forces in India(284) and Tunisia where it has documented how "alongside imprisonment, short-term detention, harassment and torture, the authorities have introduced telephone tapping, fax and mail interception and even sleaze campaigns to harass and intimidate human rights defenders and curtail their activities".(285)

Some telephone-tapping and surveillance can be relatively "low tech" as illustrated by the use of tape recording equipment in Guatemala during the 1990s. Both the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Archbishop's Human Rights Office (ODHA) complained, the director of the ODHA stating that "here the espionage is outrageous, you can hear when the tape starts to run and [the people listening] talk in the middle of the conversations we're having." The director of the Guatemalan Telephone Company (TELGUA) stated that they do not have the technical or human capacity to carry out phone tapping. He later admitted that, "Rudimentary equipment for this practice has been placed in the exterior boxes." (286)

However, surveillance technologies and software have developed at a rapid pace and many of the modern surveillance functions have outpaced developments in export controls and in many cases the ability of politicians to understand the dangers that such systems can pose when exported to repressive regimes.

EU "lawful interception" and the potential impact on human rights

Privacy is specified as a fundamental right by a number of international agreements.(287) At a global level, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the protection of privacy. At the European Union level Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly includes in law the right to respect for privacy of communications. Despite such international conventions, Amnesty International is concerned that the supply of telecommunications infrastructure systems by European Union based companies to countries with poor human rights records will facilitate violations of such fundamental human rights. By adhering to EU standards, these telecommunication systems will have built-in capabilities to enable "lawful interception" by legitimate "law enforcement agencies". Such "lawful interception" may be acceptable in countries that have effective parliamentary scrutiny and legal mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the surveillance activities of the police and intelligence services. But in many countries where a pattern of human rights violations is committed by the "law enforcement agencies", the supply of hi-tech telecommunications infrastructure with built-in interception, surveillance and monitoring capabilities can only facilitate such violations.

Any EU company providing telecommunications infrastructure systems is required to meet the technical standards produced by the "Working Group on Lawful Interception" (WG LI) of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).(288) One of the key guidelines is that "the act of interception is kept discreet".(289) ETSI has devised a number of standards for different types of communication systems such as Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) and the 3rd Generation mobile phone systems.(290) The need for secrecy or "non-disclosure" as it is called is outlined in the technical specification for the lawful interception of the Terrestrial Trunked radio (TETRA).(291) It is clear from this specification that the "manufacturers of the technical installations" are involved in the implementation of the "lawful interception" capabilities and activities of the communications systems.

According to a 2001 report, the EU (and ETSI) had co-operated with the US-Federal Bureau of Investigation to create international technical standards for interception (wiretapping). In 1993, the FBI had hosted meetings at its research facility in Quantico, Virginia called the "International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar" (ILETS), inviting representatives from Canada, Hong Kong, Australia and the European Union. At these meetings, an international technical standard for surveillance, based on the FBI's demands, was adopted as the "International Requirements for Interception."(292)

This means that all EU countries have to ensure that their systems have built-in capabilities for "lawful interception". For example, in 1999 it was reported that the US-based company Nortel Networks and the US Federal Bureau of Investigations had reached a "first-of-its-kind agreement enabling telecommunications companies to use computer software to assist law enforcement agencies in conducting lawfully authorized wiretapping under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act".(293) These interception capabilities are not restricted to the boundaries of the EU as was identified by the 1996 ETSI guidelines on interception across national boundaries. The ETSI guidelines state that if the interception interface lies in a foreign territory, then arrangements are made by EU Member States so that interception is still possible.(294) Although subject to further review, the guidelines imply that any telecommunications infrastructure systems installed in non-EU countries would need to have the same level of "lawful interception" capabilities as a European system.

Even where national legislation exists to control the use of telephone-tapping and other forms of surveillance, this legislation can be ignored or abused by law enforcement or intelligence agencies. For example, in Taiwan, under the martial law-era Telecommunications Surveillance Act, permission for telephone tapping and other similar interferences with privacy of communications must be granted according to law. However, according to the Taiwan Association for Human Rights in 1999, "prosecutors appeared to have abused their eavesdropping power by authorizing law enforcement units to monitor more than 16,000 telephone calls in less than a year. Such behaviour has constituted a serious infringement of peoples' privacy."(295) In 1999 the new Telecommunication Protection and Control Act imposed stricter guidelines on how wiretaps could be used, although they can still be approved for broad reasons such as "national security" and "social order". According to the US State Department, following the new law the number of wiretaps was 3,377 in 2000 and 6,505 in 2001.(296)

Research conducted for this report has discovered that 28 companies in eight EU and new Member State countries manufacture or supply equipment designed for the purposes of covert surveillance and the monitoring of telephone and other forms of electronic communications.

Turkmenistan:
In September 2003 Amnesty International reported serious, widespread and ongoing human rights violations by the Turkmenistan government. (297) Similarly in 2002, and for many previous years, the US State Department has reported that: "Security officials used physical surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and the recruitment of informers. Critics of the Government, and many other persons, credibly reported that their mail was intercepted before delivery. Mail delivered to the post office must remain unsealed for government inspection." (298)

It was therefore of concern that in early 2001, the Ministry of Communications of Turkmenistan signed a contract with German company Siemens and French company Alcatel for Euro 3.3 million to install 12,000 telephone lines. Since 1993 Alcatel has installed 60,000 lines while Siemens has installed 40,000. A total of 325,000 lines are to be installed by 2010.(299) As two leading EU telecommunications companies, it is assumed that both Siemens and Alcatel comply with the ETSI guidelines – and therefore ensure that their telecommunications systems are designed to enable government surveillance and telephone tapping to take place.

Amnesty International is concerned that the German and French governments have permitted such transfers despite reports by governments and human rights organisations that the Turkmenistan government has a longstanding and continuing practice of surveillance and telephone tapping as part of a policy of repression against those perceived to be critical of the government.

For example, in one case a civil society activist who had a telephone conversation with a representative of a foreign human rights organisation was subsequently summoned to the Secret Service in July 2003. Here the activist was questioned about his conversation with direct reference to what had been discussed in the phone call. There are strong indications that the authorities in Turkmenistan are also trying to monitor emails.

Amnesty International's concerns about the transfer of telecommunications systems to Turkmenistan have been deepened by recent revelations in the German magazine Der Spiegel that Siemens had also transferred surveillance and telephone tapping equipment to Turkemenistan.(300) This was confirmed by correspondence between Amnesty International and Siemens. In a letter to Amnesty dated 17 February 2004, Dr Peter Ramm of Siemens stated: "In accordance with a contract that was signed in the year 2000, monitoring-facilities were delivered, which due to the client would be exclusively used to monitor activities in organised crime and terrorism. This appeared to be believable purpose, given the country's location in an unstable crisis-ridden region, and its shared borders with Afghanistan and its former Taliban-Regime. Comparable and more advanced technical facilities are in use in a number of democratic countries, including Germany." (301)Dr Ramm continued that "Those responsible for this business agreement were obviously aware that Turkmenistan is not a western-style, democratic state. However, they assure that they were not aware of any human rights violations at the time the contract was signed - in the year 2000….The secret service was not our client. If there has been a misuse recently of the technical facilities delivered by us, we are very sorry and distance ourselves from the matter explicitly. We will approach the client appropriately through existing contacts. However, neither are we able to verify misuse ourselves, nor are we technically able to stop it."


Intelligence and surveillance provided by EU Member States

A number of EU governments have provided intelligence and surveillance assistance packages directly to governments whose security forces have used such intelligence to target perceived opponents such as human rights defenders, trade unionists and journalists. Such "opponents" have subsequently faced intimidation, arrest and sometimes torture and execution.

Colombia:
In its ongoing conflict with left-wing guerrillas and drug-trafficking cartels, the Colombian government has been the recipient of direct MSP assistance from a number of states. The vast majority of this MSP aid has come from the US Plan Colombia programme. However, a number of EU states have been significant providers of additional MSP support, including surveillance and intelligence assistance.

It has been reported that two Spanish satellites will be made available to the Colombian government, one for observation and another for communication. The majority of information will come from the Helios 1B reconnaissance satellite, which was launched in 1999, jointly financed by Spain, Italy and France. In 2004, France, Belgium and Spain will launch Helios 2, a satellite with infra-red technology able to undertake night-time intelligence photographs. Military intelligence collected by this second satellite will also reportedly be provided to Colombia. Spain will also provide assistance and collaboration in the "fight against terrorism" with eavesdropping equipment and intelligence training developed in its fight against ETA.(302)

It was reported in March 2003 that Colombia had asked for further military intelligence assistance from the British government.(303) According to the Colombian media the UK may be providing support in the creation of the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CENIT, National Intelligence Centre, a body to coordinate all Colombian security force intelligence operations.(304) On a visit to Colombia in July 2003 Nicholas Sarkozy, the French Minister of the Interior, renewed his pledge to support the Colombian government and signed an agreement which included exchange of intelligence data.(305)

Amnesty International is also concerned that the US military Forward Operation Locations (FOLs) in the Dutch islands of Curaçao and Aruba, as well as El Salvador and Ecuador, from where US aerial intelligence flight operations are reportedly coordinated over Colombia and other countries of the Andean region could facilitate human rights violations. A number of Dutch NGOs are currently coordinating efforts to raise concerns on agreements reached between the US government and the Dutch government for the operation of FOLs in Curaçao and Aruba. It is interesting to note that in the USA's Plan Colombia there is a budget allocation of around USD 54 million to upgrade the Aruba FOL and the Curaçao FOL.(306)

Given the failure by the Colombian authorities to significantly reduce human rights violations by the security forces and particularly by the security force-backed paramilitaries, there can be no guarantees that this intelligence support will not be used by military units operating in collusion with paramilitary structures or to help coordinate paramilitary operations. The Colombian authorities have not yet fulfilled UN requirements to ensure that all Colombian military intelligence files are revised and the data contained on human rights defenders and other legitimate civil society representatives made public. In a letter to President Uribe, dated 11 June 2003, Colombian non-governmental human rights organizations called on the government to revise military intelligence files and ensure that if any of these files contained information which justified legal proceedings these should be undertaken observing all the guarantees for a fair and impartial trial or investigation and if they contained no such information the file should be destroyed.

A report by the UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani, had expressed concern about practices of the Colombian police and the army against human rights defenders, in particular the keeping of intelligence files containing false information about human rights defenders and the tapping of telephones of NGO offices. According to information provided to her, there are clear parallels between the information collected by military intelligence regarding human rights defenders and the information that appears in public threats issued by paramilitary forces.(307)

Internet "blocking" and surveillance

Article 6 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states that: "Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others [...] freely to publish, impart to disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and fundamental freedoms [as well as] to study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and appropriate means, to draw attention to those matters." (308) However in many countries human rights organisations have detailed attempts by the authorities to block access to the internet, censure the content of internet web sites and harass and intimidate internet users.

For example in Togo, Amnesty International received reports that the authorities informed an internet café owner that internet access would be cut during the hours immediately after the election in June 2003. For some months previously Togolese authorities had, in fact, censored some Internet sites by preventing access from Togo. This measure seems to have been taken after September 2002 when the website letogolais.com published an interview with the former Prime Minister, Agbéyomé Kodjo, currently in exile, which criticized the way political power was exercised in Togo. In the same period, the authorities also prevented access from Togo to other websites, including that of the UFC opposition party.(309)

Saudi Arabia has provided limited Internet Access via a government controlled 'gateway' at King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology. (310) However, the access is through a special telephone number which can be identified by the primary exchange(311) (and presumably monitored) and it has been reported that the Saudi government have deployed web monitoring that is more 'sophisticated' than just blocking or filtering access to specific "undesirable" web addresses. It was reported that "users who attempt to access banned sites reportedly receive warnings on their computer screens that their access attempts are being logged."(312)

China and the Great Firewall:
It is China that is thought to have in place the most extensive censorship of the Internet of any country in the world.(313)

Up to 7 January 2004, Amnesty International had recorded(314) the names of 54 people who had been detained or imprisoned for disseminating their beliefs or information through the Internet - a 60 per cent increase compared to figures recorded at the end of 2002. (315) Those detained for downloading information from the Internet, expressing their opinions or circulating information on the Internet or by email include students, political dissidents, Falun Gong practitioners, workers, writers, lawyers, teachers, civil servants, former police officers, engineers, and businessmen. Signing online petitions, calling for reform and an end to corruption, planning to set up a pro-democracy party, publishing 'rumours about SARS(316)', communicating with groups abroad, opposing the persecution of the Falun Gong and calling for a review of the 1989 crackdown on the democracy protests are all examples of activities considered by the authorities to be "subversive" or to "endanger state security". Such charges almost always result in prison sentences. Prison sentences ranged from two to 12 years.

Many of those arrested have been held for long periods, sometimes for over a year, awaiting a formal trial and for some there has been a long delay between trial and sentencing. All are believed to have been denied full and adequate access to lawyers and their families, particularly during the initial stages of police detention, and several have reported being tortured or ill-treated. Such violations of the right to a fair trial and to freedom from torture or ill-treatment often contravene provisions of China's Criminal Procedure Law as well as international human rights standards.

Huang Qi is notable for being the first person in China to be arrested for posting articles concerning human rights and political issues on his own website. After his trial in August 2001, he continued to be detained for almost two years before his sentence was finally announced on 9 May 2003 - five years' imprisonment for "inciting subversion". By that time Huang Qi had spent a total of almost three years in detention. This was taken into account in his sentencing and he is due to be released in June 2005. It remains unclear why it took so long for the sentence to be announced after the trial. Huang Qi filed an appeal on 18 May 2003 pointing out that China's Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and of the press. During his appeal hearing, prison guards reportedly held him down by the throat as he tried to speak in his defence. In August 2003 his appeal was turned down and the five-year sentence upheld.

According to the court verdict, the prosecution cited evidence which included reference to the posting of an Amnesty International document on Huang Qi's website. Amnesty International believes that merely publishing names of individuals imprisoned following the 1989 pro-democracy protests on the Internet can never amount to "inciting subversion". After his appeal Huang Qi was transferred to Chuanzhong high security prison, in Nanchong in Sichuan Province. Following a visit by representatives of the international non-governmental organization, Reporters Without Borders in October 2003, Huang Qi was reportedly placed in solitary confinement and then moved to a punishment cell. He is reported to be in poor health.

Many of the toughest regulations to control the Internet have been issued since 2000 and those who cause "especially serious harm" by providing "state secrets" to overseas organizations and individuals over the Internet can be sentenced to death. As all communication on the Internet in China passes through government-controlled routers the authorities are able to block access to many sites and to filter content and delete individual links or web pages if considered "dangerous" or "subversive". No list is publicly available on what is filtered and blocked, but one study done by the Harvard Law School found that over 50,000 of 204,000 web sites tested were inaccessible from at least one location in China although some were accessible from the USA. (317)

Amnesty International has reported how, over the past year, websites using banned words such as 'Taiwan', 'Tibet', 'democracy', 'dissident', 'Falun Gong' and 'human rights', have continued to be regularly blocked, together with the websites of international human rights groups, including Amnesty International, and several foreign news sites. In addition, several new regulations have devolved greater responsibilities for control of the Internet to Internet cafes, companies and, most recently, portals providing news. In October 2003, the Ministry of Culture announced that by the year 2005 all China's 110,000 Internet cafes will need to install surveillance software which would be standardised throughout all Internet cafes in China. The Ministry of Culture also intends to issue licenses to allow up to 100 companies to manage the majority of Internet cafes. According to Liu Qiang, a senior official with the Ministry of Culture, the management companies would be required to use software that would make it possible to collect personal data of Internet users, to store a record of all the web-pages visited and alert the authorities when unlawful content was viewed. On 20 November 2003 the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued rules for approximately 30 large companies that manage Internet addresses in China. While these regulations appear to be intended to improve service standards, they are also aimed at strengthening control over sensitive information posted on the web.

As China's burgeoning economy grows and with its admission in December 2001 to the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign ownership, investment and involvement of foreign companies in China's telecommunications industry have soared. One foreign investor, Nortel Networks, announced in September 2003 that it plans to invest US$200 million over the next three years to strengthen its research and development capabilities in China.

Amnesty International remains concerned that in their pursuit of new and lucrative markets, foreign corporations may be indirectly contributing to human rights violations or at the very least failing to give adequate consideration to the human rights implications of their investments. In its first report on State Control of the Internet in China, Amnesty International cited several foreign companies (Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Nortel Networks, Websense and Sun Microsystems – many of whom have production or distribution operations in the European Union), which had reportedly provided technology which has been used to censor and control the use of the Internet in China. Amnesty International urges all companies which have provided such technology to China to use their contacts and influence with the Chinese authorities to bring an end to restrictions on freedom of expression and information on the Internet and to urge the release of all those detained for Internet-related offences in violation of their fundamental human rights.(318)


Key lessons to be learned
Despite evidence from Amnesty International and other human rights groups about the extent to which communication and surveillance systems have contributed to, or facilitated "internal repression" in China, and other countries, EU governments seem to have paid little regard to this aspect of export control.

All EU governments and the European Commission should review their export control policies with regard to the export of "dual-use" goods and their obligations under Operative Provision 6 of the EU Code of Conduct so as to develop further specific mechanisms to ensure that that the transfer of sophisticated communication and surveillance systems is not permitted to countries where such systems are likely to be used to facilitate human rights violations.