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Western Europe

Control Arms Campaign in Europe

Contents

Introduction

Basic flaws in the EU Export Control Criteria

Transfers of "Surplus" Arms

Failures to Control Transit and Trans-shipment

Arms brokering and transport services

Licensed Production Overseas

Components for Military and Security Systems

Private Military and Security Services

Transfers of MSP personnel, expertise and training

Surveillance and "Intelligence" Technologies

Security Equipment used for Torture and Ill-Treatment

Monitoring and Controlling End Use

Transparency and Reporting

Flaws in the EU Code and the Accession Process

An Arms Export Agenda for the Expanded EU

References

13. Transparency and Reporting

Amnesty International believes that an essential component of demonstrating commitment to the EU Code and related national and regional control mechanisms is that EU Member States enable effective parliamentary and public scrutiny of the decisions taken to authorize the export of military, security or police (MSP) equipment. This can only occur when governments provide detailed and timely information to the public and their elected officials on the MSP transfers authorized and delivered.

Nearly all EU Member States and the new Member States have made improvements in the information that they provide on MSP transfers, albeit in many cases only after extensive public pressure. However, it remains the case that very few EU governments provide the level and extent of information that is necessary to enable effective parliamentary and public scrutiny to ensure that MSP transfers do not contribute to, or facilitate, human rights violations.

The absence of some types of information directly reflects loopholes and flaws in EU Member States' export control systems. Clearly, if a state's export control legislation does not cover activities such as arms brokering or licensed production agreements, or does not control the transfer of private military training, or products such as stun guns or leg irons, then that government is unlikely to have records of such activities or transfers.

However, even where states do control or authorise types of MSP transfers, most EU governments provide little or no useful information on those transfers, for example on government-to-government transfers, many dual use goods or military or police assistance and training to foreign governments. Few EU governments provide detailed descriptions of the products that are licensed for export, even fewer provide details of the quantities of weapons actually exported or the specific end-user. This type of information is vital to enable parliamentarians and the public to hold governments to account.

This section contains two detailed examples from Ireland and the UK that were chosen to try and examine how, even where governments do publish annual reports on export licensing decisions, it is still very difficult, if not impossible, to understand what exports have been authorised. In some ways this focus is unfair on the Irish and UK governments because they do make publicly available more data than most other EU governments. But this is also a powerful argument for the other governments to improve their own reporting and transparency, and for the EU Member States to agree appropriate reporting standards to enable meaningful scrutiny.

United Kingdom: lack of transparency
Recent analysis undertaken for Amnesty International, Oxfam and IANSA of the UK Strategic Export Controls reports for 1998 – 2002(390) has shown several marked trends. Firstly, there had been a significant increase in the number of countries receiving UK export licences for "components for assault rifles" compared to "finished" assault rifles. This issue was raised by the NGOs because from 2000, when the UK government began to report the numbers of small arms licensed in each application, the number of licences issued for "finished" small arms has remained relatively constant, with a slight downward trend. This contrasts significantly with the dramatic increase in the licences being authorized for "components for" small arms. But although licences authorized for small arms components are reported, the number of components included within each licence is not, so it is very hard to scrutinise the scale of this trade. This is a major failing in the transparency of the UK government's annual reports.

The second trend identified was that there was an even greater increase in the use by the UK government of Open Individual Exports Licences (OIELs) for assault rifle components, rising from only two occurrences in 1999 to 23 in 2002, which represents an 11-fold increase (See Chart 2). The use of such licences can create serious gaps in public information because open licences allow the exporting company to make multiple shipments to specified destinations, and the amount of equipment exported under these licences is not recorded by the UK authorities. Indeed, in 2002, OIELs for assault rifle components accounted for approximately one-third of all licences issued for assault rifles. It is clear from this data that small arms components are subject to a much lower level of reporting than for complete or "finished" weapons. Starting with the 2000 Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls, the UK government had included details of the numbers of small arms licensed for export. However, the government does not currently provide any information on the numbers of components licensed for export via Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) and provides no details of numbers on either "components for" small arms or "finished" small arms that are authorized via open licences (OIELs). It is therefore much more difficult for the UK parliament to hold the UK government to account to ensure the protection of human rights.

Of particular concern to Amnesty International is that companies exporting from the UK to at least 16 countries that manufacture small arms (including assault rifles, machine guns, and revolvers) have received export licences for "components for" small arms since 1998. Many of these recipient manufacturers are located within Europe or North America, where export control systems are fairly robust and transparent, but still contain loopholes. More worryingly however, "components for" small arms have also been authorized for export to countries where arms export controls are either far less stringent or to countries which, not being in the EU, are not bound by EU embargoes. These countries include Brazil, Turkey, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea. Since 1998, each of these countries have exported arms to at least one destination where security forces have carried out a pattern of human rights violations, including Myanmar, Indonesia, Guatemala, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

Since the UK government currently provides no data on the amounts of components being licensed for export, the "components for" small arms could be for foreign assembly and re-export, or the components themselves could be for re-export to other countries. For example, in 2002 the UK government authorized the export of "components for grenade launcher" to Singapore. Since 1994, Chartered Firearms Industries of Singapore (now ST Kinetics) has had a licensed-production agreement with PT Pindad in Indonesia for the production of the CIS 40-AGL 40mm automatic grenade launcher.(391) Given the serious pattern of human rights violations committed by the Indonesian security forces, the inadequate end-use monitoring and reporting system practiced by the UK government means that British SALW components may be diverted for end-users who would not receive direct export authorization from the UK.

German "best practice"
In contrast to the inadequacy of the UK government's reporting of arms component exports, the German government has begun some partial reporting of the quantity of such parts and components. In its 2002 Rustungsexportbericht (Military Equipment Export Report), details are given of exports of SALW (excluding pistols, revolvers, sports and hunting weapons) and parts/components to non-EU and non-NATO countries.(392)

Comtrade (Customs) data

All EU Member States collect data on their own imports and exports both within (intra) the EU and outside (extra) the EU. A series of harmonized custom codes (or 'tariffs') has been developed to describe the various types of products that are traded. There are a number of tariffs that are used for arms, ammunition and other defence equipment. For example: "9302 0010 Revolvers and pistols: 9mm calibre and higher" and "9302 0090 Revolvers and pistols below 9mm caliber."(393)

This means that a government agency within each EU country (and many others worldwide) is collecting data on the imports and exports of a range of small arms and defence equipment. This data should include details of the destination country, the value (in US dollars), the weight (in Kg) and the number of items. Unfortunately, many governments choose not to provide details on the trade in military weapons using such data, or only publish partial data. In addition, many governments refuse to make the data publicly available in a dis-aggregated form.

For example, over the last few years the UK government's Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls have purported to provide details (using the Customs data) of the value of exports of "small arms" while in reality failing to do so because the UK government has deliberately chosen to aggregate several Custom tariff codes together for small arms, light weapons and larger arms. This published information is virtually useless for any meaningful analysis. The UK government has chosen to include the following codes as "small arms"(394):

9301 11001,2 Artillery weapons (eg guns, howitzers, mortars) – self propelled
9301 19001,2 Artillery weapons (eg guns, howitzers, mortars) – other than self propelled
9301 20001,2 Rocket launchers; flame throwers; grenade launchers; torpedo tubes & similar projectors
9301 90001,2 Other military weapons (exc. Revolvers, pistols and the arms of heading 9307)
9302 0010 Revolvers and pistols: 9mm calibre and higher.
9302 0090 Revolvers and pistols below 9mm calibre.

This means that the values provided in the UK Annual Reports could be for a very large number of "revolvers" or for one expensive "self-propelled howitzer". Thus, the UK reporting system does not provide transparent reporting or allow for effective parliamentary scrutiny to hold the UK government accountable for the protection of human rights and its other international obligations. Amnesty International believes, therefore, that this policy of aggregating data is unacceptable and requires urgent correction so that meaningful UK Customs data is made publicly available. The excuse of "disproportionate cost" sometimes used by the UK government to deny public information is irrelevant because the data is already collected by the UK Customs authorities. Nor is the excuse that the data is "commercially confidential" a valid excuse to withhold meaningful export information from the public and parliament as it is possible to provide meaningful export data which does not divulge the names of specific companies and in any case the companies themselves should not be above scrutiny when it comes to UK responsibilities to protect human rights and other international obligations.

Burkina Faso and Pakistan
It is encouraging that a number of countries are increasingly publishing detailed reports of imports (and in some cases) exports of small arms, light weapons and associated security equipment, thus enabling greater scrutiny of such transfers and end-use destinations. Although in some cases the information is only available for a temporary period.

For example the government of Burkina Faso has published details of the authorizations given to companies in Burkino Faso to import small arms and ammunition. The level of detail given goes far beyond that which could be obtained from analysis of the same transfer from information provided by most exporting states. For example, the table below shows the January 2003 authorization given to the Ouago Arm company to import a range of pistols and ammunition, including 110 CZ pistols, originally from the Czech Republic. (395)

The following countries could also have received products within those categories via "Global licences" issued between 2000 –2002 that covered: Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates. According to the DETE a "Global licence" can be issued when an "unusually large number of licences are required for the export of dual-use items…to prevent the creation of an undue administrative burden for the exporter" and is valid for six months.(405) Although, global licences are granted on the understanding that the licence is not valid for military or security users, it is unclear if that restriction applies if the recipient of the dual-use components is a civilian company.

In addition, the following countries could receive such dual-use goods via the Community General Export Authorisation (CGEA) without the details being reported in the export licence statistics that the DETE currently makes publicly available, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, United States of America.

Although the DETE licence data has included an indication of the end use of the dual use items, Amnesty International has concerns about the lack of transparency of such reporting. Arms-related companies in France, India, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the USA have all reported using SHARC or TigerSHARC products in a range of military electronic warfare or surveillance systems – which may then be exported to other countries. For example, according to a detailed agreement between Thales Nederland and CNPEP Radwar, a Polish company, Squire battlefield surveillance radar systems - which are equipped with Analog Devices SHARC digital signal processors - will be made for export to third countries.(406)

Ireland's need to improve monitoring and reporting
Ireland has granted licences for the 3A001a2 and 3A001a7 dual-use categories to a number of the countries where civilian companies or "end-users" have publicly reported using SHARC processors in a range of military or police surveillance products.

Furthermore other Irish-based dual-use manufacturers continue to announce their success in obtaining defence-related contracts.(407) Amnesty International finds it difficult to reconcile these announcements with the Irish government claims that all dual-use export licences have been granted solely for "civilian" end use.

The basic problem is that it is not currently possible, from the information provided by the DETE, for the Irish parliament or for NGOs such as Amnesty International to establish whether such as the SHARC processors have been authorized for export to countries for incorporation into military or police systems for use in that country (or for subsequent re-export to countries) to facilitate human rights violations by the ultimate end-user. Amnesty International believes that the current level of detail in the information that the Irish government makes available does not allow effective parliamentary or public scrutiny.

Lessons to be learned

Parliamentary and public scrutiny is crucial to help ensure that all EU governments do not licence transfers of MSP arms, equipment, technology, components and services that will contribute to internal repression, regional conflict or breach relevant embargoes. However, such scrutiny is only possible if EU governments improve the detail and clarity of their reporting mechanisms. Crucial to this end is the provision of sufficiently detailed and timely information on export licences granted for such MSP transfers and corresponding data on deliveries actually made.