



“Shadow Report” on Brazil’s 2008 PoA Implementation Update **Daniel Mack, Instituto Sou da Paz**

Heeding the invitation made in the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects, encouraging “civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts to implement the present Programme of Action”, we offer this “shadow report” on Brazil’s implementation of its PoA commitments.

One must commence acknowledging that Brazil has taken significant strides in gun control matters since the inception of the PoA, and has largely complied with the commitments it entails. Although much is left to do, Brazil has made tremendous advances, especially in comparison with other countries in the region and across the globe. The simple action of submitting a report must be praised, as only 12 of 40 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean fulfilled this duty for the present BMS in a timely fashion. Any criticism that follows includes the awareness that the limitations in reporting and implementation are also indicative symptoms of greater difficulties with the PoA process in general shared by a vast majority of countries.

Still, Brazil’s 2008 BMS report does justice neither to the impressive recent gains the country has achieved in the area of gun control nor to the obstacles encountered in the process. The text is strikingly similar to its 2005 counterpart, with exact repetitions to a worrisome extent. Surely, both Brazil’s success and difficulties – and the PoA process itself – deserve more careful consideration from a country that still leads the world in number of annual deaths due to firearms (over 35,000), despite a significant fall in the last years. The similarities also suggest that many developments that should be taking place – according to the PoA commitments and national legislation– are unfortunately not.

Brazil’s report rightly places much emphasis on legislative aspects of gun control, but fails to attach the same importance to the real world implementation of the country’s strong law. Since the Disarmament Statute was promulgated, the number of gun related deaths has decreased considerably, a 12% fall from 2003 to 2006 according to a recent Ministry of Health study. These results have been vastly celebrated by government and civil society alike, as they prove that the central tenets of the law – civilians being prohibited from carrying guns and greater restrictions to ownership – have had a very positive impact.

Yet, Brazil is in no position to rest on the laurels of passing the Disarmament Statute, momentarily important as it was. The report simply lists the laws and regulations that govern gun control, as well as manufacture, import/export, and marking, followed by an explanation of the Brazilian Army’s role in the process repeated from the 2005 report. The real-world implementation of the law, that is, how the tough legislation is actually

being enforced, is mostly absent from the report but constitutes the lifeblood of gun control, without which the legislation can be a toothless paper tiger.

The lackadaisical attitude regarding implementation is reflected in the lack of numbers and data that plague the entirety of the report. For instance, on “Law Enforcement and Criminalization”, while offering a complete list of crimes and penalties and noting stiffer penalties for gun-related crimes, there is no notion of how often these are being enforced. Though the information is not shared with civil society, one assumes that the federal government knows, for example, how many people have been convicted for illegally possessing firearms of restricted use (military weapons) or for internationally trafficking firearms. This information is essential in order to determine how well the law is actually being implemented, that is, its real results for safety on the streets. The same can be said for numbers of apprehended, destroyed, produced, sold, exported, registered and diverted guns, all also absent.

(With this in mind, Instituto Sou da Paz, in partnership with the Brazilian Disarmament Network – composed of over 70 local organizations in 25 Brazilian states – plans to launch a study over the next year which will investigate and analyze how the law is being enforced by each responsible party. For a civil society attempt to partially remedy this vacuum with the information currently available, please see this report’s addendum).

While focusing on the legal aspects of gun control, the report does not mention that the legislation in question is not entirely safe. The Disarmament Statute has been under legislative attack since its inception, and suffered some near calls in the previous year that could have badly damaged it. Two “provisional measures” sent by the Executive branch to Congress in order to postpone the deadline for the slow-paced re-registration of firearms were “high-jacked” by parliamentarians intent on relaxing the law through amendments. Though such maneuvers do not represent the will of the majority of lawmakers – 9 members proposed 80% of the amendments – the nature of the alterations was often quite radical. These included giving gun-carrying rights to lawyers, truck drivers and income tax auditors, diminishing the legal age for purchasing guns from 25 to 18 for several categories, and retiring all requirements such as psychological and shooting tests for some calibers.

Thanks to the concerted effort of pro-gun control lawmakers and civil society, these provisional measures were rebuked and substituted by provisional measure 417, approved by Congress in late May and a much better – albeit not perfect – reform to the Disarmament Statute (see below). Still, much work must be done – by well-intentioned law makers, the Federal government and civil society alike – to protect Brazil’s legislation against constant attempt to relax its strong and effective measures.

Complementing the record straight

In addition to the aforementioned absences, from a civil society interpretation some of the information presented in the report is either incomplete or not entirely accurate. Many stated facts cannot be corroborated by independent sources, mostly due to the secretive nature of the military’s role in gun control. The Brazilian Army, responsible for many aspects of implementing gun control, is anathema to sharing information, holding onto a belief that it constitutes a national security issue – rather than one that would benefit from civilian oversight and transparency.

No surprise then, for example, that Brazil’s report contains no information on stockpile management and security (PoA II.17), which should be a focus given the constant appearance of military and police weapons in the hands of criminals. While the report rightfully states that the Army is responsible for destroying surplus and seized weapons and ammunition, there are some concerns regarding delays in the destruction process. Moreover, while hoping it is true, the press and civil society are unable to confirm that “military inspection is mandatory at point-of entry and exit”.

In the same manner, it would be helpful to gain more information on another aspect controlled by the Brazilian Army, export controls, which are explained only on their legislative surface (decree 3665, also known as R-105). Civil society, concerned with where weapons are sent and how the decision to send them is made, would be especially interested in knowing the exact number and destination of exported firearms, as well as having access to the National Export Policy for Military-Use Materials (PNEMEM), a secret policy document from the military dictatorship that establishes the guidelines for authorizing exports. Such secrecy does not dovetail with a very positive aspect of Brazilian export controls, enforced by the DFPC agency: end-user certificates (PoA II.12), which are always demanded and contain a significant amount of essential information, such as name and address of importer and exporter, final destination and purchaser, contract number, and detailed description of the goods.

Regarding registration systems, the information that both the civilian (SINARM) and military (SIGMA) firearm registries are “mutually accessible” is not fully corroborated by facts, as the systems have not been duly connected. While the report notes that “every effort” is being made to integrate the two systems “despite the undeniable difficulties”, by force of law this should have been completed on July 1st 2005. It has still not occurred despite the mentioned “increased attention over the last years”. Likewise, the necessary upload of information into SINARM when weapons are stolen or seized by police – a responsibility of state governments rather than federal authorities – is likewise not occurring satisfactorily. With the exception of the police forces from a couple states, reports indicate that the majority of states are failing miserably in sharing this information, which is vital for tracking guns that have or may be used in crimes.

The noted “growing awareness in Brazil regarding the importance of controlling firearms” is indeed undeniable, and an excellent example of how the federal and state governments can efficiently work with organized civil society. The noted “Disarmament Campaign” (voluntary gun buy-back) that collected almost half a million guns was indeed a momentous development and had a direct correlation with the celebrated reverse to the homicide rates. In fact, Brazil’s experience on this matter is so significant that it would do well to share the details of its disarmament efforts – in accordance to PoA II.21 – as a world leader and pioneer in this field.

In the matter of awareness-raising, however, Brazil has done very little since that groundbreaking campaign, though reportedly will engage the public once more this year as part of the new gun buy-back and re-registration effort rendered possible by provisional measure 417. Despite the lack of recent public destructions – in accordance with PoA II.20 – the same article’s “voluntary surrender” activities deserve much praise.

Regarding the issue of cooperation and assistance, the report perfectly notes the need for greater efforts in this arena in order to fulfill the PoA objectives, and also rightly emphasizes bilateral, multinational and regional cooperation. It should also note that Brazil has much to teach neighbors and other nations around the world still grappling with gun control issues, especially as regards the passing of strong legislation and the logistics of implementing an extremely successful buy-back campaign. Thus, in many areas – such as those comprised in the PoA commitments III.3 to III.7 – Brazil can offer essential assistance to many countries. Likewise, Brazil’s successes with marking guns and ammunition could serve as important reference to countries wishing to develop their systems and procedures.

For a more comprehensive report

Following the template developed by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to help national governments report on their PoA implementation would be a helpful exercise towards a more complete report. In comparison, one notices that several important aspects are absent in Brazil’s report. One such issue is the lack of the requested web links that could allow the reader to gain more information about a given legislative or policy aspect (see Addendum). Likewise, the question “how have these measures been implemented”, oft-repeated in the report template, is utterly ignored in Brazil’s report, which as aforementioned is arguably its greatest shortcoming.

A comparison between Brazil’s report and that of neighboring countries also can be quite instructive as to manners in which to ameliorate reporting in coming years. As noted, only 12 of 40 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean submitted reports for the current BMS in a timely fashion. While Brazil’s report is not as complete and detailed as we would have hoped, in all fairness the average report on PoA implementation tends to be disappointing as regards to the detail and comprehensiveness of the information. In fact, some other reports from Latin American nations are little more than perfunctory exercises marked by extreme brevity and utter lack of information. However, some countries point to a direction to be emulated. For instance, Colombia’s report, at a colossal 130 pages, contains a plethora of essential information.

Though surely Brazil lacks issues that Colombia must report on (such as demobilization), it should take notice of the importance of including very detailed information not only on legislation and procedures, but also on technical issues (such as marking – which Colombia explains for each gun model and type of ammunition) and especially gun-related data (for instance, Colombia presents complete tables of apprehended guns and ammunition for the previous two years by type and state jurisdiction in which they occurred). Colombia’s report also points to the importance of following the proposed ODA template item-by-item in order to achieve a more comprehensive report.

Likewise, Argentina’s report (2007) should be commended for its comprehensive numbers on gun destruction as well as detailed information about civil society activities. Reports from Ecuador, Mexico and Nicaragua also helpfully note the numbers of guns apprehended. Several countries, such as Ecuador, Mexico and Nicaragua candidly report on “challenges and obstacles” faced in PoA implementation, often including honest *mea culpas* which can serve as departure points for better implementation.

The good news: examples of effective real world PoA implementation

After the caveats and criticisms, it is only fair to conclude with the aspects of PoA implementation and gun control that Brazil has performed extremely well, whether included or not in the country’s 2008 BMS report.

From the report, several aspects are noteworthy. Commendably, and as mentioned, the arms embargoes established by the UN Security Council have been duly incorporated into Brazil’s national legislation in a timely fashion, through presidential decrees. For example, the embargo on Liberia – decided by the UN on December 20th 2006 – became law in Brazil through this mechanism on February 1st 2007. Likewise, the embargo on the Ivory Coast only took five days more. There are no official reports that Brazil’s government or industry have disrespected a UN-issued arms embargo.

On the global level, we enthusiastically welcome the following sentence: “Brazil firmly supports the adoption of common standards on small arms and light weapons import, export and transit controls, provided that such standards are objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and negotiated through the framework of the United Nations”. This sentiment echoes Brazil’s constructive approach regarding the work towards an Arms Trade Treaty at the UN, where it has been an active actor in the Group of Governmental Experts discussing the ATT’s proposed “feasibility, scope and parameters”. We also applaud the report’s reference to the “urgent need to halt and prohibit transfers to non-State actors who are not authorized by competent authorities of the importing State”.

At the regional level, Brazil’s report correctly reflects the country’s emphasis and positive stance in forums such as MERCOSUL and the Organization of American States. Brazil was a leading actor in establishing regional mechanisms such as CIFTA and CICAD, but also works at the implementation level through the MERCOSUL Working Group on Arms, for instance, on nuts-and-bolts issues such as customs, information-sharing and administrative procedures. Also essential are the many noted training courses with officials from neighboring countries that Brazil has been responsible for.

The report also reflects a changed point of contact within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from COCIT (General Coordination for Combat of Transnational Illicit Acts) to DDS (Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies). With absolutely no demerit to the former responsible office, the change – explained as a merely administrative move as both offices remain jointly responsible for the matter – can be construed in a positive light, as DDS has had a good level of openness and dialogue with civil society on a plethora of disarmament matters.

Regarding aspects not fully fleshed out in Brazil’s report, it may be helpful to further delve into three highly successful aspects related to PoA implementation at the national level: strengthening gun control legislation with a significant impact on gun homicides (PoA II.3), law enforcement by identifying illegal possessions and getting firearms off the streets (PoA II.6), and public awareness programs with voluntary surrender of small arms in cooperation with civil society (PoA II.20).

As mentioned before, Brazil took a major leap regarding PoA II.3 with the Disarmament Statute, which became arguably the continent’s strictest gun control law when enacted in 2003. The law’s central determination, criminalizing civilians carrying

a gun (though possessing one at home is still allowed under strict requirements), was instrumental in the aforementioned 12% drop in gun-related homicides between 2003 and 2006. In fact, 2003 was the first time in 13 years that homicides decreased. Such impact occurred especially because contrary to popular belief, it is not the nexus between organized crime and cocaine trafficking that causes the majority of firearm deaths in Brazil, but rather interpersonal conflicts (mundane arguments, bar brawls, traffic disputes, football disagreements) that become lethal with immediate access to a gun.

According to police reports, the fear of being imprisoned without bail and with increased penalties for carrying a gun illegally – especially in the locations with aggressive enforcement – has noticeably diminished the numbers of people carrying weapons. In addition to the carrying ban, other central innovations of the law – such as the centralized registry, tougher requirements to purchase, procedures to reduce guns in circulation, marking, increased controls on police weapons and ammunition controls – have likewise proven to have an essential impact. Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Health study that quantified the fall in deaths noted that “the first factor mentioned by the analyses as significant in the reduction of homicides in Brazil was the impact of the creation of the Disarmament Statute and of the gun collection actions on the deaths by firearm”.¹

Though not implemented nationally in a uniform fashion, law enforcement actions relative to PoA II.6 have also been essential in garnering positive results for gun apprehensions. Prime examples are the intelligence work, geo-reference/database technologies and gun seizure efforts the police forces in the state of São Paulo have put into place in order to identify and imprison those illegally carrying guns. The effect – combined with the legislative backing and gun buy-back campaign allowed by the Disarmament Statute – has been nothing short of sensational. The murder rate in São Paulo – which reached 35.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1999 – is currently on the brink of reaching the level of 10 per 100,000, deemed “acceptable” by international organizations.² In percentage terms, this means a 60.7% drop in only 8 years, an outcome compared to the most impressive case studies worldwide, like Bogotá and New York. While only one of several reasons for the decrease, the numbers of gun seizures the São Paulo police have turned out over the past few years are quite impressive: over 155 thousand guns were apprehended in the state between 2003 and 2007, roughly 85 guns per day taken off the streets.³

A forward-looking example of the effective implementation of the PoA will be the new edition of the voluntary gun buy-back campaign, poised to occur in the second semester of 2008. Building on the tremendous success of the first campaign, which between July 2004 and October 2005 collected over 460,000 guns (making it the second largest of all time), this next phase will seek to collect or re-register firearms, as around 4 million guns are estimated to be in the hands of civilians who are otherwise law-abiding

¹ The Ministry of Health study is available at:

http://www.deolhonoestatuto.org.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=195&Itemid=112

² Ted Goertzel and Túlio Kahn, “Brazil: The Unsung Story of São Paulo’s Dramatic Murder Rate Drop”, May 2007

³ Secretaria de Segurança Pública (São Paulo). According to police reports, the number of guns apprehended has diminished considerably since the Disarmament Statute, as less people are carrying guns. “SP: apreensão de armas cai 40,7% após estatuto”, Terra, June 29, 2008, <http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/interna/0,,OI2976058-EI306,00.html>

citizens. The re-launch of the campaign has been made possible by recently approved provisional measure 417, which determines that the campaign become indefinite, that is, people can from now on always be reimbursed for guns they decide to surrender.

Importantly, in the initial phases to determine the public awareness media campaign and strategic messages, the Ministry of Justice has drawn heavily from civil society experience, involving NGO representatives in all meetings and working in tandem towards the implementation of the campaign. An example of the government’s goodwill was the recent sponsorship of a seminar bringing together 50 civil society representatives of the Brazilian Disarmament Network to discuss the initial steps for the 2008 campaign. In addition to the initial plans, civil society is slated to be intimately involved in the application of the buy-back campaign, collecting guns at NGOs, churches and other locations – a combination between government and civil society that proved very fruitful in the first campaign.

These three examples of successful implementation of the PoA in preventing and combating the illicit trade of firearms point to the real-world success – measurable in hard numbers – a country can enjoy when honoring its commitments and carrying out effective PoA implementation. While it should strengthen both the comprehensiveness of its reports and the implementation of measures that still resist being transformed from legislative intentions to public policy, Brazil must be deemed to be on the correct path towards greater gun control and less armed violence.

Addendum: Numbers!

1 – Firearm deaths

With less than 3% of the world’s population, Brazil accounts for 13% of the planet’s deaths by firearms. Between 1993 and 2003, an estimated 325,000 Brazilians were killed with guns – one every fifteen minutes. The numbers have fallen since 2003:

Year	Firearm deaths	Variation from previous year	Variation in %	Rate by 100,000
2003	39.325	+1.347	+3,5%	22
2004	37.113	-2.212	-5,6%	20
2005	36.060	-1.053	-3,2%	19
2006	34.648	-1.412	-4,0%	18
Reduction 03/06		-4.677	-12,0%	-18%

Source: Brazilian Ministry of Health

2 – Guns produced and exported

Brazil reportedly produced **2.3 million firearms** between 2002 and 2006, of which 1.7 million were exported and at least 531,000 entered the domestic market. Of the weapons exported by Brazil’s main producer, Taurus, a reported 70% of exports went to the United States. As for ammunition production, between 2000 and 2003 Brazil’s sole producer CBC averaged an output of 253 million cartridges per year, of which over 40% are exported. While Brazil’s small arms industry is the second largest in the Americas, it constitutes a paltry 0.048% of the country’s industrial GDP.

Sources: Agência Brasil (<http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2007/03/24/materia.2007-03-24.2414855059/view>), “*Brasil: As Armas e as Vítimas*,” ISER/Viva Rio, Sete Letras, 2005.

3 – Guns in circulation

According to a 2005 study, Brazil has an estimated **17 million** firearms in circulation between those in the hands of the State, legal owners, unregistered owners and criminals. Of these, only 10% are in the hands of public security forces (armed forces and police). Of the circa 8.5 million illicit guns in private hands, 3.85 million are believed to be in the hands of criminals.

Source: *Brasil: As Armas e as Vítimas*, ISER/Viva Rio, Sete Letras, 2005.

4 – Number of collected guns, by state, in first buy-back campaign (2004-2005)

State	Guns turned in	Population	Guns turned in by 1000 people
São Paulo	138.787	39.827.570	3,4
Paraná	49.233*	10.284.503	3,5
Rio de Janeiro	44.065	15.420.375	2,9
Rio Grande do Sul	33.432	8.485.386	3,1
Minas Gerais	27.000	19.273.506	1,4
Ceará	24.543	8.185.286	3
Pernambuco	23.651	8.485.386	2,8
Bahia	16.766	14.080.654	1,2
Sergipe	16.560	1.939.426	8,4
Santa Catarina	16.159	5.866.252	2,7
Paraíba	12.880	3.641.395	3,6
Alagoas	12.781	3.037.103	4,2
Distrito Federal	8.374	2.455.903	3,6
Mato Grosso Sul	7.306	2.265.274	3,2
Pará	6.125	7.065.573	0,9
Goiás	5.654	5.647.035	1
Espírito Santo	5.275	3.351.669	1,5
Mato Grosso	4.844	2.854.642	1,7
Rio Grande Norte	4.259	3.013.740	1,4
Piauí	3.242	3.032.421	1,1
Maranhão	3.200	6.118.995	0,5
Amazonas	2.825	3.221.939	0,9
Rondônia	1.861	1.453.756	1,2
Tocantins	1.634	1.243.627	1,2
Acre	1.348	655.385	2,1
Amapá	541	587.311	0,9
Roraima	510	395.725	1,3
Total	472.855*	141.997.740	2,5

Source: Federal Police, *Includes 13,000 guns collected in Paraná before the federal campaign.

5 – Number and types of seized weapons by year and type, selected states

State	2005	2006	2007
São Paulo	31.704	25.924	23.443
Rio de Janeiro		13.312	11.062
Espírito Santo		1.641	1.535

Sources: Secretaria de Segurança Pública (São Paulo), Instituto de Segurança Pública (Rio de Janeiro), DHPP (Espírito Santo).

	Brazilian-made	% Revolvers	% Caliber .38	% Registered
RJ (98-03)	78%	61%	41%	19%
SP (03-06)	85%	74%	41%	17%
Brasília (03-06)	87%	63%	59%	37%

Sources: CPI de Tráfico de Armas/ Divisão de Fiscalização de Armas e Explosivos (DFAE), Polícia Civil do Estado do Rio de Janeiro; Divisão de Produtos Controlados de Identificação e Registros Diversos (DIRD) da Polícia Civil do Estado de São Paulo; Divisão de Controle de Armas, Munições e Explosivos (DAME), Departamento de Atividades Especiais, Polícia Civil do Distrito Federal.

6 – Number of first time gun registrations, by state

New Registrations			
State	2005	2006	2007
Acre	7	38	77
Alagoas	187	244	624
Amazonas	256	328	330
Amapá	170	185	68
Bahia	604	762	234
Ceará	375	305	240
Distrito Federal	10.406	17.113	8.350
Espírito Santo	405	211	331
Goiás	256	423	108
Maranhão	14	12	15
Minas Gerais	144	536	416
Mato Grosso do Sul	11	69	96
Mato Grosso	57	12	60
Pará	0	5	58
Paraíba	0	0	2
Pernambuco	65	170	237
Piauí	0	44	47
Paraná	3.219	1.860	1.919
Rio de Janeiro	1.116	1.581	807
Rio Grande do Norte	3	13	31
Rondônia	41	40	44
Roraima	5	30	44
Rio Grande do Sul	766	340	413
Santa Catarina	1.033	872	1.007
Sergipe	0	12	71
São Paulo	3.808	4.046	2.086
Tocantins	29	30	26
TOTAL	22.977	29.281	17.742

Source: Federal Police, SINARM (Sistema Nacional de Registro de Armas de Fogo), 2007

7 – Diversion from public security forces

While total official numbers are not shared, recent cases are illustrative of the magnitude of the problem. In December 2007, two Army soldiers removed 9,000 7.62 caliber bullets from the military depot in Paracambi, reportedly the largest in Latin America, and sold the cargo to drug traffickers in Rio de Janeiro. A congressional investigation (CPI) on arms trafficking, concluded in November 2006, noted that of the 10,549 guns in the hands of criminals and seized by the police in Rio de Janeiro, 18% were originally sold to the state (71,4% were diverted from police forces, 22% from the Army, 4% from the Air Force and 1% from the Navy).

8 – Gun-carrying authorizations issued by state (2007)

State	New authorizations	Renewals	TOTAL
Acre	27	3	30
Alagoas	114	46	164
Amapá	0	0	0
Amazonas	11	2	13
Bahia	57	23	80
Ceará	66	3	70
Distrito Federal	44	23	68
Espírito Santo	77	23	101
Goiás	22	3	26
Maranhão	11	3	15
Mato Grosso	38	9	47
Mato Grosso do Sul	5	1	6
Minas Gerais	146	5	151
Pará	9	1	10
Paraíba	11	1	12
Paraná	26	9	35
Pernambuco	66	13	86
Piauí	2	0	2
Rio de Janeiro	146	34	183
Rio Grande do Norte	5	0	5
Rio Grande do Sul	255	80	340
Rondônia	7	2	9
Roraima	2	2	4
Santa Catarina	11	4	15
São Paulo	69	21	94
Sergipe	14	10	28
Tocantins	7	1	8
Federal Police Dept.	283	116	414
Total	1531	438	2016

Source: Federal Police SINARM (Sistema Nacional de Registro de Armas de Fogo) 2007

9 – Private security gun registrations (for companies, since 2003)

	Private Security	Shooting Ranges	Armored transportation	Total
Renewed	369	33	132	534
Not renewed	3681	205	195	4081

Source: Federal Police, SINARM (Sistema Nacional de Registro de Armas de Fogo), 2007

Links (most available only in Portuguese):

Estatuto do Desarmamento: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil/Leis/2003/L10.826.htm>

English version:

http://www.deolhonoestatuto.org.br/downloads/biblioteca/STATUTE_OF_DISARMAMENT.pdf

De Olho no Estatuto: <http://www.deolhonoestatuto.org.br>

(Website run by the Brazilian Disarmament Network that closely monitors all developments regarding Brazil’s gun control legislation, its implementation, and results)

R-105: http://www.dfpc.eb.mil.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31

(Legislation that defines the Army’s responsibilities regarding firearms)

DFPC: <http://www.dfpc.eb.mil.br>

(Diretoria de Fiscalização de Produtos Controlados – “Controlled Product Monitoring Directorate”, Army agency in charge of authorizing and monitoring the production and export of firearms)

Marking:

Ministerial Act 7DLog (determines the technical aspects of marking guns):

http://www.dfpc.eb.mil.br/institucional/legislacao/Armas_fogo_Classif_Utilz_Marc/Portaria07.doc

Ministerial Act 16DLog (regulates the marking of ammunition):

<http://www.dfpc.eb.mil.br/institucional/legislacao/Municoes/Portaria16-DLog.doc>

For detailed official numbers regarding violence from state public security officials:

São Paulo - <http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/estatisticas>

Rio de Janeiro - <http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/ResumoAisp.asp>

All other states at: <http://www.deolhonoestatuto.org.br> under “Dados e Estatísticas”

CPI do Tráfico de Armas (Congressional investigation on arms trafficking):

http://www.comunidadesegura.org/files/active/0/relatorio_final_CPI_armas.pdf



Institutional Credits

Founded in 1999, Instituto Sou da Paz’s mission is to “contribute to implementation in Brazil of public security and violence prevention policies that are both effective and firmly based on the values of democracy, social justice and human rights, by means of the mobilization of society and of the State as well as the implementation and diffusion of innovative practices in this area”. In order to achieve its mission, Instituto Sou da Paz works in four distinct areas, which are supplementary and integrated: arms control, adolescence and youth, police, and local administration of public security.

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