

9: PROGRESS TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE ON SALW

9.1 INTRODUCTION

International co-operation and assistance are essential elements of efforts to implement the PoA, and commitments to co-operate and to provide such assistance form a key part of Section III. Co-operation at the regional and sub-regional levels was a feature of much action on SALW prior to July 2001, and has continued to develop and expand since then (see Chapter 3). Similarly, both before and after 2001, a number of donors have provided important support for efforts to prevent and reduce SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse. Support and co-operation has developed substantially in a range of areas, including policy development and co-ordination as well as at the operational and implementation levels. The key challenge now for the UN small arms process is to enhance the scale and effectiveness of such international co-operation and assistance.

Section III of the PoA is dedicated to outlining states' commitments towards international co-operation and assistance for action on SALW. This further ties together all other sections of the PoA and the norms that are contained in it. Some 18 paragraphs of this section specify undertakings to take measures including:

- Providing assistance, on request, with the implementation of the PoA
- Co-operation at the sub-regional, regional and international levels to achieve the aims and implement the measures of the PoA
- Development and strengthening of partnerships to share resources and information, and co-operation in implementing the PoA, including partnerships within governments, between states, regional and international organisations and with civil society groups
- Regional and international programmes for specialist training on stockpile management and security
- Establishing co-operation in tracing illicit SALW
- Supporting DDR and addressing development in post-conflict situations
- Exchanging information, on a voluntary basis, on relevant issues and practices, including systems for marking and developments relating to national controls, collection and destruction of SALW

This chapter does not examine the success and failure of all assistance and co-operation projects and programmes. The scope and range of projects and programmes supported and their varying contexts and aims militate against such a comprehensive and detailed assessment. Detailed evaluations of at least some SALW co-operation programmes have been conducted, some of which are available, which we have drawn upon as appropriate. However, there is insufficient information available to conduct such an 'across-the-board' assessment. A significant proportion of SALW programmes supported by international assistance have not been reviewed or evaluated in detail. Where evaluations exist, many of these donor programmes lack effective mechanisms for evaluating outcomes (rather than outputs) of SALW-related or other projects. The focus of this chapter is, rather, the practices of co-operation and assistance as well as identifiable trends and opportunities for improvement.

Overall, it appears that there have been some significant developments and changes in international co-operation and assistance relating to SALW since 2001. But some of these are still at an early stage. The community of possible donors, and the scale of available resources, has grown. Policies and practices of relevant multilateral and bilateral aid agencies donor practice has evolved in useful ways. Assistance is slowly beginning to move away from typical models of Northern patrons

assisting developing and transitional states - towards a stronger web of co-operative assistance relationships at all levels. While this is in its infancy, these first steps are encouraging. The range of projects on SALW that have benefited from co-operation and assistance has also broadened, and regional frameworks for supporting such action have developed. This is further reinforced by strengthened co-operation and capacity at regional levels.

However, the current scale, scope, and foci of SALW action are still insufficient to meet manifest needs. While there are encouraging signs of increased integration of SALW action with development programming and security sector reform, such integration is still limited. Information exchange and co-operation frameworks have not matured as well as they could have in the five years since the PoA was agreed. As a result, states have not been able to realise their commitment to ensure co-ordination, complementarity and synergy in their actions on SALW. The Review Conference therefore needs to tackle a number of issues and priorities in order to strengthen international co-operation and assistance and make it more effective.

This chapter assesses assistance and co-operation in relation to the following questions of importance for the Review Conference:

- How has the donor community, its practice and capacity changed since 2001?
- What have been the priority areas for and neglected dimensions of SALW-related co-operation and assistance?
- To what extent have SALW issues been integrated into wider programmes of international co-operation and assistance?
- Have mechanisms for information exchange and transparency matured?
- Have international co-operation and partnerships with civil society developed?
- Have these developments enhanced the capacity of the international community to tackle SALW?
- What are the priorities for the Review Conference?

9.2 DONORS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES ON SALW

The donor base for assistance to SALW programmes has undergone some significant changes since 2001. The ranks of donors and assistance agencies, and the resources available for SALW-related programmes have grown. A number of new donors have entered the field. The character of international assistance programmes appears gradually to be moving away from relatively inflexible and project-based donor aid to more flexible and sustained co-operation with greater scope for genuine partnerships, including south-south as well as north-south. While such emerging patterns are only in the early stages of becoming a feature of international assistance, these first steps are encouraging. Further, regional and international institutions have become increasingly involved in raising, providing, channelling and co-ordinating assistance.

Relationships of assistance and co-operation on SALW issues have therefore developed at all levels. There are also some indications that support for SALW action is beginning to be incorporated into broader development and governance programmes. The overall amounts of assistance being provided appear to have increased significantly. However, many of these developments are in their infancy and the scale and scope of assistance programmes remain inadequate to the task of supporting the full implementation of the PoA.

Donor governments and agencies have provided substantial quantities of support for SALW programmes on a bilateral basis. This includes supporting recipient governments and civil society organisations and providing funding or technical support to specific programmes. In addition, many states provide non-project specific funding to multilateral and regional institutions such as UNDP, which is then channelled into projects related to SALW.

9.2.1 BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

There is a small but growing base of bilateral agencies and donors providing financial and/or technical assistance to programmes on SALW. At least 26 states have provided some form of financial or technical assistance to action on SALW in other states since 2001. These include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the USA. Many more have participated in international processes on SALW issues and provided mutual legal assistance to other states in relevant frameworks.

While it is impossible at present to produce a reliable and precise estimate of the total value of international assistance provided (the information is not available or collated), a preliminary analysis of the main bilateral donors' levels of support (see Box overleaf) indicates that approximately US\$200 – 250million worth of assistance has probably been provided to SALW-related projects over a five year period. Much of this amount consists of resources provided for post-conflict DDR programmes, which are important and relevant, but disarmament-related action within them generally accounts for a small proportion of total funding. The range of other types of SALW programmes probably amounts to between 15 – 25% this total, including civilian weapons collection, stockpile management and security, SALW destruction, legal reform, border controls, training, research, conferences and meetings, public awareness campaigns, and support for the development national action plans).

Thus such assistance has grown to a substantial scale. However, it remains an order of magnitude less than aid for landmine actions, and is probably only a fraction of what would be needed to meet legitimate and urgent needs in developing and transitional countries. It represents a small fraction of the money spent by the international community on post-conflict reconstruction or combating violent crime, and is incomparable to the terrible costs of small arms misuse during that period.

The amount of support provided by each donor varies enormously, and the majority of aid for SALW-related programmes comes from only small number of donors. Most of the 26 donor countries listed above have provided only quite modest support in resource terms, and in a limited number of areas – both thematically and geographically. Fewer than half of these donors have provided the equivalent of US\$1million per year or more for SALW related or DDR programmes, and there are very few large donors (that have provided sums in excess of the equivalent of several million US dollars per year). Those few medium and large donors that have tended to provide the equivalent of US\$1million or more include only Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

According to information available to Biting the Bullet and in national reports to the UN DDA, smaller donors include Austria, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, South Africa and Spain. Smaller donors' support tends to be targeted at particular activities or regions. For instance, France has provided financial support to SALW work in West Africa by the UN Regional Centre in Lomé, the UNDP's Programme of Assistance and Coordination for Security and Development (PCASED) and ECOWAS' Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP). Several of these donors, however, also provide more general financial contributions to regional and international organisations such as the EU and the UNDP, which may then be used in SALW projects (see section 9.2.3). In many cases, however, such assistance has been quite limited, with support provided to only one or two specific projects. For instance, like many other small donors, China has participated in numerous processes and has hosted a regional workshop, but its financial support has been relatively small, totalling just US\$31,800.

The core SALW donor base: major and medium bilateral donors and their practices (in alphabetical order)

N.B. For the purposes of this illustration, a major or medium bilateral donor is one whose financial assistance appears, according to our information, to have amounted to an average of the equivalent to US\$1million per year or more over the five-year period. Other donors may be on the borderline of this level. Still others may have provided similarly important assistance that has taken a technical form (for which no values have not been estimated), or have provided insufficient data in their national reports upon which to base an estimate.

Australia

Australia is a substantial donor of assistance relating to SALW, particularly within the Pacific region and South East Asia. It has closely co-ordinated with New Zealand on support to the Pacific region and has contributed substantially to efforts to implement the PoA in those regions. In recent years, it has provided support in relation to: the development of law and regulations; weapons collection and destruction; DDR; stockpile management; capacity-building; public awareness campaigns; policy research and trans-border co-operation to prevent or combat illicit trafficking. The main area of support has been in SALW stockpile management and security. Half of all Pacific Island states have received some assistance from either, or both, Australia and New Zealand. For example, Australia has provided seven new armouries in Papua New Guinea, costing US\$2.3 million in 2002 and 2003. It also built armouries in Fiji and, in co-operation with New Zealand, upgraded armouries both in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and built armouries in Samoa. In addition, the Australian Defence Force has provided expert assistance to military and police in Papua New Guinea to destroy surplus small arms and crime guns and, through the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, has supported weapons collection and destruction. Australia has provided support to civil society, for example, research by the Small Arms Survey.

Canada

Canada is a significant donor, providing particular support to destruction programmes, civil society action, national strategies, awareness-raising, and technical and financial assistance to issues such as stockpile security and destruction of surplus arms. Canada directly supports small arms work through Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency and indirectly through the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Also, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has provided technical support for weapons destruction and stockpile improvements in several South American countries in collaboration with UNLiREC.

For example, Canada has acted as the lead nation for a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund Project to destroy 11,650 tonnes of surplus stocks of SALW ammunition, munitions and explosives in Albania. Likewise, it has supported OSCE destruction projects such as ammunition disposal in Moldova. Canada has also provided support to the NATO South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) Trust Fund Project to destroy SALW in Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 and has provided copies of the Firearms Registry Software to UNLiREC that will serve to register stockpiled or destroyed firearms under the 2003 Lima Challenge. Canada has provided and supported expert training on issues such as SALW for DDR practitioners. It has co-funded a 'train-the-trainers' course for police officers from throughout Latin America in the Costa Rica campus of United Nations University (UPEACE), aimed at increasing technical knowledge on SALW. It is expected that some 800 law enforcement officers will receive this training.

Canada has been a major donor to civil society organisations including Project Ploughshares, Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible in Guatemala, Biting the Bullet, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Small Arms Survey, Gun Free South Africa and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South

Africa), International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Physicians for Global Survival Canada, the Quaker United Nations Office, and the Geneva Process.

Denmark

The Danish government has provided approximately US\$7.5million in financial assistance since 2001.¹ This has been provided to DDR projects in a range of countries. The largest amount is US\$3.3million, given in support of DDR in Liberia through the UNDP Trust Fund from 2004 to 2006.

Germany

Germany has been a significant donor on a range of projects in several regions. It has provided financial and technical assistance to a range of projects including DDR, weapons and ammunition destruction, stockpile management, marking and tracing and awareness-raising. Germany has contributed funds to various projects including DDR and disposal project, both directly and through World Bank trust funds. It has also provided support to arrange of civil society organisations activities on SALW. It has supported the OSCE destruction project in Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace destruction in Ukraine and SEESAC destruction in Albania. It has provided financial and technical support to seminars and workshops on border security, marking, and stockpile management. In 2004 the German Technical Cooperation Corporation (GTZ) produced a practical field and classroom guide to DDR, which includes issues and problems which may arise in weapons collection projects. GTZ also provides various forms of technical assistance including: personnel to assist in the training of local specialists; safety equipment; cutting equipment, organisational support and electronic equipment for documentation.

Japan

Japan has been a donor to SALW activities since 2001 but, in the last few years, has particularly increased its assistance to practical projects. It supported a range of workshops, particularly in the immediate post-conference period and has, in addition, contributed financially to UNDP's SALW work, for instance providing US\$1.03 million to the UNDP SALW program in Kosovo in April 2003. It has also provided US\$3.35 million to UN DDA and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for SALW-related work. A considerable amount of Japanese assistance has been targeted towards project support for particular disarmament and weapons management efforts in post-conflict situations. In this regard, the most substantial assistance in financial terms has been the Japanese support for the New Beginnings Programme in Afghanistan (the implementing programme for DDR). Japan pledged US\$35million as lead donor for this UNDP project. Japan's most comprehensive assistance, however, has been that provided to Cambodia. In 2003 the Japanese government undertook a significant expansion of its SALW-related assistance in Cambodia, aimed at complementing and reinforcing the EU's EU-ASAC programme in the country. Thus, in April 2003 the Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC) was formed and began its multifaceted work, reportedly amounting to US\$3.7 million in aid. In addition, the Japanese government has provided technical assistance in police investigation techniques in Asia, and Central and Latin America.

Netherlands

The Netherlands established the 'Stability Fund', from which it can finance SALW projects up to an annual level of €3million (initially this was set at €2.27million but was then increased). This assistance has been provided to regional programmes such as the UNDP SEESAC, UNLiREC, the Nairobi Secretariat and others. The Netherlands contributes to the UNDP Small Arms Trust Fund with both earmarked and un-earmarked funds. In 2004 and 2005 it supported destruction projects in Afghanistan,

¹ Estimate based on figures in 2005 National Report.

Cambodia (through EU-ASAC), Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has supported several DDR programmes and provides financial assistance to Civil Society projects, including the Small Arms Survey, *Biting the Bullet*, the Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), *Viva Rio* (Brazil). It has supported the Nairobi Secretariat, and has supported export control assistance for Ukraine and Slovakia.

New Zealand

New Zealand is a significant provider of assistance, particularly within the Pacific region. A major focus of this support has been stockpile management and security. It has worked with Australia to upgrade armouries in the Solomon Islands and in Vanuatu and to build armouries in Samoa. It has also supported the building of armouries in the Cook Islands and Tonga. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) offers Pacific countries' defence and police forces assistance to improve armoury security and the storage, maintenance and management of their weapons through the Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP). Further, it has been a significant part of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which was deployed in July 2003 and has destroyed over 3,700 weapons. In addition, New Zealand hosted an International Firearms Safety Seminar in February 2006 and is currently assisting with the establishment of a permanent base of operations for the Oceania Customs Organisation in Suva. New Zealand has also supported civil society organisations, particularly through attending meetings and funding research.

Norway

Norway has provided approximately US\$1.5million to US\$2million per year in assistance to numerous SALW projects. This has included bilateral support to destruction programmes, assistance to civil society projects on SALW (including in particular the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) and the Small Arms Survey), funding for UNDP Trust Funds, and OSCE and NATO PfP funds for SALW projects. The largest of these have been bilateral agreements with South Africa on the destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons and ammunition held by the South African Defence Force and by the South African Police Service. It has also supported numerous other projects.

Sweden

Sweden has provided over US\$50million in assistance to projects that have involved some aspect of work on SALW since 2001,² primarily through the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA). Most of this has been in support of DDR programmes and has not necessarily been for the specific SALW projects therein. Nevertheless, this is significant donor assistance that has been channelled to numerous places including Albania, Cambodia, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, SADC, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The Swedish government also sponsored the Stockholm Initiative on DDR. Assistance has been provided to governments, the World Bank, UNDP, UN Regional Centres, research organisations, civil society groups, humanitarian organisations and others. In addition to DDR programmes, this support has contributed to awareness-raising, action-oriented research, the development of legislation and consensus building projects.

Switzerland

Switzerland has provided important financial assistance to a range of projects. In 2004 and 2005 this has averaged around US\$2million per year.³ Much of this has been to research projects of civil society organisations such as the Small Arms Survey, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), and *Viva Rio* (Brazil) and to international meetings processes such as the Geneva Forum and the *Biting the Bullet* Consultative Group Process. In addition, the Swiss Agency for

² Estimate based on Annex to 2005 National Report *Overview* of projects related to SALW 2001 – 2005.

³ Estimate based on figures in 2005 National Report.

Development and Co-operation (SDC) has supported a range of projects with financial aid, such as the 100,000CHF that it donated to the UNDP DDR trust fund for Liberia, among others. Switzerland has also supported SEESAC activities in 2002 and 2003. It has provided technical assistance on stockpile management in the framework of the OSCE.

The United Kingdom

The UK has provided major levels of support to a range of SALW-related projects. This has largely been conducted through the Joint Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) mechanism of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence, which has led to a more co-ordinated approach to assisting SALW projects and programmes than would otherwise have been the case. The United Kingdom pledged £19.5million for SALW projects through this mechanism from 2001 – 2004 and £13.25million for the Small Arms Strategy of the GCPP from 2004 – 2007. This was provided to UN agencies, regional organisations, governments and NGOs to implement the PoA.

Assistance has been provided across most of the thematic issues covered by the PoA, to bodies including UNDP, UNLiREC, SEESAC, the Nairobi Secretariat, ECOWAS, OSCE, SADC and numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The UK has supported national action plans and SALW commissions in Ecuador, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as well as work towards the development of a co-ordinated response to the SALW problem in Sri Lanka, and has provided crucial support to numerous civil society groups, including IANSA, The Small Arms Survey, Geneva Forum, SaferAfrica, and Biting the Bullet. It has funded and provided technical support to a large number of destruction programmes. For example, it has been lead donor of a destruction project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, contributing over £500,000 for destroying a target of 250,000 small arms and 10,000 tonnes of ammunition. Similarly, it has been a lead donor in an OSCE project on stockpile management, destruction and recordkeeping in Belarus and contributes to ammunition destruction in Albania, and the destruction of SALW, ammunition and surface-to-air missiles in Ukraine by NATO.

The UK has a separate and substantial Export Control Outreach Programme, which has held detailed bilateral discussions with seven developing or transitional SALW exporting states since 2003. The UK has also, for example, supported the Transfer Control Initiative and a range of associated regional meetings, as well as other regional SALW meetings and workshops.

The USA

The USA is a major donor in a wide range of areas of PoA commitments, including, in particular, DDR, destruction programmes, stockpile management and security, export control assistance and a range of other law enforcement, training, tracing and related technical assistance.

Different agencies of the US government provide support to different types of programmes. For instance, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) primarily offers assistance in the reintegration aspect of DDR. The US has provided support for such post-conflict projects in Colombia (child soldiers), East Timor, Kosovo, the Philippines and Sierra Leone, among other countries.

The State Department's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has provided technical and financial assistance in destruction programmes in over 23 countries. The budget for these activities has substantially increased over the last three years, with US\$3million per year from 2001 to 2004, increasing substantially to US\$7million in 2005 and US\$8.75million in 2006. Thus far, these programmes have destroyed over 800,000 small arms and light weapons, 80 million rounds of ammunition, and destroyed or disabled over 17,000 Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), with a commitment for an additional 7,000.

The Department of State and the Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) offers SALW stockpile management and physical security briefings and training to countries requesting assistance.

The State Department's Bureau of Non-Proliferation (NP) co-ordinates US export control assistance for 25 countries and is seeking to expand to another 17 under the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) programme. This support includes issues such as arms brokering regulation, legal and enforcement tools. In addition, the US has provided a range of support for law enforcement training, regional agreements, Interpol's Weapons Electronic Tracing System (IWETS) and tracing centres. The United States also provides specialised law enforcement training such as customs inspection and maritime interdiction through the EXBS programme.

9.2.2 NEW SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID

Most of the major and medium bilateral donors are OECD countries and long-established members of the so-called 'donor community'. However, a number of non-OECD developing and transitional states have also provided critical support. This is a significant contribution to the broadening of the donor base of SALW assistance. Such donors can provide useful assistance because they have intimate knowledge of many of the challenges of conducting SALW programmes and experience of ways in which such challenges can be tackled. Most commonly these donors have provided assistance to their neighbours, and therefore often share common understandings of key SALW problems with recipients. Countries like South Africa are emerging as significant contributors to their neighbours, and others such as Brazil have contributed to regional projects. For example, South Africa has provided a range of assistance to neighbouring states through bilateral co-operation and implementation of the SADC Protocol. Operations to collect and destroy weapons and assistance and training for police have been particularly significant. Although most of this assistance has been regional, some technical assistance has been provided further afield; for example, members of the South African Police Force participated in a feasibility study in Nicaragua on the operationalisation of legislation based on South African laws. In Latin America, in 2004, the Brazilian National Public Security Secretariat, in co-operation with UNLiREC and UNDP, created the Regional Public Security Training Center, through which Brazil has been offering training courses and capacity building activities to Latin American and Caribbean government officials and civil society representatives who work on public security issues. SALW is a priority area of capacity-building for the centre.

Assistance from and between developing countries has been small but increasing and is potentially significant. Thailand has provided some training and operational assistance within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and co-operates with neighbours in the prevention of trafficking, but otherwise is not a donor for SALW projects. It is likely that such assistance occurs more frequently and on a larger scale than clearly discernible information suggests, as it may often not be reported as bilateral aid.

It seems likely that the growth of sub-regional and regional agreements and fora for co-operation, as supported in the PoA, has contributed to this broadening of the donor base for SALW. It is thus increasingly the case that relationships of assistance are moving away from typical models of Northern patrons assisting developing and transitional states - towards a stronger web of co-operative assistance relationships at all levels. Although this is in its infancy, and still requires dramatic upscaling and resourcing from the international community, these first steps are encouraging.

9.2.3 MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL AID AGENCIES AND MECHANISMS FOR ASSISTANCE

Multilateral and regional organisations have also developed substantial international assistance programmes in key areas of action on SALW. Among the most significant examples are the EU, the

UNDP, UN DDA and UN Regional Centres, OSCE, NATO and the Stability Pact. As with the practices of bilateral donor relationships by states, regional and multilateral support has built upon foundations established before the UN PoA was agreed and have developed since 2001 (see Box below for description of these mechanisms and their development since 2001).

Each regional or multilateral donor organises its assistance differently. Most of these multilateral and regional bodies rely entirely on specific financial donations from the major donors (with the exception of the EU). In some cases, these funds are given to SALW funds from which a range of programmes can be supported. In most cases these organisations do not maintain permanent SALW funds, but seek to mobilise and pool donors' assistance in trust funds created on a programme-by-programme basis. Indeed, even within more general SALW trust funds, donors often earmark their funds for particular projects. The EU is an important and instructive exception to this dominant model of regional and multilateral assistance.

REGIONAL AND MULTI-LATERAL DONORS

UN Agencies

The UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UNCASA)

The UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UNCASA) mechanism was established by the Secretary-General in 1998. It is tasked with serving as a mechanism for consultation, information exchange and priority setting among UN Departments, Agencies, Funds and Programmes dealing with issues related to SALW. Numerous UN agencies are part of UNCASA in order to work together on small arms issues, and some have jointly supported and developed projects. The UNCASA has recently enhanced its mechanisms for information exchange and co-ordination.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The UNDP is one of the leading international assistance agencies in SALW areas. Its programmes now range over virtually all areas addressed by the PoA, including: support for disarmament and weapons collection and destruction programmes; strengthening legal and administrative controls over weapons; conducting national surveys, and security sector reform.

The UNDP was involved in SALW issues before the PoA was agreed. It has since developed a wide range of assistance programmes on a variety of aspects of implementation of the PoA. It has developed a range of mechanisms designed to assist and enhance action on SALW.

Through its Small Arms Trust Fund (established in 1998) it has conducted country projects in, for example: Albania, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, Niger, Papua New Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, the Republic of Somalia and the Solomon Islands. It also supports regional projects in Central America, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and South East Europe (through SEESAC).

The Geneva-based Small Arms and Demobilisation Unit has provided assistance to a wider range of countries through supporting 25 countries to prepare National Reports on PoA implementation, and, more recently, holding a series of workshops to support a further 80 states.

UNDP - Stability Pact

The UNDP and the Stability Pact established the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) at around the same time as the PoA was established. This

is a regional clearing house to promote and facilitate reduction and control of SALW in South Eastern Europe, and to provide, support and channelled assistance to a range of projects in South East Europe including: assistance to National Commissions; SALW legislation (both domestic and export controls); border control workshops; weapons destruction; safe storage of weapons and explosives; weapons collection; awareness raising and research. SEESAC has emerged as a leading centre for developing detailed good practice standards for the range of different programmes and systems involved in controlling or reducing SALW.

UN Department for Disarmament Affairs

Since 2001 the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN DDA) has periodically responded to requests from governments to provide technical or substantive support in the implementation of the PoA. It is not established primarily as an assistance agency, and thus normally depends on partnerships and ad hoc arrangements in order to respond to such requests. Nevertheless, it plays a useful role, particularly in promoting some precedent-setting initiatives in the early years of the PoA. Countries it has helped in this way include Argentina, Cambodia, Kenya, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka.

Additionally, UN DDA and UNDP have jointly developed assistance tools for states reporting on the PoA. Following requests from governments, two packages of assistance tools were developed in order to build states' capacity to report on their implementation of the PoA. They were submitted to the UN DDA and are available online.⁴

The United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs

The United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has contributed to action on small arms by UN agencies. It is, for example, the implementing partner in the UN DDA-funded project to support the National Commission in Sri Lanka.

UN Regional Centres

There are three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament. The involvement of each of these in SALW initiatives has varied, but has been increasing since 2001. The UN Regional Centre for Peace Disarmament and Development in Latin America, (UNLiREC), based in Lima, and the UN Regional Centre for Peace Disarmament and Development in Africa (UNREC), based in Togo, have been the most active of these centres. However, the Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UN-RCPDAP) based in Katmandu, Nepal has been developing a stronger profile on SALW over the past couple of years – at least in terms of discussions in workshops – although this support is still significantly weaker than what is required. Such regional centres have created clearing house programmes; supported conferences and workshops; provided assistance for weapons destruction; carried out capacity-building and training of officials and assistance to NGOs. UNLiREC has been active in assisting states to review their stockpiles, destroy surplus weapons and upgrade stockpile facilities, co-operate in preventing and combating illicit arms trafficking and co-operate on tracing illicit firearms. Programmes of the UN Regional Centre in Africa have included the Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa (SATCRA), which aims to promote methods for marking and tracing, harmonisation of legislation, information exchange and monitoring, and stockpile management.

Regional and multilateral donors

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Through its Partnership for Peace, NATO assistance has focused on three areas of action: general training, stockpile management, and weapons destruction. Tailor-made projects are established with

⁴ See <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/PoA.htm>

specific Trust Funds. NATO has thus provided assistance for the destruction of weapons in Albania, Moldova and Georgia and, more recently, Ukraine. It has also assisted in defence reform projects in Ukraine and, with the Stability Pact, in South Eastern Europe. Operations by NATO forces in the Balkans have included support for the handing in and destruction of weapons and for weapons searches and DDR in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In addition, the NATO South East Europe Initiative has destroyed 23,223 SALW in Serbia and Montenegro.

The Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE is a significant supporter of SALW projects, particularly within its own region. It has to fundraise for each specific project from member states, and has done so successfully for a number of projects. It has conducted a number of training workshops in Central Asia as part of a programme to promote effective border control management to combat and prevent small arms trafficking in this region. It has carried out a range of programmes to encourage weapons collections and to support destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition in Georgia as well as providing multi-ethnic police training in Serbia and Montenegro. Following the development of the OSCE Best Practice Guides covering a range of key issues under the PoA, the OSCE has provided an important framework for disseminating and promoting use of these guidelines, particularly in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. A particular focus for OSCE assistance has been in the field of stockpile management and in the disposal of large surplus stocks of weapons and ammunition.

The European Union (EU)

The EU is relatively unique among regional organisations in the sense that EU structures involve the regular and reliable resourcing of European Commission budgets for the purpose of providing assistance. Other regional and international bodies depend on more ad hoc funding from states to be able to conduct such activities. Through the EU Joint Action on Small Arms, funded under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, the European Commission has thus provided assistance to: Cambodia (EU-ASAC); UNLiREC; UNDP-SEESAC; UNDP projects in Albania and four projects for weapons collection and DDR in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Tanzania and Sierra Leone.

Assistance provided within this framework totals around US\$3 – 4 million per year. Much of the support provided through the EU Joint Action has been for joint projects, channelled for example through UNDP/SEESAC or UNLiREC. However, it also has important assistance projects of its own. Perhaps the most important of these is the EU-ASAC assistance programme to Cambodia. Established in 2000, this has been a precedent-setting programme, not only for the scale and timescale of the project, but because of the relatively comprehensive design and the flexibility provided by its structure for the programme manager to take opportunities as they arise and develop the profile and approach of the programme accordingly over time. The activities of this project have included national weapons collection; local and regional 'weapons for development' schemes; weapons destruction; registration and secure storage of arms (of the military and police); public-awareness campaigns and the drafting and introduction of laws and regulations to enhance controls on SALW and other arms.

The EU has recently taken another step forward to enhance its capacity with regard to SALW assistance. In December 2005 it agreed an EU Small Arms Strategy. This strategy and its action plan outline a range of priorities for future assistance, including issues, regions, and the need to further mainstream SALW in a range of programming areas such as security sector reform.

Many donors have relied, to some extent, on providing assistance to multilateral and regional donors as a means of ensuring de facto co-ordination and complementarity of assistance, avoiding duplication and enhancing the value of assistance by pooling resources. In many cases this has proved to be

relatively successful. However, there remains much room for improvement. For example, while the OSCE has often been successful in mobilising and drawing together donor assistance for important projects for the disposal of large surplus stocks in the former Soviet states, in some cases important projects have failed to attract donor assistance. In 2003, Belarus requested assistance from the OSCE for the destruction of 300,000 surplus SALW that had been designated for destruction. An initial assessment visit was undertaken in April 2004 by a multinational assessment team led by the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). After a subsequent four assessment visits conducted between December 2004 and March 2005, experts from the UK, Switzerland, Spain and the CPC developed a project proposal on security of SALW stockpiles. Unfortunately, the project has yet to attract donors and in November 2005 Belarus withdrew its request for assistance. Similarly, there are cases in which regional frameworks have been provided with significant budgets but have failed to deliver strong action on SALW with them. For instance, the Programme of Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), was developed by UNDP to support the ECOWAS Moratorium, but was disbanded at the end of 2004 as a result of the feeling among both civil society groups and donors that it was not performing as intended.

9.3 PRIORITY AREAS AND NEGLECTED DIMENSIONS

9.3.1 'PICK AND MIX': THE FOCI OF SALW SUPPORT PROGRAMMES

From the late 1990s to 2001, the range of types of SALW programmes assisted by donors was worryingly narrow. The few donor countries and agencies that were involved tended to support only voluntary weapons collection, weapons destruction, public awareness, campaigns, arms export control systems and workshops. There were various reasons for this, including donors' perceptions that these were of low political risk. In contrast, areas requiring engagement with armed forces that were seen to be the sphere for defence co-operation programmes, such as stockpile management and security were relatively neglected. Similarly, donors have tended to avoid programmes with an overtly political aspect to them but which are nevertheless critical to developing effective action on SALW (such as supporting the development of SALW policy through building the analytical capacity to develop policy within political parties to ensure that they play a role in the development of national policy and practice). Prior to the PoA, donors tended to focus overwhelmingly upon a handful of countries and short-term single-issue projects (such as weapons collection and destruction and so forth). Much of this assistance, while valuable, was not designed to build sustainable action to combat illicit SALW and their misuse.

The commitments in the PoA cover wider ground than most donor practice as it was in 2001. Although some agencies were already moving towards more comprehensive agendas, it does seem that the PoA has contributed to the broadening and consolidation of donor agendas.

While the PoA encourages action and assistance in implementing all of its commitment areas, some particular issues are specifically highlighted in Section III. Paragraph 6 commits states, and international and regional organisations to helping build states capacities in:

- The development of appropriate legislation and regulations
- Law enforcement
- Tracing and marking
- Stockpile management and security
- Destruction of SALW
- Collection and exchange of information

Some areas receive more operational commitments and emphasis. These include:

- Regional and international programmes for specialist training on stockpile management and security (Section III, Para 8. See Chapter 6)
- Establishing co-operation on tracing illicit SALW, in particular by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information (Section III, Para 10 and 11. See Chapter 5)
- Support DDR and address development in post-conflict situations (Paras 16 and 17. See Chapters 7 and 8)

The extent to which international co-operation and assistance has reflected these emphases has varied considerably. However, it is worth noting that most of the main areas of donor assistance and co-operation did receive explicit emphasis in the PoA.

Those issue areas that the PoA highlighted with operational commitments have seen significant action. DDR programmes, stockpile management and, in particular, destruction programmes have been a major focus for donor assistance. However, the specific operational commitments made in relation to these areas have not been fully implemented. For example, the PoA operationalises its commitment enhance action on stockpile management and security by calling for the creation of regional and international programmes for specialist training. While several donor states have provided assistance on various aspects of stockpile management and security and some regional organisations such as SEESAC and the OSCE have tackled these issues, no co-ordinated global programmes for specialist training have materialised (see Chapter 7). Regarding co-operation on tracing, the development of the international agreement on marking, recordkeeping and tracing has been one of the major achievements of the UN SALW process. However, practical implementation of measures to enhance co-operation in tracing has lagged behind the process of negotiating this instrument. Some pre-existing initiatives in this area have slowly continued to develop. For instance, the United States and Canada have provided financial support (of US\$125,000 and Can\$300,000 respectively) for enhancing the Interpol Weapons Electronic Tracing System (IWETS). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have reportedly also developed a prototype IWETS system and donated it to Interpol. However, the development of practical frameworks and assistance in this regard has been unnecessarily slow.

Those areas that were highlighted by the PoA, but were not accompanied by specific operational commitments appear to have received less donor attention. These areas are the development of appropriate legislation and regulations and law enforcement. As noted previously, 68 states have amended some aspects of their legislation on SALW manufacturing and transfer, though few of these requested or received international aid for this. Assisting states in reviewing and developing appropriate legislation and regulations necessarily takes the form of technical expert assistance rather than substantial amounts of financial assistance. Relatively few donors have engaged in this. The USA and the UK are the most significant providers of bilateral assistance in relation to the review of legal frameworks, (but mostly in relation to transfer control laws). Of the multilateral and regional assistance providers, the EU has provided aid for regulatory reform (e.g. Cambodia), and in South East Europe SEESAC has given this significant attention through its arms law consultations.

Similarly, the EU Code of Conduct and associated EU regulations and commitments have been of crucial importance to supporting the processes of legislative reform in new member states. Other regional frameworks have offered important opportunities for sharing technical expertise and learning lessons on these issue areas and international processes associated with arms transfer controls have been important. However, few others have fed practical assistance directly into changes in domestic legislation. One positive development in this area is the emergence of good practice in co-ordinated action for reviewing legislation and improving co-ordination through the process of commissioning a

SALW survey including a legislative review, establishing a national commission to consider the findings and then developing a national action plan to address the problems identified during the survey process (see Chapter 4). While these processes have occurred in 20 states and have been supported by parts of the international community, they remain the exception rather than the rule. Thus, most regional agreements have been important in highlighting issues for reviews of legislation, but many have not provided a strong framework for technical or financial assistance to review processes.

Assistance in law enforcement is relatively common but the tackling of SALW issues within those frameworks has tended not to be prioritised, and certainly has not been well tied into the UN SALW process. It is likely that the tackling of SALW issues in law enforcement assistance (training, assistance in reforms, operational assistance) will increase as states move to implement the more specific commitments and requirements of the Firearms Protocol. Nevertheless, progress on mainstreaming SALW action in law enforcement assistance has thus far been neglected. Likewise, many states claim in their national reports to provide mutual legal assistance. However, there is little public information on how well this is functioning in practice, or the degree to which it is focusing on or facilitating action on SALW.

9.3.2 THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF SALW PROJECTS

Single-issue projects continue to be the norm. A few de facto multi-dimensional programmes have now in practice been running for several years (such as in Albania, Cambodia, El Salvador, Honduras and Sierra Leone) but surprisingly, few new ones have been established recently. This is disappointing, since experience shows that such relatively multi-dimensional and longer term programmes are relatively effective (see information exchange and lesson learning below). Further, because some of these programmes have been multi-dimensional in a de facto manner rather than necessarily by strategic design and support, some opportunities have been lost. Within these programmes, managers have often had to triumph over erratic short-term funding from multiple donors, each with their own complex disbursement and reporting requirements. Further, donors are sometimes only able or willing to allow their resources to be used in only one or two aspects of the programme – thus even relatively comprehensive multi-dimensional programmes have suffered from the limitations of donor policy and budgeting frameworks and practices.

The primary responsibility for ensuring the comprehensive implementation of the PoA lies with states. The primary limitation on the comprehensiveness of action on SALW is the failure of most states to develop a comprehensive strategy for themselves. The donor community has continued to support the development of such national strategies, and this has yielded among the clearest and most significant results of implementation. National Action Plans have been developed for Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda, and is in the process of being developed in Albania. These types of programmes invest in sustainable and comprehensive programmes, ‘owned’ by the government and people of the countries concerned. As experience in this area has grown, the importance of mapping studies, extensive consultation processes, and surveys conducted in these processes has become increasingly apparent. These processes have three further advantages of great relevance to international co-operation and assistance:

- They involve a comprehensive review and strategic plan of all critical areas of needed SALW action.
- They involve national commissions, which should enhance the capacity of all relevant ministries and departments to work together on these issues.
- They are developed by the governments of the countries concerned and donors together, thereby developing partnerships and creating great potential to match assistance to needs.

Nevertheless, both the donor and recipient community prioritising the development of national strategies remain very limited.

Most SALW projects have been small and short-term. Some newer programmes are going beyond this, although limited to project cycles that tend to last one to three years. For instance, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) project for disposing of surplus SALW and ammunition is set to run for 12 years in four phases. This has involved the establishment of a trust fund for the purpose of carrying out the project. Multiple donors will feed into it. In November 2005, the EU pledged €1million towards the first phase of the project, which is being led by the USA and expected to cost €7million over three years. However, this type of long-term SALW project remains rare outside of the comprehensive programmes mentioned above. In most severely SALW-affected countries, the sustainability of action on SALW therefore remains vulnerable to the vagaries of donor frameworks.

9.3.3 REGIONAL FOCI AND SUPPORTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Since the 1990s, assistance for action on SALW has consistently had a focus on supporting regional and sub-regional co-operation. As previously noted, national implementation of PoA commitments has been found to correlate with the presence of such frameworks. In part, this is because of the value of such co-operation, and in part it is because the strong support for their development has built upon donors' regional foci. It is also because the PoA commits states to supporting regional agreements, many of which, or the predecessors of which, were in place prior to the UN Conference. Before 2001, therefore, substantial donor support was provided for workshops, conferences and institutional capacity-building relating to the developing of sub-regional co-operation in SADC, ECOWAS, the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol), South and Central America, Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia, the Pacific and elsewhere. Since 2001, such international support for regional co-operation has continued, clearly contributing to significant aspects of regional and national implementation of the PoA and the commitments contained in regional and sub-regional agreements. Co-operation in some regions and sub-regions has developed well, including in some regions with a recent history of tension or violent conflict between states, including in Central and Eastern Africa and in South Eastern Europe. However, this support has sometimes not been effectively translated into action. Further, and perhaps inevitably, it has also led to the relative neglect of those regions that have lagged behind in the development of regional or sub-regional agreements on SALW. Regional co-operation, and major programmes of national action (with a few notable exceptions) in other geographical regions now attract relatively little donor resources each year. Much less donor assistance appears to have been provided to regional or national programmes in ASEAN and throughout much of Asia (with a few notable exceptions) and in the Middle East and North Africa. This reflects a failure to ensure a comprehensive approach to international assistance as well as more limited opportunities to provide support, arising from limited political will and buy-in to the PoA, and low prioritisation of SALW in those regions. Nevertheless, there are now some important steps towards stronger engagement on SALW issues in these regions.

9.4 INTEGRATING SALW INTO WIDER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES

The extent to which SALW projects can be integrated into wider assistance programmes will be key to enhancing the effectiveness of SALW action, to targeting its impact appropriately and to ensuring greater sustainability. There will continue to be an essential role for SALW-specific aid programmes. But in most countries and regions, SALW-related problems are part of a wider set of problems and processes, relating for example, to crime, governance, development, conflict, peace-building, and security sector issues. It is more effective where possible to address these in an integrated or comprehensive way. Moreover, the resources available to provide assistance for development or post-conflict reconstruction are vastly greater than those dedicated to SALW, and it is important that efforts to implement the PoA can make some use of these larger aid resources.

9.4.1 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

Since the 2001 UN Conference there has been increasing recognition of the need to mainstream SALW activities within development assistance. Action-oriented research and some donor policy has clearly reflected this and built a strong empirical basis for promoting and developing this integration. The OECD Development Co-operation Committee (DAC) recently expended the guidelines for what types of programme assistance can be officially included as overseas development aid so that most aspects of SALW programming can now be included. This increased the scope for many development aid agencies to support SALW-related programmes. Several key donors have now established policy in favour of appropriate integration of SALW and development programmes, though most still have not really done so. However, even amongst such leading aid agencies, practical progress towards such integration remains limited.

There has been increasing awareness and discussion of the importance of strengthening co-ordination between SALW and other programming, and of 'mainstreaming' SALW concerns into wider development, humanitarian or peacebuilding programmes, as noted in Chapter 8. For example, an international workshop was convened at Wilton Park in 2003 by UK DFID with the University of Bradford and Saferworld to examine the links between poverty and SALW problems and the challenges and opportunities for integrating SALW into development programmes. This was followed up with a series of major studies into this issue and an informal series of workshops involving groups of major donors seeking to develop OECD DAC guidance on this issue. A follow-up workshop was held at Wilton Park in April 2006, and the UNDP and Switzerland will host a high level conference on armed violence and development issues on 7 June 2006, hopefully resulting in agreement on a set of important principles (see Chapter 8).

Effective integration of SALW issues and development aid requires substantial development and reform of both development and SALW community awareness, understanding, capacity and communication. They are still two relatively distinct communities.

Mainstream development practitioners tend to have over-simplistic understandings of the significance and roles of arms and conflict for poor communities and developing countries. They tend to regard engagement with conflict and security issues as risky and politicised, and the SALW issue as excessively technical and focussed on arms rather than societal relationships. They are unfamiliar with the range of different types of SALW programme, and their potentially productive links with development efforts. They lack much relevant experience and capacity. They are under strong institutional or procedural pressures to neglect SALW-related issues or to priorities elsewhere. In many cases, the policies or mandates of development aid agencies of international financial institutions still impose strong constraints on what can be done.

Similarly, many of those in the SALW reduction and control communities are unfamiliar with the institutional frameworks and practices of development and development aid programming, or with good practices and procedures in this field. They are often themselves unfamiliar with the issues involved in appropriately integrating SALW and development programming. They sometimes overstated their case. The vocabulary used can itself be a barrier. For this reason, after the 2003 Wilton Park conference noted above, those concerned with integrating SALW and development aid programming decided to focus in this context of the concept of preventing and reducing 'armed violence' rather than SALW controls per se.

If SALW and armed violence issues are to be appropriately integrated into development and development aid programming, they must be specifically addressed in the national development frameworks (NDF) or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of those developing countries in which

SALW-related problems are a serious issue for poor or vulnerable communities or for the country's development. These are the strategic documents that guide the development programmes of the developing country governments, and to which development aid agencies are now committed to respond. Similarly, SALW and armed violence issues need to be taken properly into account in the country or regional strategies that development aid agencies develop to guide their aid programmes. Until recently this was almost never done. Even in countries severely affected by SALW-related violence and insecurity, the development institutions responsible for preparing NDFs, PRSPs, or country and regional strategy papers rarely regarded such issues as a matter for them. This is now changing. For example, Uganda's recent poverty eradication action plan (i.e. its PRSP) specifically includes SALW related issues in some detail. Similarly in Ghana, at least a strong reference to such issues is included. This will enable and promote appropriate integration of SALW and armed violence issues into future development programming. However, without sustained effort and capacity-building (in both donor agency and recipient countries) this potential will still not be realised.

The change in 2005 of OECD DAC guidelines of eligibility for overseas development assistance (ODA), noted above, is strategically important in this context. A number of development aid agencies are restricted to provide only aid to programmes that are 'ODA-eligible', and they use OECD DAC guidelines to determine such eligibility. Most aspects of SALW programming are now permitted, including voluntary weapons collection, destructions, legal and governance reform, public awareness and so on. To contribute to efforts to capitalise on these changes, in February 2006 a process was established through the relevant OECD DAC sub-committee to develop elaborated guidelines on ways to appropriately integrate armed violence and development issues in various contexts. These developments need to be internationally recognised and specifically welcomed, for example in the Review Conference Outcome Document.

However, not all SALW-related assistance programmes are now ODA eligible. Aid directed towards the armed forces remains outside this framework. This severely limits the scope for some development agencies to support military stockpile security or destruction of surplus stocks, for example. The time is probably not ripe to try directly to overcome this through OECD DAC. It is a higher priority for governments that wish to assist countries affected by SALW or armed violence (either conflict or crime related) to ensure that they have put into place mechanisms to flexibly provide aid as required. This requires establishing mixed ODA and non-ODA budget lines, to enable flexibility. For example, the UK and Netherlands have now established mechanism to provide such flexible funding, so that they can focus on supporting the integrated programmes that the partner countries need rather than on their own bureaucratic constraints. This is now emerging good practice, and should be encouraged more widely.

In March 2006, the Norwegian government hosted an international meeting aimed at identifying and examining ways of appropriately integrating development into the PoA. The meeting identified seven priority areas for discussion, including: the community dimension; demand factors; gender and age sensitivity, relations between civil and security forces, assistance to survivors of SALW violence, regional co-operation and international assistance.⁵ It generated some 45 specific recommendations. Among the most important of these in this context are for the outcome document from the 2006 Review Conference:

- To encourage development partners, including aid agencies and international development institutions, to take measures to ensure that they have the mandates, policies, capacities and programme in place to enable them to assist countries in developing and integrating development policies and programmes into which SALW issues are appropriately integrated

⁵ Recommendations from Expert Seminar of 'Integrating Development into the UN Programme of Action process, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway and NISAT, Oslo, April 2006.

- To ensure that the World Bank and other international financial institutions have the policies, capacities and programmes to support such integrated development – SALW programmes in affected countries
- To take measures to overcome organisational divisions between programmes relating to development co-operation and SALW control and armed violence.

9.4.2 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The limited progress in developing integrated programming that explicitly links SALW with poverty alleviation, governance, or post-conflict peacebuilding unfortunately also applies in areas where the links and opportunities are obvious. In security sector reform (SSR), the opportunities for tackling a range of SALW issues are clear – including stockpile management and security, identification and destruction of surplus arms and ammunition and enhanced law enforcement. There are often opportunities for the revision of legal frameworks, for building or enhancing good practices with respect to state use of firearms, awareness-raising activities, weapons collection programmes and numerous other SALW actions. However, SSR programmes have often missed these opportunities. For example, the efforts of the EU-ASAC programme to be complementary to SSR in its SALW projects have been successful in their own right, but other security sector reform programmes in Cambodia were unable or unwilling to become directly linked with an SALW programme. More recently, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia all entered into an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO in 2004, which provides for a range of changes in their security sectors, including initiatives related to SALW. In addition, work on SALW is being considered as a component of the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) process in Kosovo.

There are slow but encouraging signs that this may be changing. SSR is an evolving area of programming and SALW issues are increasingly being taken into account, as practice in implementing SSR is solidified and improved. For example, OECD DAC is in the process of developing an implementation framework and associated guides for SSR that will include the integration of SALW projects within SSR.

9.5 INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND TRANSPARENCY MECHANISMS

The PoA contains a range of commitments relating to information exchange and transparency. Some of these are framed around particular issues, in which information exchange is operationally important. For instance, there is an emphasis on information exchange as a key means of operationalising PoA commitments on marking and tracing, including strengthening mechanisms on information exchange to help with tracing (Section II, Para 11) and voluntary information exchange on marking systems (Section II, Para12). Largely, however, they are more general commitments that are not specifically attached to particular areas for action on SALW. The PoA thus commits states to make public laws, regulations and procedures relevant to issues covered in the PoA and to submit to regional and international organisations, on a voluntary basis, information on issues such as SALW destroyed in their jurisdiction and illicit trafficking (Section II, Para 23).

There has been little systematic implementation of these commitments. No systematic information exchange has developed on weapons and ammunition destroyed, although some states have provided illustrative information in annual reports to the UN DDA, and reports to other regional fora such as the OSCE. While many states have given basic descriptions of their legislation and other controls on SALW in their national reports, only 18 have taken advantage of the opportunity to provide copies of those laws and procedures to the UN DDA, and this has slowed since the first years of PoA implementation (13 of these had provided this information by 2003).

The only global information exchange that has so far taken place at a significant level has been the production of national reports on implementation of the PoA. 135 states have submitted at least one national report on implementation of the PoA to the UN DDA. The scope and regularity of these have varied hugely. 43 states that have reported have done so only once, while only one has provided reports for all five years (as of May 2006). Nevertheless, the level of reporting has broadly increased over the past five years. Most national reports have so far been submitted prior to or during the Biennial Meetings of States (BMS). Assistance has been provided to 25 states in preparing them by the UNDP and UN DDA support project. Further, UNIDIR, with partners, has produced two in-depth examinations of reporting.⁶ These analyses have found that reporting has increased and improved overall, but that there remains significant scope for improvement. While some states have used this reporting and the BMS process to share detailed information on systems and standards in place, and some have identified areas in which assistance is needed, overall the character of information exchange is still uneven, and the utility of information provided has varied. Opportunities for feeding that information into a lesson-learning process have been very limited.

The growing amount of public information on SALW issues from independent researchers is substantially augmenting this system of reporting. This information tends to be more analytic and comprehensive and draws on the national reports and numerous other sources of information. For example, *Biting the Bullet*, in co-operation with IANSA, have produced the series of in-depth 'Red Book' reports, of which this is the latest, on states' implementation of all aspects of the PoA, including action on SALW within the PoA framework and other multilateral, regional, bilateral, and national initiatives.

Additionally, the UN CASA mechanism has reportedly launched an internet-based database intended to serve as a platform for information exchange among its members and for the dissemination of key information and data to member states.⁷ Further, in December 2005 CASA adopted a strategic framework aimed at improving and strengthening co-operation among its members, as well as better responding to requests for assistance from member states. However, no further information on how well these mechanisms are functioning is yet available.

Informal frameworks for information exchange that have enhanced both the depth and regularity of information exchange have also developed. For example, the Geneva Forum (a joint initiative of the Quaker United Nations Office (QUONO), UNIDIR, and the Graduate Institute of International Studies) set up the Geneva Process on Small Arms, in which approximately 30 states and several civil society organisations meet every two months to discuss key issues and experiences of action on SALW. Similarly, there is a New York Small Arms Forum that undertakes similar informal information exchange. Civil society-led processes have also provided key opportunities for information exchange between states. International meetings convened by civil society organisations and governments on issues such as transfer controls, transfers to non-state actors, civilian possession controls, regional actions on small arms, and numerous other issues have contributed to the sharing of information and experiences on those key issues among states and between states and civil society. While such forums and meetings do not involve the production of formal national reports, they provide valuable space for sharing information, building common understandings of key issues, challenges and approaches, and developing partnerships.

At the regional level, information exchange mechanisms exist for a wide range of issues. These, however, remain largely nascent mechanisms with little practical implementation. The primary exception to this

⁶ Kytömäki, Elli and Yankey-Wayne, Valerie, *Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the Reports Submitted by States in 2003*, Geneva, United Nations, 2003 and Kytömäki, Elli and Yankey-Wayne, Valerie, *Five Years or Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports*, Geneva, United Nations, 2006.

⁷ *Report of the Secretary General on Small Arms*, 17 February 2006. UN Doc S/2006/109.

limitation is in Europe. The OSCE Document contains commitments to exchange information on: national marking systems; manufacture control procedures; export policy, procedures and documentation, and control over brokering; and destruction techniques and procedures. Information is also shared on national procedures concerning: stockpile management and security; numbers of small arms seized and destroyed; and small arms imports to and exports from other OSCE participating states. Since 2001, some further enhancement to this mechanism has been made. For example, the May 2004 Decision by the OSCE on principles for export controls on MANPADS also commits participating states to report transfers of MANPADS using the OSCE Document's information exchange mechanisms.

Overall, improvements within the OSCE information exchange mechanism have been gradual. A set of templates was designed in 2002 to assist participating states to prepare their national submissions in a more standardised format. However, increasing the yield of the information exchange and enhancing the comparability of national submissions remain key challenges and the quality and scope of reporting appears to vary from country to country. At the beginning of 2004, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) was tasked with examining the information exchanged by participating states on the implementation of the OSCE Document.

Additionally, for many European states, information exchange takes place through EU mechanisms. Within the EU, the European Council's Working Group on Global Arms Control and Disarmament matters (CODUN), with representatives from the 25 member states, meets on a monthly basis to discuss small arms issues and other disarmament issues. CODUN has been the main mechanism for information exchange on the PoA among EU member states. Further information exchange takes place through COARM, the Working Party on Conventional Arms, which is focused on arms transfer issues such as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (see section 9.5.2).

Other regional institutions have formally developed such information exchange systems, but reporting within them has been less well developed than in the OSCE. In the Americas, UN-LiREC and the OAS Commission for Inter-American Drug Abuse Control have developed the Small Arms and Light Weapons Administration (SALSA) system to serve as both a public and private portal for exchanging information on national legislation and policy actions. Several Latin American states, such as Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, have used SALSA to support their preparation of national reports on PoA implementation. The website also has a private interface where Latin American governments can exchange confidential information related to imports, exports, transit and confiscated SALW, although this does not appear to be in use yet.

In Africa, the SADC Protocol and Nairobi Protocol have provisions for information exchange between their parties. For example, the Nairobi Protocol states have committed themselves, among other transparency measures, to exchange information between law enforcement agencies on illicit trafficking, establish national databases to facilitate information exchange and to "develop and improve transparency in small arms and light weapons accumulations, flows and policies relating to civilian owned small arms and light weapons, including serious consideration to the development of a sub-regional small arms and light weapons register on civilian possession." Further, meetings between National Focal Points (NFPs) have occurred for the Nairobi Protocol states and, recently, for the SADC Protocol states in which NFPs share information.

9.5.1 ISSUE-SPECIFIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Some information exchange mechanisms have been established on specific issues both prior to and after 2001. Issue specific information exchange processes have tended to be better implemented and have seen some significant improvements. In these areas the information exchange process is more clearly linked with particular purposes. This has meant that more systematic and detailed information has

been provided, but it has also meant that much of this exchange is confidential. For instance, information exchange within the EU, the OSCE and the Wassenaar Arrangement is largely confidential.

Overall, however, systematic information exchange processes on SALW have developed only very modestly and inadequately since 2001. In terms of the types of information exchanged between states there have been three issue areas that have received greatest attention:

- Legal/authorised arms transfers (usually of all arms and ammunition)
- Illicit trafficking
- Marking, record-keeping and tracing

9.5.2 ARMS TRANSFERS

At least 23 states publish national reports on their arms exports, although considerably more exchange information on SALW transfers is contained in confidential reporting and information exchange mechanisms within regional and multilateral agreements. This has increased substantially in the past five years, largely as a function of the maturing of regional and other multilateral arms export control regimes rather than being given a particular imperative from the UN SALW process. Reports on arms exports usually apply to all arms and military equipment rather than focusing primarily on SALW. However, increased global action on SALW has led to greater attention and, in some cases, detail in these reports coverage of SALW.

At the regional level, the EU has continued to add to provisions for information exchange in its post-PoA instruments related to SALW such as the Common Position on Arms Brokering. It has also made some steps forward in operationalising and strengthening its pre-existing information exchange within the scope of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. All 25 members exchange information confidentially within COARM, new member states have begun producing annual reports on exports, and a central database, managed by the EU Council Secretariat, has also been developed in order to log all denials issued (which are also circulated to EU candidate countries) as well as the details of bilateral consultations between member states. Additionally, the EU is also considering introducing a post embargo ‘toolbox’, which is to incorporate “a set of temporary procedures which could be applied vis-à-vis countries with respect to which the EU has decided to lift an existing embargo” which are understood to contain a number of mechanisms including information exchanges. This, however, is not yet agreed and is not operational.

Among supplier groups, one of the most systematic improvements in transparency and information exchange has been within the Wassenaar Arrangement. Transparency within this 34 member group has been enhanced since the 2003 plenary agreed to add SALW (including MANPADS) as a category within the scope of mandatory reporting requirements. However, information exchange within this mechanism is confidential, and there is no public information on how comprehensively this aspect of the regular information exchange has developed or how useful it is.

Globally, some states have included a broader range of SALW than are required in the voluntary reporting to the UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers. This voluntary transparency measure has been developing progressively for over a decade, but has recently begun to cover some light weapons such as MANPADS and often includes information on mortars of calibres below its initial 120mm limit. While the inclusion of MANPADS within the seven categories of major conventional arms covered by the UN Register was agreed in 2003 to be carried out on an exceptional basis, a number of states have taken to reporting on them – particularly on national military holdings.⁸ The lowering of the

⁸ 2005 Report on the UN Register of Conventional Arms, UN Doc A/60/160, July 2005.

category threshold for artillery systems from 100mm to 75mm has facilitated greater coverage of light weapons mortars that used to be excluded (such as common 81mm and 82mm mortars). Additionally, some states have provided further information on SALW within this framework, including, for example, Dutch information on SALW exports and imports. In 2005, however, that information was held separately in the UN DDA rather than being integrated into the annual report on data submitted to the Register. While the submission of greater information on SALW to the UN Register reflects reinforced global concern and awareness of the importance of these issues, the Register remains focused on major conventional arms and is not designed for exchanging systematic information on SALW exports, imports or holdings.

In addition to these multilateral information exchanges, a number of bilateral exchanges have developed. For instance, the February 2004 United States – Russian Federation Agreement on Co-operation in Enhancing Control of MANPADS includes a quarterly information exchange on transfers of this type of weapon.

9.5.3 ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

The development of information exchange mechanisms on illicit trafficking has enjoyed some success in a few regions. While no information on illicit trade routes has been made public by governments, it appears that some states confidentially exchange this information on a regional or bilateral basis. This has largely taken the form of ad-hoc information exchange and co-operation rather than annual reporting and systematic incorporation into intelligence-led interdiction.

Some law enforcement frameworks have enjoyed a degree of success in systematising such information exchange mechanisms, but even these have not been as well developed as they could have been. In South Eastern Europe, developments have taken place regarding cross border co-operation among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies. In April 2002, the South-Eastern Europe Co-operative Initiative (SECI) Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime established a sub-group within its Anti-Terrorism Task Force to “prevent, detect, trace, investigate and suppress illicit trafficking in SALW by establishing direct, sustainable and rapid channels of information exchange”.⁹ The sub-group consists of a network of police and customs officers from South Eastern Europe, who share intelligence on illicit SALW seizures. The first SALW seizure information exchange, Operation Ploughshares ran from November 2002 to April 2003.¹⁰ From March to September 2005, following a proposal by Albania, a second, more detailed, information exchange on SALW seizures was implemented under the name Operation Safe Place.¹¹ This operation sought to identify individuals and groups engaged in the illegal trade, transfer and possession of illicit SALW and to collate data on the types of goods being trafficked. Whilst relatively successful, both operations suffered from financial and operational resource limitations.

In some regions, regional information exchange has faltered, but bilateral co-operation has progressed. In 1998, the MERCOSUR countries agreed on paper to a joint firearms register covering all importers, exporters, intermediaries, brokers and vendors, although this has never become operational. However, the governments of Brazil and Argentina, including members of their national and provincial parliaments, have shared extensive information related to SALW and ammunition produced for their owned armed forces that has ended up in the hands of organised crime. In addition, Brazil and Paraguay have worked towards greater transparency and information exchange in order to prevent the illegal re-exports of

⁹ Saferworld Briefing Paper, *The SECI Centre's Activities in Combating Firearms Trafficking in South Eastern Europe*, London, Saferworld, 30 November 2004.

¹⁰ The following five SECI states actively participated in Operation Ploughshares: Albania, Bulgaria, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova and Turkey.

¹¹ By 30 May 2005, seven SECI states had exchanged information under the auspices of Operation Safe Place: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Turkey.

weapons from Paraguay to neighbouring countries. In both of these ad hoc cases the involvement and participation of civil society organisations, the media and parliamentarians has been instrumental in bringing the issue to the public agenda.

New steps are beginning to be taken in other regions towards enhancing such information exchange. For example, in the Pacific, reporting on illicit trafficking within the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO) appears relatively under-developed for some nations but there are some moves towards enhancing these processes. Additionally, the recent EU SALW Strategy commits EU member states to “devise mechanisms approved by the Member States for the exchange of information on SALW trafficking networks, in particular in the context of monitoring UN and EU embargoes.”

At the global level, in addition to the PoA, the UN Firearms Protocol envisages a confidential information exchange on a range of issues relevant to illicit manufacturing and trafficking in SALW. Now that it has entered into force, these information exchange commitments should be implemented. States committed themselves to exchange information on: “organised criminal groups” taking part in illicit manufacturing and trafficking firearms, their parts, components and ammunition; methods used for concealment; methods and means, points of dispatch and destination and routes used in trafficking; and – critically – “legislative experiences and practices.” These commitments are similar to the PoA’s commitments on exchanging information on illicit trafficking, which are as yet implemented primarily on an ad hoc basis. Within the Firearms Protocol, states also committed themselves to other information exchanges. For instance, states are committed to exchanging “relevant case-specific information on matters such as authorized producers, dealers, importers, exporters, and, whenever possible, carriers of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.” (Article 12, Para 1). However, it is not clear that all ratifying states have developed the capacity to effectively engage in these processes. Many states themselves lack detailed information on all of these issues, and the failure of the MERCOSUR mechanism on such information exchange is disappointing. Nevertheless, information exchange in this area should be enhanced by implementation of numerous regional agreements that will build the capacity of states to engage in such information exchange.

9.5.4 MARKING, RECORD-KEEPING AND TRACING

The International Tracing Instrument calls for information to be exchanged on the basis of requests for assistance in tracing and for this to be done on the basis of guarantees of the confidentiality of that information. It emphasises that the information shared should be as full as possible, and that explanations should be given if information is withheld on the basis that it might impinge upon ongoing criminal investigations or confidentiality laws. Further, it commits states as soon as possible after the adoption of the instrument, to submit to the UN DDA the name(s) and contact information for the national point(s) of contact appointed in line with the instrument, and information on the national marking practices related to markings used to indicate country of manufacture and/or country of import as applicable. Finally, states then request the Secretary General to collate the information provided and to issue it to member states.

9.5.5 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND TRANSPARENCY

The UN process has clearly and substantially contributed to the quantity and quality of information on action on SALW that is available. However, most information exchange remains fragmented, ad hoc, and is not well integrated into learning lessons or enhancing the capacity of states and civil society to take action on SALW.

Many international and regional agreements and initiatives have reporting requirements that can create significant challenges for many states that lack the technical capacity to produce reports. While that capacity has been enhanced in many states through the process of producing national reports on PoA

implementation, significant challenges remain in living up to the demands for regular and substantial reporting from multiple frameworks.

It is important to note that information exchange is not transparency. While information exchange has in some cases improved, this has often been at a technocratic level and there have been very few cases of governments providing more public access to information. Indeed there are some examples of states actively working against the movement towards greater openness in SALW control, such as Pakistan and Egypt and others preventing NGOs from participating in the 2006 Preparatory Committee.

PoA commitments in this area are framed largely around the exchange of information that would “contribute to the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.” This aim, however, has not been realised. The provision of limited and often unrevealing generalised or technical information has been equal to, if not more common than, the provision of information in forms, and of types that would contribute directly to the learning of lessons on the nature of illicit trade and the identification of effective means of tackling it by effectively implementing the PoA.

9.6. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND PARTNERSHIPS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

The PoA encourages partnerships between governments and civil society and since 2001 such partnerships have been fruitfully developed in many countries. Civil society groups can contribute across the whole range of measures envisaged in the PoA. It appears that wherever governments have been open to co-operation on tackling SALW issues, at least some local or international NGOs and other civil society groups (such as professional bodies, women’s groups, or community representatives), have proved interested and capable as co-operating partners.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) fulfil many roles in action on SALW. NGOs, academia, the media, community groups and others can be valuable partners in tackling SALW problems. Civil society can act as a generator of ideas, an independent monitor of action and as a partner in implementation. CSOs have conducted surveys and other research, organised meetings and processes to bring states together internationally, regionally, and sub-regionally; contributed to the formulation and design of policy, developed the capacity of states and other civil society organisations to work on SALW, provided oversight to action on SALW; raised awareness of SALW issues and problems; and many other essential tasks that have greatly enhanced and shaped global action on SALW.

At the global level, civil society groups have played a significant role in furthering understandings and agendas on tackling illicit SALW. Both prior to and since the 2001 Conference, civil society groups and experts have been closely involved in the UN process itself. This has involved substantial contributions to the Biennial Meetings of States in thematic discussions; the production of ‘Red Book’ reviews of implementation, and numerous other studies; and participation in other UN SALW processes such as the Group of Government Experts on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (GGE) and the Open Ended Working Group on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (OEWG), and the broad-based consultations on brokering. Similarly, some NGOs have well-developed international networks that enable them to facilitate contacts between donors, international institutions and government agencies in severely affected countries, thus contributing to the development of international co-operation and assistance, as well as to the wider dissemination of lessons learned from experience.

The development of partnerships between states and civil society has progressed well in some places, but remains weak in others. Co-operation and partnerships with civil society have yielded positive

experiences in many countries. In many cases, a well-functioning national commission or national coordinating body with systematic civil society representation or engagement has proved to be a key institution in efforts to develop and implement effective national plans to implement the PoA and similar regional agreements. However, in many cases such co-operation has been unstructured and ad hoc and dependent on the development of relationships between particular NGOs and government departments. Very few states have developed extensive, active and systematic engagement and co-operation between government and civil society across a range of issue areas. Even in countries with wide civil society engagement with government, there are important gaps or distortions in the patterns of engagement. For example, ‘grassroots’ organisations are often relatively unrepresented in national commissions compared to policy research institutes or single-issue lobbying organisations. Systems need to be established to provide wide range of access points according to organisations’ capacities and experience. The great majority of countries would achieve real benefits by moving to establish specific structures to ensure systematic information exchange and engagement across the full range of issue areas.

Civil society campaigns can draw attention to problems with government policies and programmes. Although this criticism is sometimes uncomfortable, the overall impact is generally to help to mobilise political will and to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and develop more sustainable initiatives. However, much support for civil society organisations and the development of partnerships has focussed on implementation, rather than more critical but essential roles. Obviously, substantial NGO co-operation and engagement with government tend to be limited in countries where the institutions of democratic governance are poorly developed or non-existent, or where society is highly polarised. In this context, quasi-official NGOs can also play a useful role, facilitating two-way communication between government and citizens who otherwise lack mechanisms for engagement. Co-operation is easier where both government and NGOs enter into the relationship with some confidence and expertise, and where there are good precedents from partnerships in other areas.

Overall, experience with partnerships between government and civil society on issues relating to the PoA is now sufficiently broad and established that the time is ripe for international elaboration of useful mechanisms and principles to facilitate them with a view to developing an appropriate annex to the PoA at the Review Conference.

9.7. HOW HAS THE CAPACITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT ACTION ON SALW DEVELOPED?

International co-operation has matured significantly in the five years since the PoA was agreed and the donor base for action on SALW has grown and diversified. Its approach is beginning to mature into the early stages of movement towards mainstreaming SALW assistance. However, while the five years since the approval of the PoA have generated considerable experience on supporting action on SALW, the extent to which the international community, primarily donors, has developed its capacity through this experience appears to be mixed. It is through the development of this capacity that efficiencies in co-operation and assistance can grow, and their effectiveness and sustainability can be enhanced.

9.7.1 HOW WELL HAVE INDIVIDUAL DONORS DEVELOPED THEIR CAPACITY TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE?

Inevitably, as donors have expanded their activities in SALW areas, there have been processes of building expertise. However, often such expertise is held by individual staff members and SALW programming is often the responsibility of one or two persons who usually also have other briefs. The turnover of such staff is often frequent, and since 2001 most major donors have been through several

changes of staff, requiring that capacities are constantly being rebuilt. Given that most of the donors mentioned above have struggled to retain technical capacity or institutional memory on SALW programming, the scope for advantageous consolidation through co-ordination frameworks and international programmes is substantial but at the moment, still only potential.

Similarly, as various states have entered the ranks of SALW donors, there have been numerous processes in which new donors try to find a niche for themselves and develop their profile. While various international meetings and workshops have clearly contributed to channelling these processes in a constructive direction, they have been unable (and not designed) to avoid duplications. Further, and most importantly, donors new and old tend to focus on particular types of projects: largely those in which their limited budgets can make a discernible and visible contribution. This has contributed to a focus on public destruction projects, weapons collections, awareness raising and other relatively small scale focused actions.

Beyond individual donors' capacities, the key to the building of overall donor capacity is clearly expressed as an aim of commitments on international assistance: Section III of the PoA begins with an appeal to co-operate to ensure "co-ordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels." Unfortunately, these aims of co-operation have not been met. The overarching picture of assistance and co-operation for action on small arms is fragmented and ad hoc. While numerous positive steps have been made, many opportunities for more effective tackling of the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects have been missed due to a lack of the "co-ordination, complementarity and synergy" recommended in the PoA.

The commitment to enhance synergies in assistance has been neglected. Some donors have made significant progress in this area internally, but synergies are lacking internationally. For example, the UK has developed assistance policies and a Global Conflict Prevention Pool mechanism that has enabled the UK to provide support for a wide range of different types of SALW programmes through a single programme management team that is able to draw on expertise from all of three constituent ministries (Foreign, Defence, and Development). However, few donors have followed this example and developed the types of internal capabilities to build such synergies; and regional and multilateral frameworks are not yet adequate to the task. Most donors have preferred to attempt to achieve such results by contributing funds to multi-donor supported programmes through regional and multilateral frameworks, which has a number of benefits in terms of complementarity of actions (although this remains limited). Co-operating in this way imposes substantial transaction costs on recipients or programme managers and relies on a good level of donor co-ordination, which has been seldom achieved in recent years. Donors have a responsibility to ensure that they have the capability to provide flexible and timely support for implementation of the full range of PoA commitment areas.

Overall, there is considerable need for individual states within the international community to build their capacity and willingness to engage in effective action on SALW. Few donors have dedicated SALW budget lines, and few have established mechanisms within themselves (pooled or otherwise – for example, through better national co-ordination mechanisms) to ensure complementarity in the assistance provided by their various ministries. Further, few have taken sufficiently seriously their responsibility to ensure that their support is co-ordinated and mainstreamed with broader programming areas and goals. Donor support can only be effective where there is real political will and at least some basic capacity to implement programmes to tackle SALW problems. Many states that could benefit from donor support in tackling SALW problems may lack the desire or capacity to manage that support at the current time. The capacity to ensure effective support for action on SALW is thus lacking among potential beneficiaries as well as among donors.

9.7.2 INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR CO-ORDINATION, COMPLEMENTARITY AND SYNERGY IN ASSISTANCE

The growth of the donor base and the broadening of its agenda(s) have made co-ordination among donors and between donors and recipients' institutions even more crucial. Each donor country or institution has its own policy frameworks, goals, priorities, funding cycles and limitations. Co-ordination is therefore an inevitable challenge.

In principle, it is best for the recipient government or regional organisation to co-ordinate the donor assistance that it receives. In practice, this still rarely appears to take place. Many recipient countries have not developed sufficiently strong interest or capability in such co-ordination. 101 countries lack national co-ordination mechanisms, and those that exist may lack the capacity or strategic direction to effectively distribute resources to SALW action. Since 2001, increased international support has been made available to countries to systematically develop both their own comprehensive national SALW strategies and action programmes and the associated national institutions and partnerships that are required to implement these strategies. However, this remains a relatively uncommon feature of national implementation.

Donors inevitably have significant structural power, and are in a position to insist on their own priorities, whether or not these are based on better assessments of needs and opportunities. In this context, some recipients can even be tempted to try to benefit from poor donor co-ordination by playing one against another or through obtaining multiple funding for the same activities. The SALW community is increasingly alert to such bad practices and seeks to avoid inadvertently imposing priorities or allowing duplication. However, strong mechanisms are required for real co-ordination to take place. They are also required to identify cases when SALW control is not the national priority and when insisting that this is the area that a state will support would only contribute to donor distortion of the needs and desires of recipient governments.

The co-ordination of assistance to ensure a degree of complementarity and effectiveness often needs some kind of mechanism involving a lead agency. At a regional level, this can be done by clearinghouse mechanisms. Such mechanisms have proven effective means of co-ordinating assistance in some regions. In South Eastern Europe, SEESAC assistance has developed into a capable and influential co-ordination mechanism for aid. This is partly because donors have increasingly channelled SALW-related support through SEESAC, and it would increasingly be recognised to be bad practice to launch a bilateral support programme in this area without at least consulting with SEESAC. Similarly, numerous donors use UNLiREC as a regional clearinghouse in Latin America and OSCE for the limited programming that occurs in Central Asia. In some other regions, however, the role of regional and sub-regional institutions has not included acting as a clearinghouse. Similarly, at a country level donor co-ordination is often poor until some form of a 'friends of the country' mechanism emerges, where a lead country or agency takes responsibility for convening regular donor meetings and exchanges.

International information exchange should be contributing to co-ordination, complementarity and synergy, and also to the effectiveness of SALW programmes and their integration into broader programming. Information exchange on action on SALW has developed since 2001, and has so far yielded numerous national reports, but little in regard to the foundations of a systematic framework. The critical mass of experiences - at which point information exchange could productively have contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of implementation - has passed. There is, therefore, a clear need for renewed and refined efforts for systematic information exchange mechanisms to be developed and implemented at the global and regional levels.

Information exchange should have a purpose of learning lessons and building capacity to achieve the aims of action on SALW and co-operation and assistance in support of that action. Recent experience highlights two challenges with regard to this:

- Information exchange is not taking place for the wealth of lessons that are available
- Lessons are not being learnt from the information that is being exchanged

Effective identification, dissemination and learning of lessons from experience with SALW assistance programmes is widely agreed to be essential to improve their relevance and effectiveness. However, until very recently, SALW programmes were subject to remarkably little, if any, evaluation and review. Lessons tended to be generated mainly through anecdote, or a few influential studies. In the last few years there has been an increase in activities in this area. Unfortunately, many of these evaluations and reports are likely to remain confidential or be circulated only among a narrow group. There is a need to ensure the wide sharing of such studies and to resource systematic examination of the full range of programmes to draw reliable lessons.

Nevertheless, a number of reasonably reliable crosscutting lessons from experience have already been identified about how to design and implement different types of SALW programmes. These include the importance of:

- Sustainability
- Full engagement with relevant local communities and stakeholder interests
- Appropriate comprehensiveness and flexibility
- Linkages with development, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, security sector reform and related issue areas

These lessons have been widely disseminated. But many donors have in practice been extremely slow to actually learn and apply these lessons and mistakes are repeatedly made.

Overall, the capacity of regional and multilateral frameworks to provide complementarity and synergies between projects has not been well developed. The lack of global programmes to add value and facilitate the aims of donor co-ordination is a dominant feature of the donor landscape, which has grown but remains fragmented and limited. While national and regional frameworks for assistance have developed in constructive ways, there are critical opportunities to make them more effective and minimise their failures. These lie in the development of global programmes, accompanied by a dramatic increase in the scale of assistance.

9.7.3 THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR ENHANCING DONOR CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

The key to effective co-ordinated, complementary and cost-effective assistance will be appropriate frameworks and resources at all levels. The implementation of the PoA, and particularly its commitments on international co-operation and assistance appear to have reinforced the growth of the global donor base and, albeit in a less than comprehensive way, the development of some national and regional capacities for co-ordination. However, national and regional capacities remain under-developed and the lack of global programmes is notable.

There is a well-known need to match assistance to needs. In the first instance there remains much to be done in terms of identifying needs. Nevertheless, overall PoA implementation is already well enough advanced and key problems have been sufficiently well identified to begin practical action where it has not yet begun. Further, many structures already exist that could, and are supposed to, be used for co-ordination with and between donors to enhance the effectiveness of assistance. National points of contact, often supported by and working with national co-ordination mechanisms, exist in most countries but are not fully capable of fulfilling their roles. National points of contact and national co-ordination mechanisms are not merely simple bureaucratic appointments for occasional contact with the

UN system, but are the foundations of implementation of other commitments. In many cases the functioning of these foundations is significantly enhanced by the development of national strategies or action plans. Donor support has increasingly been provided to initiatives developing such strategies and this is welcome. Further, a range of lessons can be learned about how such strategies can be developed (see Chapter 4). National and regional plans and programmes of work should focus on enhancing synergies and ensuring full and complimentary implementation. International programmes in key areas should draw together lessons from the past five years (and more) of experience and developing good practice, and should assist co-ordination and complementarity with a specific focus on building synergies in assistance.

There have been calls for some form of permanent assistance mechanism, for the strengthening of regional mechanisms, and for the creation and strengthening of trust funds. These should be a priority for the Review Conference. In particular, there is a need for the elaboration of what a possible permanent assistance mechanism could look like. It is evident that the need for much more substantial assistance is urgent and critical. It is also clear that greater co-operation and co-ordination is needed to ensure that this is effective and sustainable. These pressing priorities should not be hostage to the development of a single permanent assistance mechanism. If, as debate evolves on this issue, the creation of a single global instrument proves to be slow or problematic, urgent global level action should still take place. This can take place through global programmes on particular areas of programming in combination with enhanced national and regional co-ordination. These will necessarily involve groups of interested states and inter-sessional processes of some type. Whether or not these coalesce into single or multiple (co-operative) assistance mechanisms is important, but is second to the urgency of their aims.

The requirements for such frameworks are already in place. After five years of PoA implementation there is now a wealth of experience of supporting action on SALW, which provides a strong basis for the development of key practical lessons on how to ensure more effective and efficient action. Further, there is sufficient breadth of experience of technical assistance and co-operation to show that assistance on SALW is not the preserve of wealthy nations. Bilateral and multilateral co-operation and sharing of experiences of national implementation is not only open to all states, but is of benefit to the 'donor' as well as the 'recipient'.

9.8 PRIORITIES FOR THE 2006 REVIEW CONFERENCE

In conclusion, therefore, since agreement of the PoA in 2001 by the UN Conference on Small Arms, the broadening of the donor base has enhanced action on SALW, and both good practice and information exchange have developed. However, each of these developments has been much too limited. The capacity of the donor base to provide effective assistance to action on SALW has not been sufficiently expanded to achieve adequate implementation of the PoA's commitments on international co-operation and assistance, or to contribute sufficiently to effectively combat the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. However, there are now enough experiences of donor assistance in critical areas of SALW programming to learn lessons on the effective and efficient provision of SALW assistance. The Review Conference can learn from these experiences and provide for the establishment of international programmes that can achieve the essential co-ordination benefits. Thus the two critical priorities for the Review Conference must be to:

- Encourage a dramatic increase in the scale of assistance
- Facilitate the establishment of practical frameworks for co-ordination, complementarity and synergy

This will require the development of strong and well supported international programmes through a single, or multiple co-ordinated, international programme(s) or permanent assistance mechanism(s).

This should encourage the further development of co-operation and partnerships at all levels, including between governments and civil society, at the sub-national, national, sub-regional, regional and global levels and in relation to SALW policy and operational programmes of action. It should also encourage, where they do not exist, regional and sub-regional agreements on small arms and provide concrete support to their development.

A priority for the Review Conference is to encourage the integration of SALW assistance, where appropriate, into development, security sector reform, post-conflict peacebuilding, and other broader programmes, and should contribute to the development of initiatives and frameworks for achieving this integration. This could include, for example, supporting the incorporation of SALW and PoA implementation into national poverty reduction strategies or organising national level donor conferences for supporting national programmes of action. Such integration needs to include: encouraging the practice of developing mechanisms for enabling flexible funding that can focus on supporting integrated programmes that reflect needs; and ensuring that development actors and international financial institutions have the policies, capacities and programmes required to support appropriately integrated development-SALW programmes in affected countries.

The Review Conference should specify further voluntary information exchange mechanisms on issues that can command wide support, and emphasising the need for these to feed into practical frameworks. In particular it should encourage regional, and possibly cross-regional, co-operation and lesson learning as well as effective, operational, thematically organised international processes. It should agree to create a process to develop international mechanisms for identifying and tracking needs and matching assistance to those needs.